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ABSTRACT 
 
 There is perhaps no issue more controversial in the so-called American culture war than 
that of gay marriage.  In the last five years, four states have legalized same-sex marriages and 
several more appear poised to follow suit.  This paper creates an analytical framework with 
which to evaluate the chances of successful gay marriage initiatives in any given state.  
Demographics, political institutions, and state-specific variables make up the three parts of the 
framework, which is then applied to three case studies in which gay marriage has already been 
addressed: Massachusetts, Vermont, and California.  A fourth case, Maine, serves as a prediction 
state to test the validity of the framework.  The paper’s conclusions indicate that, in the current 
political and cultural domain, there is a set of factors that tend to promote the legalization of gay 
marriage.  The demographics of a population need to be such that they qualify as a “tolerant 
citizenry,” people who are hesitatingly accepting of gay marriage and can be persuaded to 
support that legalization.  On the political side, a positive evaluation of gay marriage by the state 
supreme court that then passes on responsibility to the state legislature is the most conducive to 
legalization.  The court provides the constitutional and legal grounds for gay marriage, while the 
legislature acts as an intermediary between the justices and the wider population.  Finally, states 
in which the constitutions are difficult to amend, and which amendment procedures are 
controlled by the legislature, are the most likely to legalize gay marriage.  The application of the 
framework to the three case studies illustrates this complex process. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“Culture war (n.) – a conflict between societies with different ideas, philosophies, beliefs, 
and behaviors.” 
 -Webster’s New Millennium Dictionary of English 
 
“…The word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.1 
 -Defense of Marriage Act, 1996 
1 
 
 The United States seems to forever be in a state of conflict about who is entitled to 
what rights and legal protections under the law and this fight is frequently dubbed the 
American culture war.  Political scientist Alan Wolfe sees the separation as one between 
“traditionalists, who want to get back to the old-time religion and old moral values, and more 
modern people, who are much more individualistic and kind of libertarian in their social 
views.”1  Since the mid-1990s, gay marriage has stepped into the fray as a defining part of 
the American culture war, and the divide Wolfe identifies is the underlying separation 
between supporters and opponents of gay marriage.  Fervent argument has resulted ever since 
Hawaii’s Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that same-sex couples were equally entitled to the 
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rights provided to couples of the opposite sex, thus marking the start of what would turn into 
an ardent fight about morality, traditions, and equality. 
 The gay rights movement has evolved dramatically in the last few decades, 
from a public need to address the HIV stigma in the 1980s to the current effort to extend 
marriage rights to same-sex couples.  The jump from acceptance to marriage is one that has 
come quickly and as a surprise to many, resulting in a substantial wave of backlash in a 
country that is more conservative about this sort of “moral issue” than many others.  The 
language used by Anita Bryant and other anti-gay activists in the 1970s is echoed in many 
circles today, particularly those using a religious vocabulary to describe and justify their 
opposition.  In fact, religion provides some of the most potent ammunition for opponents of 
gay marriage and other gay rights initiatives.  Despite public opinion being solidly opposed 
to gay marriage and not particularly supportive of alternatives such as civil unions and 
domestic partnerships, gay advocacy groups have charged ahead, resulting in some clear 
successes and other obvious disappointments.  For instance, Massachusetts represents 
possibility for advocates of gay marriage, while the passage of California’s Proposition 8 
undermined the argument that gay marriage was not limited to the liberal Northeast.   
On all of the battlefields of gay marriage-related initiatives, people have come 
together to oppose or support their sides of the issue and the results have been mixed across 
the country.  At the heart of this issue is the question, what factors make a given state more 
or less conducive to achieving gay marriage?  How have those factors come into play in 
states that have already, at least for now, addressed this issue?  What states are likely to be in 
play in the near future and what are the expected outcomes?  In essence, what does the future 
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of gay marriage in the United States really look like, and what does that say about this 
country? 
These are the questions that this paper addresses, analyzing the direction, goals, and 
outcomes of the movement to achieve equal access to marriage for same-sex couples.  The 
country has by and large clung to the traditional understanding of marriage as a union 
between a man and a woman only, as social conservatives have managed to dominate the 
discourse of this issue.  The legal rationales for banning or supporting gay marriage have 
offered distinctly different understandings of the subject, such as whether or not marriage is 
an inherent right, how to define marriage, and what, if any, is marriage’s public function.  On 
the other side, advocates for gay marriage have argued that banning gays from access to 
marriage is discriminatory, but opinion is divided among gay rights advocates because many 
think that civil unions rather than marriage would be a more effective step in moving the 
country in the direction of accepting the gay community and its right to marry.  Challenges 
abound for both sides of the debate; the traditionalists, as the historically positioned side, 
have the benefit of arguing for the familiar.  On the other side, supporters of gay marriage 
have a growing coalition of younger, modern citizens becoming more active in persuading 
the rest of the country that gay marriage is good.  The Constitutional justification for 
extending marriage to gay couples seems to be a very strong one, which may ultimately be 
the deciding factor in how this saga turns out.  Determining how and when acceptance of gay 
marriage will happen is central to this research; by examining certain factors and variables at 
any given time in a particular state, I gauge the likelihood of support for, and the success of, 
a gay marriage initiative.  The goal of this paper is to examine what factors make popular and 
legal acceptance of gay marriage plausible in a given state as a means of evaluating the 
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strategies and circumstances necessary to legalize gay marriage.  This paper assesses whether 
a distinctive and identifiable combination of demographic factors, political infrastructure, and 
state-specific variables raises the probability for or against gay marriage, and thus predicts 
the future of gay marriage in the state in question. 
Like many other issues that struggle with a perceived right on the one hand, and 
conceptions of morality on the other, achieving same-sex marriage has already proved to be a 
monumental challenge, and organizers of the movement have managed to make it a legal 
right in four states: Massachusetts, Connecticut, and only recently, Iowa and Vermont.  A 
handful of other states have civil unions, domestic partnerships, or similar protections for 
same-sex couples.  But while a bare majority of people support civil unions (51% as of June, 
2008), only thirty-eight percent of the populace supports gay marriage.2  In the past five or so 
years, national public opinion has not changed dramatically, but the opinion in different 
states is likely to vary considerably from national polls.  Each state’s combination of 
demographics, political institutions, and other relevant variables will shape its response to the 
question of gay marriage. 
Massachusetts was the first state to legalize gay marriage, by a decision of the state’s 
Supreme Judicial Court in 2003.  There are still many people who cannot adjust to the 
legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts but those people have been largely 
silenced over the past five years in many respects because none of the apocalyptic 
catastrophes that were anticipated came to pass.  Four years later, Kevin Cullen, a columnist 
for the Boston Globe, wrote, “Some who oppose gay marriage are deeply principled. Others 
are bigots. But they share a common cause. Their cause in Massachusetts is dead.  It's over.  
Get used to it.”3  The anti-gay marriage has little traction in the state and has turned its 
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attention to other states in the area.  Nonetheless, what is now the status quo in Massachusetts 
is anything but in the rest of the country.  Why did the effort to legalize same-sex marriage in 
Massachusetts work? 
A precise set of circumstances had to exist that were conducive to the idea of gay 
couples getting married, and it had to be more than simply public opinion.  While 
Massachusetts’s residents did indeed support the idea of same-sex marriage more strongly 
than the rest of the country, the opposition challenged and continues to challenge the idea in 
a number of capacities.  Despite those efforts, however, there have been few successes for the 
anti-gay marriage groups.  Thousands of gay couples have been married in Massachusetts 
since the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in the now famous 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health and the ruling took effect in 2004.  Fourteen 
same-sex couples challenged the fact that only heterosexual couples could get marriage 
licenses from the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, effectively excluding them 
from getting married.  The Court’s ruling determined that such a ban was unconstitutional 
and instructed the legislature to change existing marriage laws to accommodate that ruling.  
The obvious answer to the question, “Why did this effort succeed?” is that the Court imposed 
its judgment and a generally receptive audience and legislature ensured its incorporation into 
the day-to-day of Massachusetts life.  This gives way to the next question: Is the Bay State an 
anomaly, or the first of what will eventually be many states?  In 2009, though universal gay 
marriage is still a long way off, the example of Massachusetts is looking more and more like 
a not-so-distant norm. 
By developing a formula for potential success, I can explain successes and failures in 
states across the country as a means of analyzing the movement as a whole.  Every state has a 
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particular combination of demographic characteristics, political institutions and 
infrastructure, social circumstances, and timing that determine the receptivity to certain 
issues, in this case, gay marriage.  There are four characteristics or groupings within the 
demographic section of the framework: age, gender, religious affiliation, and political party.  
I compare the public opinion numbers from national studies conducted by the Pew Research 
Center to the demographic data in each state’s census.  For example, age groups show 
significant differences when it comes to feelings about homosexuals, gay marriage, gay 
adoption, etc.  Younger people (18-29 years old) tend to be more accepting than the senior 
population (65+).  In June 2008, fifty-two percent of the 18-29 group favored gay marriage, 
while only twenty four percent of the 65+ group felt the same.  Forty percent and fifty-eight 
percent, respectively, opposed gay marriage in the same poll.4  Thus, it would seem a logical 
conclusion, at least taken alone, that states with large senior populations or, conversely, large 
young populations, would respond to the prospect of gay marriage in a negative or positive 
way, respectively.  Voter turnout is a variable to consider when evaluating the demographic 
influence because if people do not show up at the polls, their relative demographic 
dominance will have little influence where issues of gay marriage are decided by voting. 
In order to create this section of the framework, I use the most exhaustive public 
opinion research available on gay marriage, compiled by the Pew Research Center for People 
and the Press, and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.  Not only is Pew data well-
known and respected, it is also the most consistent as far as gauging public opinion toward 
gay marriage over an extended period of time.  Pew has recorded trends dating back to the 
1980s and usually has a new poll every six months.  As a result, I can study individual data 
sets as well as trends, giving me a more complete account of where gay marriage stands in 
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the United States today.  Pew data also goes far beyond the four traits I have selected for my 
analytical framework, which may help me account for inconsistencies or surprising 
outcomes.  In addition, Pew includes the four traits used in my framework in a large majority 
of the surveys, meaning that I have a substantial number of surveys and contexts to consider..  
Using United States Census data from the 2000 census, I collected the gender and age data 
from the three case study states and one prediction state.  Religious affiliation came from the 
Pew U.S. Religious Landscape Survey while Gallup’s “State of the States” series provided 
most of the political affiliation data. 
Demographics cannot simply be considered in a vacuum: political opportunities, 
processes, and infrastructure all weigh heavily on the outcome of gay marriage initiatives.  
Opportunities come in many forms and serve both the opponents and advocates of the issue.  
The 2004 election, for instance, was a political opportunity for the anti-gay marriage 
movement to mobilize in response to and in conjunction with the re-election bid of George 
W. Bush.  In February 2004, sixty-one percent of Republican voters strongly opposed gay 
marriage, and “half [of those Republican voters] would not vote for a candidate who 
disagree[d] with them on the issue, even if they agree[d] with the candidate’s position on 
most other matters.”5   That sort of motivation, particularly in an election year, made the 
difference for the opposition; Karl Rove, Bush’s chief strategist, used the gay marriage issue 
to the Republican ticket’s success that year.  As Karen O’Connor and Alixandra B. Yanus 
explain, “In 2004, eleven states had ballot measure proposing bans or limitations on same-
sex marriage.  Commentators argued that these measures were crucial to mobilizing 
Republican voters, and indeed, Bush won all of these states.”6  On other side of the issue, 
however, was way in which Massachusetts legislators chose to handle the issue; because of 
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the distinctive procedures for constitutional amendment in Massachusetts, legislators were 
able to vote not to put an amendment to ban gay marriage on the ballot. Political processes 
have also played an important role in determining the outcome of gay marriage efforts.  
Unique strategies must be developed on a state-by-state basis because of the different ways 
that the states use democratic institutions to determine law.  Ballot initiatives, referenda, 
constitutional amendments, structure of the courts, and election rules will all affect the way 
in which gay marriage will be perceived and acted upon in the state in question.  For 
example, Massachusetts’ constitution is extremely difficult to amend: to do so would take at 
least three years and require lawmakers passing the amendment in two successive legislative 
sessions before the amendment would be submitted to the people in ballot form.7  Other 
states’ constitutions are not nearly so difficult to change (or to reverse change), particularly 
those in which the legislature plays no role in the amendment process.  Furthermore, most 
Americans do not support amending the United States Constitution: in 2006, the fifty-six 
percent who opposed gay marriage were split regarding amending the Constitution by about 
half (thirty percent for and twenty four percent opposed).8  The hesitation to amend the 
United States Constitution is critical for the future of the gay marriage movement: a 
successful effort to define heterosexual marriage in the Constitution, while unlikely, would 
be devastating to the campaign for marriage equality.  In any event, the strategy for 
advocates at this point remains focused on state-by-state action, and each state’s political 
structure and context will change the strategy when pushing for same-sex marriage.   
The final part of the analytical framework deals with particular variables that might 
affect the outcome of a gay marriage initiative or decision.  This includes previous voter 
opinions on issues of similar character (like abortion), outside influences (funding or 
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organization), and the timing (such as proximity to an election). This component will be the 
most diverse across the states because there is no guarantee that exigent factors would have 
played any role.  I include this section as a counterpart to the other two because it would be 
intellectually unsound to examine demographics or political institutions in a vacuum.  
Underlying both of those components are real people, subject to influences and actions 
beyond what age or legal protocol dictates.  An important instance of this outside influence 
occurred in November with California’s Proposition 8 initiative.  Huge amounts of money 
were donated to both sides of the Prop 8 campaigns, particularly from the extremely anti-gay 
marriage Mormon Church.  In fact, the New York Times explained, “the California measure, 
Proposition 8, was to many Mormons a kind of firewall to be held at all costs,” and as a 
result, the Prop 8 campaign raised more than $5 million dollars in a matter of days, mostly 
from Mormon-affiliated groups and individuals.9  This sort of external influence must be 
considered with the other data in order to generate an accurate portrayal of the circumstances 
in which gay marriage was addressed.  The three parts making up the framework will then be 
taken as a whole and applied to case-study states to test its validity. 
 The actual application of the framework is very straightforward.  For demographics, I 
compare the Pew national data to the numbers collected for each state. If the state has a large 
population of a group that generally opposes gay marriage, then there is at least one reason to 
argue the state is not gay marriage friendly.  Evaluating all four traits will lead to a more 
complete picture of how the demographics of the state are likely to affect gay marriage there.  
The second part, political structures, requires a look at how gay marriage came up in a state, 
be it by referendum or in the judicial system.  The way in which gay marriage became an 
issue of public action initially will then dictate how the political institutions will affect the 
C. Madigan 
10 
result of the initiative.  A vote in the legislature might have a quite different outcome than a 
state Supreme Court ruling.  Knowing how the political institutions function and what they 
consist of will allow for a more complete picture of the circumstances, from the people to the 
politics.  The likelihood that more than just people or the political institutions would affect a 
gay marriage initiative incorporates the third part of the model: variables.  By including a 
flexible and state-specific element of the framework I can develop a more complete analysis 
of what happened and why.  If one did not know, for instance, that a huge influx of Mormon 
money went to the Prop 8 campaign in the last few days and the effects that money had, one 
would have a difficult time understanding why California voted the way it did.  Looking at 
data that better contextualizes events relating to gay marriage allows for a stronger analytical 
framework and, consequently, more compelling conclusions to be drawn. 
The structure of this paper is such that this chapter introduces the themes for the 
subsequent chapters, and the next chapter provides the background and historical information 
that explains the evolution of the gay rights movement, and the gay marriage movement 
more specifically.  I will discuss the history of the gay rights movement as it has existed 
since the 1950s, as well as its goals along the way.  In Chapter Three, I will explain in detail 
the process of developing my framework, why the factors considered are significant, the 
variables that will exist regardless of process, and how the interplay between all these factors 
says anything about the likelihood of gay marriage in the state in question.  Chapter Four is 
the first case study: Massachusetts.  In this chapter, I will discuss the Goodridge ruling, how 
it came to be and the subsequent responses, both political and social, to that decision.  In the 
second part of the chapter, I will apply the framework to the Bay State and discuss the 
implications of its outcome for the broader gay marriage effort.  Chapters Five and Six are 
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structured much like Chapter Four, with a brief history of Vermont and California, 
respectively, and their experiences with gay marriage and the application of the framework in 
those states.  In Chapter Seven, I use the framework on a state that has not yet addressed gay 
marriage and make a prediction as to the outcome.  I have chosen Maine because the state 
legislature will be considering a same-sex marriage bill in the next few months, making a 
prediction timely and relevant.  Finally, Chapter Eight provides a conclusion of my research, 
theories, lessons drawn, and expectations about how this issue will evolve and change as it 
moves forward.   
 I chose gay marriage as my thesis topic for three main reasons.  The first is because of 
its complexity: there is perhaps no “right” answer to the very difficult questions surrounding 
this issue because of the emotional, moral, and legal perspectives one can take in analyzing 
gay marriage.  This range of viewpoints makes a productive dialogue between groups 
extraordinarily difficult.  Furthermore, because many people feel so passionately about their 
perspective, finding a common language and space with which to take part in a moderate 
discourse continues to be nearly impossible.  At the moment, there remains a wide chasm 
between advocates and opponents of gay marriage, and neither side is prepared to 
compromise on their beliefs.  The second reason is how very relevant this issue is today, both 
here in Massachusetts and for the country as a whole.  Advocates stormed onto the political 
stage and have since waged a very emotional and volatile war against opponents who are 
equally strong in their convictions.  The 2008 election demonstrated mobilization on all sides 
of the debate in three states and led to the election of a President who publicly supports civil 
unions but not gay marriage.  Clearly, gay marriage as a goal or threat, depending on how 
one sees it, is not going away as an issue.  The third reason is a personal one: I believe the 
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right of gay couples to marry is a fundamental one and one that is fully consistent with 
American tenets of equality. What I seek to understand are the political factors that will favor 
or block legal progress toward this form of equality.  Thus, my thesis asks when: when we as 
a society will catch up with the progress of human rights.  And that is a question that, despite 
all of the surrounding ambiguity, difficulty, and sentiment, is worth asking.  
The gay marriage movement will ultimately succeed in achieving equal rights for 
gays in the United States.  It will not be an overnight process and there will be, and have 
been, casualties along the way.  There is no question, however, that the American public has 
made strides toward acceptance of a community that has long felt excluded from the rest of 
the country, and I do not see any reason to think that trend will cease.  While there may be 
reason to think success will take longer than hoped or anticipated, I am optimistic that 
tolerance and then acceptance are the future for the gay community.  History has repeatedly 
shown that the culture war is dynamic, and that recognition that a certain outcome does not in 
fact bring the feared consequences, leads to a shift in the cultural paradigm.  I hope that this 
paper illustrates that expanding marriage to same-sex couples will not undermine the fabric 
of American society to those who fear such an impact.  It is appropriate, then, to consider this 
an analytical coming out of the closet. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
 
 
 
“We as liberated homosexual activists demand the freedom for expression of our dignity 
and value as human beings through confrontation with and disarmament of all 
mechanisms which unjustly inhibit us: economic, social, and political.” 
 -Preamble of the Gay Activists Alliance, 1969 
 
“If gays are granted rights, next we'll have to give rights to prostitutes and to people who 
sleep with St. Bernard’s and to nail-biters.” 
 -Anita Bryant, 1977 
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 The gay rights movement is a relatively young social movement in American history.  
More accurately known as the GLBTQ movement (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and 
Queer), activists working towards a series of rights on behalf of the GLBTQ community have 
only been organized since the 1950s.   This chapter provides the historical context of the gay 
rights movement and its evolution into a campaign for equal marriage rights.  This specific 
goal was not on the radar of gay rights activists twenty years ago, and thus a better 
understanding of where that goal came from provides a foundation for the rest of this paper.  
The gay rights movement timeline consists of a several distinct stages.  Beginning with the 
first efforts to mobilize in the 1950s, it took activists more than a decade to define tentatively 
the character of the movement and its people.  Each decade since has had a unique goal, 
creating the clearly demarcated phases of the movement’s growth.  The 1970s were the 
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period of radical gay liberation politics; the AIDS epidemic provided the challenge of the 
1980s; and the 1990s and 2000s have been characterized as a shift towards assimilating the 
gay and lesbian community into the more mainstream of American life.1  The efforts of the 
21st century have been focused almost exclusively on achieving legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships and the rights and benefits afforded to heterosexual couples.  The court-based 
approach dominated early on but in recent years activists have begun to recognize the need to 
couple the judicial strategy with a grassroots educational campaign to broaden support for 
gay marriage.  
Homosexuality in the United States 
The 1950s 
 For the better part of the early 20th century, gay men lived double lives, while lesbians 
were on the very fringes of society.  Derogatory conceptions of gay men ranged from being 
sick and unclean to child predators.  In New York City, the heart of underground gay culture, 
gay men consciously avoided appearing as the stereotypical gay man, one who was 
“mincing,” “giggling,” or “quivering.”2  In many respects, the gay community was a masked 
one, with men acting “straight” in their professional lives and only engaging in the gay 
subculture at night at well-concealed gay bars. In this period, both the government and media 
exploited social fears about the homosexual man and thus perpetuated the prejudices.  To be 
openly gay was to be targeted in the 1950s, and David Eisenbach explains, “For the 
homosexual to feel free to remove his mask to his family, friends, and colleagues, society had 
to change its attitudes toward homosexuality.”3  To change society, however, would require a 
movement of individuals who face an enormous risk in revealing themselves to the wider 
public.  In order to effect change, Edward Sagarin, writing under the pseudonym Donald 
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Webster Cory, published The Homosexual in America, in which he wrote about the 
“homosexual condition” from the perspective of the gay man, the first book of its kind.  In 
the book, Cory writes: 
The homosexual is…locked in his present position.  If he does not rise up and 
demand his rights, he will never get them, but until he gets those rights, he cannot 
be expected to expose himself to the martyrdom that would come if he should 
rise up and demand them.  It is a vicious circle, and what the homosexual is 
seeking, first and foremost, is an answer to this dilemma.4 
 
By establishing a central objective for the movement, Cory’s work touched off the start of 
what would become, over the next decade, the gay rights movement.  Indeed, Cory was 
arguably the first gay rights activist in this period. 
 The majority of the 1950s was spent trying to develop an identity for the movement 
and its activists.  Gay men were found across all spectrums of society; they were black, 
white, rich, poor, powerful, and weak.  Unlike the women’s movement or the black civil 
rights movement, which could root their cries of marginalization on a specific examples of 
oppression, since gays came from all walks of life, it was a real challenge to establish what 
exactly made them an oppressed group.  In Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities, John 
D’Emilio explains that the challenge to the fledgling activists was to bring the gay and 
lesbian community together and actually form that cohesive minority.  He writes: 
Before a movement could take shape, that process [of becoming a recognized 
minority] had to be far enough along so that at least some gay women and men 
could perceive themselves as members of an oppressed minority, sharing an 
identity that subjected them to systematic injustice…Thus activists had not only 
to mobilize a constituency; first they had to create one.  The fact that most of 
them remained unaware of this task did not make it any less critical.5 
 
Two groups emerged to tackle this constituency-creation process, the Mattachine Society of 
New York and the Daughters of Bilitis (DOB).   Several publications emerged in this decade 
to combat the negative portrayals of homosexual culture in the mainstream media.  One, 
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Mattachine Review, and The Ladder gave credibility to the movement’s goals and over the 
next several years, and branches of the Mattachine Society cropped up across the country.  
The challenge facing Mattachine and other activist groups continued to be about identity and 
by the end of the decade, the movement was essentially divided into two camps: a radical, 
Communist branch, and a group working toward more mainstream assimilation.6 
 
The 1960s 
 By the early part of the 1960s, homosexuality and lesbianism (they were still seen as 
two separate entities) began to coalesce in a substantial minority group.  At this point, the gay 
rights movement was known as the homophile movement, and activists were staging protests 
against police harassment and becoming involved in the Democratic Party.  The surfacing of 
gay life in this period led to the possibility of redefining homosexuality and eradicating the 
image of the gay man as a criminal, sinner, or sickly person.7  Substantial progress was made 
in this regard, particularly with the help of social scientists and psychoanalysts, who 
challenged the negative notions supposedly intrinsic to homosexuality.  These efforts, though 
productive, underscored the commitment to work within mainstream society’s boundaries, 
and until approximately 1965, both the Mattachine Society and DOB worked explicitly 
within an assimilation framework; they used legislative and legal mechanisms to promote an 
acceptance of homosexuality in the public domain.   
By the mid-60s, however, a more radical agenda began to replace the inclusionary 
objectives of the earlier movement.8  The stirrings of a “sexual revolution” began to redefine 
the way in which society considered sexuality and an allegiance between the homophile 
movement and the broader sexual revolution was quite natural.  The effort to get civil rights 
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for African Americans and other racial minorities also helped to define the homophile 
movement as an oppressed minority.  At the end of the 1960s, the movement had a new 
identity and all it needed was an event around which it could rally. 
 On June 27, 1969 at the Stonewall Inn in Greenwich Village, New York, gay rights 
activists got their big event.  The Stonewall Riots, as they quickly became known, mark the 
official start of an organized gay rights movement.  In a brief memoir entitled, “The Big 
Bang,” Lillian Faderman recalls the Stonewall Riots: 
[The] Stonewall Riots happened quite spontaneously, on the night after Judy 
Garland’s funeral, when, with their heightened emotions, the drag queens, along 
with a handful of butch dykes at the Stonewall Inn, came to the end of their 
patience with the police raids on Greenwich Village gay bars that had been 
harassing the patrons.  However, at any other time the unrest at Stonewall might 
have been just that and…nothing more significant.  But the historical moment 
was right: It was precisely time for the Big Bang.  Stonewall was an icon that 
provided the drama that had been lacking to capture the gay and lesbian 
imagination.9 
 
The Stonewall Riots cemented the a new understanding of the gay rights movement, which 
emphasized “a positive gay identity and [relied] more on confronting and protest forms of 
collective action in pursuing civil rights.”10  With this new understanding of purpose, the 
movement entered the next decade with a distinctly different set of objectives. 
 
The 1970s 
 The movement’s more radical identity made it better equipped to form alliances with 
contemporary social movements, particularly the black civil rights movement, the feminist 
movement, and the Vietnam anti-war movement.  This also signified a rejection of the 
assimiliationist goals of the early homophile groups.  Indeed, the name “homophile 
movement” was dropped in favor of the Gay Liberation Front  (GLF), implying a 
denunciation of heterosexual society and the limitations it placed on homosexual people.  
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The early founders of the GLF were plagued with semantic and organizational challenges, 
and throughout the 1970s, the GLF waged its battle to promote gay rights with only certain 
degrees of success.  The GLF also embraced a violent radical platform and many of its 
members defected to form the Gay Activists Alliance (GAA) when the GLF leadership 
contemplated a donation to the Black Panthers.  A splinter group in the wider gay rights 
movement was the radical lesbian feminists, who rejected patriarchal society and the 
conformities of mainstream society.11  Another group also emerged in the 1970s: the National 
Gay Task Force, which conceived of itself as a gay ACLU or NAACP.12 
Away from protests, real progress was made by organizing the gay community into 
strong voting blocs and putting pressure on elected officials to recognize gays and gay rights.  
One of the crowning accomplishments of this decade was removing homosexuality from the 
American Psychiatric Association’s list of mental disorders in 1973, symbolically “curing” 
the gay community.  One of its greatest failures was the inability to recognize how the 
mainstream media could have been used to promote gay liberation.  Eisenbach notes, “By 
narrowing their focus to gay media, GLF could not reach enough closeted homosexuals or 
straights to challenge stereotypes and foster the cultural revolution that so many GLFers 
advocated.”13Nonetheless, because each branch of the gay rights movement sought to define 
gay liberation differently and with different means, the lack of cohesion was a barrier to 
sweeping progress by any standard during the 1970s.  At its most basic level, the tension 
continued to be about whether or not the movement ought to be centralized and bureaucratic, 
or about grassroots activism and politics outside of the mainstream.14   
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The 1980s 
 The divisions with the gay liberation movement became even more pronounced 
during the 1980s when AIDS became the central focus of the GLF, GAA, and NGTF.  After 
working so hard to remove the “sickness” stain from gay men, the AIDS epidemic swiftly 
undercut much of that progress.  Those who wanted to deny the AIDS reality and those who 
felt that the only way to maintain the integrity of the gay community was to address the crisis 
head on, caused turmoil.  In the early part of the decade, many gay activists decried those 
who were trying to draw attention to what was called Kaposi’s sarcoma, fearing that sickness 
and homosexuality would once again be linked.  A fear that progress would be inhibited by 
illness overrode the efforts to address the disease in the early part of the 1980s.  Felice Picano 
reflects on 1982: 
Some of us…even as we nursed our loved ones and feared for ourselves, tried to 
awaken our community to the last thing it wanted to hear: that sex was killing us.  
Many activists had fought so long for gay rights that giving up anything won – 
sexual freedom, drugs, the right to go to bathhouses – was deemed as deadly as 
AIDS itself.15 
 
A conscious effort was made to draw attention to the risks posed by unprotected sex and 
clearly marking the epidemic as a problem of disease and not a problem of sex, per se.  This 
was an attempt to sustain the ‘liberation’ achieved while also protecting the people.  In 1983, 
Richard Berkowitz and Michael Callen wrote, “If we are to celebrate our gayness and get on 
with gay liberation, we must stay healthy.  To stay healthy, we must realize that the issue 
isn’t gayness or sex; the issue is simply disease.”16  Opponents of the gay liberation 
movement used the AIDS epidemic as an opportunity to shut down gay establishments – 
bathhouses in particular – as Governor Mario Cuomo of New York did in October, 1985.  
Gay activists were outraged that political officials “stigmatized identities (‘bathhouse sluts’) 
and places (‘AIDS dens’) instead of focusing on risky behaviors.”17  The different gay rights 
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organizations struggled with trying to simultaneously achieve their liberation goals and curb 
the AIDS epidemic. 
 By the end of the 1980s, the AIDS crisis had revealed that one clear route for gay 
liberationists existed going forward.  Urvashi Vaid concludes, “There is no question that 
AIDS forced the LGBT movement to institutionalize, nationalize, and aggressively pursue 
the mainstream.”18  Consequently, the gay rights movement began to reconsider its rejection 
of assimilation and the use of mainstream political apparatuses to achieve inclusion in the 
wider American society.  Unfortunately, this also led to a top-down structure of the 
movement instead of the grassroots activism of earlier years.  This hierarchical configuration 
contrasted with that of its main opponent, the religious right, which was busy constructing a 
localized, ground-up power structure with which to combat what it perceived as the threat to 
traditional society.19  Thus, going into the 1990s, opponents of gay rights were better 
organized to promote their agenda, which effectively stalled the gay rights efforts of the 
1990s as activists constructed and adjusted to the new model. 
 
The 1990s and 2000s 
 The most recent stage of the GLBTQ movement is fundamentally rooted in 
assimilation into mainstream American society.  The central battleground of that effort has 
had two parts: adding sexual orientation to anti-discrimination laws, and focusing on 
marriage equality.  Many activists opposed the national hierarchy’s decision to use the courts 
to challenge marriage laws, arguing that the backlash would be so severe as to undermine any 
advances.  The movement was not positioned to promote the marriage equality agenda in a 
more populist manner, and in 1993, Baehr v. Lewin was heard in Hawaii, resulting in a ruling 
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that determined excluding gay couples from marriage-associated rights was unconstitutional.  
The success was short-lived, when in 1996, the United States Congress passed the Defense of 
Marriage Act, instructing states that they did not have to recognize gay marriages in other 
states, and defining marriage as solely between one man and one woman.  President Bill 
Clinton signed it into law shortly after it reached his desk.  The DOMA was a direct response 
to Hawaii’s Supreme Court ruling.  Not too long after, states began passing their own 
DOMAs.  The religious right actively pushed for these state-based marriage initiatves, while 
gay rights advocates were not in a position to mobilize in opposition to them.  The creation of 
civil unions in Vermont in 1999 led to another wave of DOMAs and state constitutional 
amendments banning gay marriage, which supporters of gay marriage were practically 
helpless to prevent.   There is little evidence that GLBTQ activists did anything wide-spread 
or influential to fight the DOMAs and similar legislation.  They took a let-it-happen attitude 
and then went ahead challenging those laws later. 
It was not until June of 2003 that gay rights activists found reason to slowly mobilize 
from the ground-up.  The United States Supreme Court had heard arguments in Lawrence v. 
Texas, a case that directly challenged the 1986 ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld 
Texas sodomy laws.  The court ruled that Bowers had been wrong when it was decided, a 
rare rebuff of stare decisis.  While this ruling had nothing to do with gay marriage as such, 
Justice Scalia wrote in his scathing dissent that the majority ruling basically paved the road 
for gay marriage as the next natural step on the gay rights agenda.  His conclusion was 
echoed by a large portion of the gay advocacy world, which took this pronouncement as a 
call to arms.  Six months later, another landmark ruling would come down from one of the 
few states that did not have a DOMA, Massachusetts.  Advocates targeted Massachusetts as a 
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prime location to challenge the so-called “traditional” definition of marriage.  In November 
2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 
that equal access to the institution of marriage was the right of all competent adults. In 
response to this ruling, states shored up their anti-gay marriage laws, many passing 
constitutional amendments banning gay marriage outright, another instance of ground-up 
backlash to top-down change.  However, the Lawrence and Goodridge decisions have 
provided a strong impetus for proponents of gay marriage to mobilize for marriage equality.  
They have recognized that a grassroots educational effort to expose the wider public to the 
gay community will improve public opinion towards gay people and its wishes, and aid in the 
effort to assimilate into American culture. 
 
Conclusion 
 The gay rights movement has had a dynamic character over the years and much of its 
work has gone towards counteracting negative stereotypes and prejudices directed at the gay 
community.  Gay marriage is no exception; even though this new focus is more positive than 
compensatory, activists are still faced with the challenge of showing the mainstream public 
that the GLBT community or its desire to partake in civil marriage is not a threat to society, 
families, or traditional marriage.  The rest of this paper will look at the various factors 
affecting the success of the gay marriage movement in the United States. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 “We’re here. We’re queer. Get used to it!” 
 -Jane Shaheen, Slogan for Queer Nation, 1990. 
 
“This reasoning leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples. Justice O'Connor seeks to preserve them by the conclusory (sic.) statement that 
“preserving the traditional institution of marriage” is a legitimate state interest. But 
“preserving the traditional institution of marriage” is just a kinder way of describing the 
State's moral disapproval of same-sex couples.”1 
 -Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissenting opinion to Lawrence v. Texas, 2003. 
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 For a society based on fundamental rights, the United States has lagged far behind 
other industrialized nations when it comes to issues of equality.  Gay marriage is no 
exception.  State-sanctioned gay marriage existed in only two states, Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, until the first week of April 2009, when Iowa and Vermont also legalized gay 
marriage.  The vast majority of states not only do not recognize same-sex unions of any kind, 
they have made an organized effort to permanently exclude gay couples from the institution 
of marriage.  Currently, forty-two states have a statute and/or a constitutional amendment 
defining marriage as the exclusive right of heterosexual couples.  The remaining five are 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Iowa, Vermont, and 
Connecticut.1  Most of the legislative and voter initiatives regarding gay marriage are 
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products of the last decade, primarily following the example of the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), passed by Congress in 1996.  The law provides that no state will be required to 
recognize same-sex marriages performed in another state, and provides an explicit definition 
of marriage as “a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex…”2 In response to the federal 
DOMA, many individual states passed their own marriage acts, some more restricted than 
others, but all limiting access to marriage to heterosexual couples.  The timeline of events 
indicates that most of the legislative initiatives were protectionist and out of concern for a 
change in the status quo.  Over time, however, as people are more exposed to the “normalcy” 
of gay couples, there have been incremental but notable shifts in public opinion on matters of 
homosexuality, civil unions and gay marriage. 
 These shifts have manifested in judicial decisions, referenda, and bills before state 
legislatures, as well as among the populace.  The public sphere and political sphere are 
inextricably connected and it is likely that as one becomes more open to the idea of inclusive 
marriage law, the other will follow, perhaps slowly but will follow nonetheless.  The 
connection between these spheres of American life is the foundation for my framework of 
analysis of examining the likelihood gay marriage will be legalized in a given state.  In fact, 
it is a defining characteristic of democracy, at least in theory, that the will of the populace 
will be reflected in its government, and vice versa.  From this standpoint, the legal barriers in 
place against gay marriage are to be expected, because a majority of people is opposed to 
such marriages.  This does not say anything about the constitutionality of people’s opinions 
or the laws that reflect those opinions, but it is not surprising that an emotional and 
controversial issue sparked such a quick and defensive reaction in the 1990s and again in 
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2004.  A closer examination of the populations and political structures in states that have 
addressed gay marriage specifically (beyond a DOMA) shows that the ties between particular 
demographic groups and their feelings about gay marriage is quite strong, while policy 
consistently reflects these divides.  These two components make up the first two parts of the 
framework I apply to four case studies as a method of examining gay marriage in the United 
States. 
 
Part I: Demographics 
The first part of the analytical framework focuses on demographic influences.  It has 
been shown that groups of people that share certain demographic traits (a religious or gender 
affiliation, for example) tend to share the same opinions of gay marriage.  With that 
observation in mind, determining the proportion of those groups in a state would give one a 
clearer idea of how receptive that population might be towards gay marriage.  To determine 
which demographics to use in the model, I relied on the surveys collected by the Pew 
Research Center for the People and the Press (“Pew Center”), and the Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life (“Pew Forum”).  Pew has conducted surveys about gay marriage 
and gay rights issues for more than two decades.  I focused specifically on surveys that 
included gay marriage from the Pew Center and Forum that were conducted between 2003 
and 2008, approximately fifteen surveys.  While there was some diversity of the groups, 
characteristics, and other variables included in the surveys, four demographic groupings 
consistently appeared and showed unique perspectives within the groups themselves.  On 
these grounds, I chose age, gender, religious affiliation, and political persuasion or party 
affiliation as the four central variables that affect how people view gay marriage. 
C. Madigan 
28 
Age1 
The first variable, age, shows a general trend: younger people tend to favor gay 
marriage while older people tend to strongly oppose it.  In May of 2008, fifty-two percent of 
people aged 18 to 29 were in favor of gay marriage, while forty percent were opposed.  On 
the other end of the spectrum, in the same survey from May 2008, only twenty-four percent 
of people aged sixty-five years or older were in favor of gay marriage and fifty-eight percent 
were opposed. Pew includes the data for four age groups as well as the total population in 
this survey (Figure 3.1). 3 
 
AGE Favor Oppose 
Don't 
Know 
18-29 52% 40% 8% 
30-49  40% 48% 12% 
50-64 34% 51% 15% 
65+ 24% 15% 18% 
Total 38% 49% 13% 
Figure 3.1 
 
Taking into consideration the fact that older people tend to oppose gay marriage in about the 
same proportion that the youngest bracket supports gay marriage is important when looking 
at the census data of a given state.  If a state has a significant population of senior citizens, 
other factors being equal, then the state may be more likely to oppose gay marriage than 
support it (Figure 3.2).   
Another notable element of the Pew age data is the “Don’t Know” category.  The 
youngest bracket, and the most supportive, is the most confident about how they feel while 
the oldest bracket is the least sure.  This would seem to reflect that the youngest part of the 
population has grown up with homosexuality as a more common and accepted reality than 
                                                
1 The way in which “age” is used in this paper refers to only voting-age members of the population.  Thus, the 
youngest individuals are those eighteen years of age or older. 
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their older counterparts.  As we saw in the second chapter, the gay rights movement is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, gaining strength in the 1980s when 18-29 year olds were 
either just born or still in elementary school. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 
 
They have likely been exposed to homosexuality and its related issues throughout their whole 
lives, making them more tolerant and accepting.  In a 2003 Pew Center and Pew Forum 
survey, people who personally knew someone gay tended to have “more favorable attitudes” 
towards the gay population at large, while those who could not name any homosexual were 
the most negative towards homosexuality.4  People who have grown up in an environment or 
context in which homosexuality is part of popular culture or their day-to-day experiences, are 
more likely to support gay rights issues.  This accounts for the discrepancy between the 
comfort levels of the younger bracket and the older brackets from the 2008 study and is 
highly relevant in looking at the state data for my case studies. 
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Gender 
 
The second demographic trait in the model is gender, which shows a somewhat less-
dramatic, but still significant divide, in opinion between men and women.  In the most recent 
Pew data, men were far less in favor of gay marriage than their female counterparts.  While 
only thirty-three percent of men favor gay marriage, forty-one percent of women are in favor.  
Further, more than half of men oppose gay marriage (53%) while a plurality of women (46%) 
is in opposition.5  Perhaps most interesting about the 2008 data is the changes in opinion 
among men and women since 2004, which show that women have become significantly less 
opposed to gay marriage.  Men are only slightly less likely to be in opposition (Figure 3.3). 
 
GENDER Favor Oppose 
Don't 
Know 
 2004 2004 2004 
Male 31% 57% 12% 
Female 33% 56% 11% 
 2008 2008 2008 
Male 33% 53% (- 4%) 14% 
Female 41% 46% (-10%) 13% 
Figure 3.3 
 
The analysis that accompanied this survey pointed out that women were among four groups 
that had notable declines in opposition to gay marriage between 2004 and 2008.  (The other 
groups were college graduates, white Catholics, and those aged 65 and older.)  Although 
there is only a small difference, women also tend to register and turnout to vote at higher 
rates than men do, suggesting the possibility of a greater weight at the polls on this issue, at 
least in some regions of the country.  In the 2006 congressional election, sixty-nine percent 
of eligible women registered to vote, while forty-nine percent showed up on the day of an 
election.  Men, on the other hand, had a sixty-six percent registration and a forty-seven 
percent appearance at the polls.6  The controversial nature of gay marriage is such that even a 
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small advantage in the polls could have a significant impact on the outcome of a referendum 
vote or other ballot initiative.  When activists on either side of a gay marriage campaign try 
to mobilize supporters of their position, that effort is ultimately limited by the size of the 
targeted group.  As a result, demographic analysis provides a better picture of the constraints 
placed on activist groups and, therefore, on the potential of their mobilization efforts.   
 
Religion 
 
 One of the most potent elements of the gay marriage debate is the impact that religion 
has on the character of the discourse.  Individuals of particular faiths tend to reflect the ideas 
from their church, and this is most often in the form of opposition to gay marriage.  There 
have been numerous examples over the last several years of religious leaders speaking out 
publicly regarding their understanding of what the Bible says about homosexuality, and study 
after study has shown that, above all other factors, religion has the most acute effect on one’s 
perception of homosexuality and gay marriage.  This makes the potential for dialogue 
substantially more difficult for a number of reasons.  Firstly, having a conversation in two 
different languages, one of God and the other of rights, is seldom productive.  Both sides will 
talk past one another indefatigably, further alienating those who cannot make up their minds 
and making a productive conversation impossible.  Secondly, religious beliefs do not 
necessarily equate to protection of equality under the constitution, and thus the mobilization 
and campaigning organized and funded by religious groups can often distort the legal and 
constitutional issues at hand.  Finally, the lack of consensus in the wider religious 
communities about gay marriage is a significant part of the discussion, but is lost when 
better-funded and better-organized churches that oppose gay marriage are able to dominate 
the religious voice. 
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 Certain denominations are especially vocal in their disapproval of homosexuality.  
Evangelical Protestants as a group have the highest levels of disapproval and the lowest 
levels of approval of gay marriage, a trend that has remained consistent over several years.  
Both black and white evangelical Protestants are staunchly opposed to gay marriage (79% 
and 81% opposed, respectively).7  White mainline Protestants have a markedly higher 
favorable opinion of gay marriage; in fact, more favor it than oppose it (Figure 3.4).  
Evangelism clearly distinguishes the feelings of Protestants towards gay marriage in a way 
that no other singular factor in my framework does.  As a result, states with a large number of 
evangelical Protestants will not only have a powerful voice of opposition from this group 
alone.  A vocal, well mobilized, and well-funded group can have an impact on the public 
opinion in a given state, or even outside of that state’s borders.  In fact, forty-nine percent of 
white, evangelical Protestants say that gay marriage is “very important” in their voting 
decisions, while only seventeen percent of mainline Protestants say the same.8  Evangelicals 
feel passionately about this issue personally and, perhaps more critically, as a voting issue, 
making their involvement weighty when it comes to addressing gay marriage initiatives.  
Individuals and groups who feel very strongly about their stance are more inclined and more 
able to mobilize around that position, within their communities or across state borders. 
 Catholics share the feelings of ambiguity of white mainline Protestants in their 
opinions of gay marriage.  This may be attributed to the message they hear at church, as well 
as how often they attend worship services.  ABCNEWS polling shows that Catholics are less 
likely to attend church every week than Protestants, particularly Catholic men, only twenty-
six percent of which attend weekly services, compared to forty-nine percent of Protestant 
men. 
C. Madigan 
33 
PROTESTANT Favor Oppose 
Don't 
Know 
Protestant 26% 60% 14% 
White Evangel. 11% 81% 8% 
White mainline 43% 40% 17% 
Black Protestant 35% 64% 11% 
Black Evan. 
Prot. 15% 79% 6% 
Figure 3.4 
 
Furthermore, the same poll notes that church attendance tends to increase with age, 
suggesting a link between the opposition of older people and that of religious people.9  
Significant also is the fact that “those who attend worship services once a week or more are 
much more likely to oppose same-sex marriage (73%) than those who attend less often (43% 
opposed).”10  The link between religious involvement and exposure and opposition to gay 
marriage is striking and undeniable, making the size of religious populations in the case 
study states extremely significant. 
 Another faith group is the non-believers, a group that consists of those who identify 
themselves either as secular or unaffiliated.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, this group shows far 
more support for gay marriage compared to the Catholics and Protestants.  Fifty-eight percent 
of these people favor gay marriage, compared to thirty-two percent who are opposed, and ten 
percent who don’t know.  The non-believers and their perspectives towards gay marriage are 
important to consider when examining the role of faith, and should not be excluded.  While 
the secularists tend not to feel as strongly about their favorable opinions as the Protestants do 
about their opposition, awareness of this discrepancy is important for activists to 
acknowledge and incorporate into their strategies. 
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Political Affiliation 
 The final factor in looking at people’s groupings and affiliations is their political 
leanings.  This is perhaps somewhat obvious, but there are a number of surprising elements 
to this part of the model. Immediately, one must realize that this issue is not as polarizing as 
it might seem; in fact, people across a large part of the political spectrum oppose gay 
marriage.  There are five political identifications used in this section: conservative 
Republican, moderate/liberal Republican, Independent, conservative/moderate Democrat, 
and liberal Democrat.  By and large, Republicans oppose gay marriage more than Democrats 
oppose it.  The only group, in fact, that has majority support for gay marriage is the liberal 
Democrats.  The next most supportive are Independents, with a plurality of forty-three 
percent in favor.  Meanwhile, conservative Republicans oppose gay marriage at the same rate 
white evangelical Protestants do (Figure 3.5).  Recognizing that this is a subject that deals far 
more with people’s understandings of traditions, personal comfort levels, and their lack of 
exposure to or education about gay marriage, than it is about politics, per se.  There is a 
certain degree of circularity in this observation, given that Republicans, for example, are less 
likely to support gay marriage but not necessarily because they are Republicans.  Rather, 
different experiences may lead to affiliate with the Republicans on this issue. 
 
POLITICS Favor Oppose 
Don't 
Know 
Cons. 
Republican 12% 81% 7% 
Mod/Lib Repub. 22% 57% 21% 
Independent 43% 43% 14% 
Cons/Mod Dem. 37% 48% 15% 
Liberal 
Democrat 75% 22% 3% 
Figure 3.5 
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 The Gallup Organization released a recent four-part report called “The State of the 
States,” in which it details a number of observations about the current political landscape of 
the United States.  Using Gallup’s data and other Census data to look at political affiliation 
by state, I will look at the political character of the case study states as yet another 
component of this part of the model.  Other factors to consider in this section are the level of 
intensity of this issue that individuals of each political party feel about this issue, and how 
and when they turn out to vote.  Political mobilization and activism is tantamount to people’s 
party affiliations. 
 
Margins of Error 
 Public opinion is bound to change and may be reflected differently from poll to poll.  
I take the numbers from Pew, Gallup, and the other resources at face value, meaning when I 
compare them to my own data, I do not explicitly account for the margins of error included in 
those polls.  On average, no poll has a margin of error greater than +/- five percentage points.  
For the age section, the fact that the United States Census data does not group people 
together the same way that the Pew Center does forced me to adjust the groupings slightly.  I 
had to make an 18+ group.  The math for that adjustment is noted in the footnotes when this 
part of the framework is addressed for each case study.  In the religion section, I realize that I 
only account for Protestants, Catholics, and non-believers.  I am aware that there are many 
other religious denominations, many of which are pro-gay marriage and active in that belief.  
There is very little data about these other sects, however, and therefore I could not reliably 
include them in my analysis.  Finally, when it comes to political affiliation, there is a greater 
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possibility that the data will be somewhat skewed based on voter turnout (or lack thereof) 
and general political engagement variability for which there is little or no available data. 
  
Part II: Political Structures 
 Demographics cannot tell the entire story of how gay marriage initiatives have played 
out in the United States.  The importance of institutions is tantamount, and activists on both 
sides of the issue recognize that an unmitigated will of the people is a myth.  After any given 
court ruling, legislative vote, or referenda, those on the losing side cry foul on their 
opponents, citing abuses of power and system.  In his 2004 State of the Union address, 
former President George W. Bush made a not-so-subtle jab at the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court Justices, calling on the people to amend the U.S. Constitution in the face of 
“activist judges [who] have begun redefining marriage by court order, without regard for the 
will of the people and their elected representatives.”11  If an institution behaves in a way that 
results in an outcome that is displeasing to some, those people dismiss the effectiveness of 
institutions.  When those same bodies act in their favor, however, those same people that 
regularly decry the institutions, suddenly reverse their earlier feelings and proclaim that this 
time, at least, the institution got it right.  The frustration shown when the court or legislature 
acts contrary to one’s own agenda lends itself to how very important those institutions are, 
and thus they must be considered in conjunction with the people that they serve. 
 
State legislatures 
 At some point, an initiative having to do with gay marriage will likely be brought up 
in a state’s legislature in some capacity.  Each legislature has a certain role in the process, as 
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prescribed by the state’s constitution.  A bill addressing gay marriage may be submitted 
directly by a legislator, as is the case currently in Maine.  If a popular initiative or referenda 
is submitted, the legislature often acts as an intermediary or buffer between the popular 
opinion and law.  This was the case in Massachusetts and Vermont.  Even a court decision is 
bound to be taken up by the state at some point, by way of adjusting the language of previous 
laws or implementing the means by which a decision can be implemented.  In California, 
however, the legislature acted independently of the courts and the people and did not interact 
in any substantive way with the Proposition 8 process.  Acting as the voice of people means 
that legislators are often in the challenging position of having to answer to their 
constituencies but also acting on their own consciences and obligations of office, a real test 
for many elected officials to address. 
 Exactly how a state legislature will impact a gay marriage effort is unique to each 
state, both in theory and in practice.  Each state constitution has specific instructions guiding 
legal initiatives, such as what percentage of the legislature is required to pass certain kinds of 
laws or amendments, and deadlines for those votes.  Both of these elements can be 
significant, particularly on this issue.  There is no question that gay marriage poses a real 
moral conflict for people, particularly those entrusted to make decisions of consequence 
about it.  Thus, how many elected representatives are required to vote to pass a law or 
amendment, as well as how much time they have to do it, may have practical consequences.  
Outside of the constitutional guidelines, one must consider the actual people.  The legislators 
fit into certain demographic groups the same way that the wider population does, meaning 
they are likely to have similar biases or opinions about gay marriage that would then affect 
how they vote.  In addition to their own sentiments, they must consider the demographics and 
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opinions of their own constituencies.  This line of thought also carries into the political 
leadership of the legislature.  A highly progressive or conservative leadership would likely 
impact how the rest of the officials vote, as they follow the Speaker’s lead, for example.  
When looking, then, at the role each state’s legislature played in gay marriage issues, there 
are both constitutional and practical realities to consider, all of which will have an impact on 
how the legislature ultimately acts. 
 
State courts 
 A second political institution that has had an instrumental role, and perhaps the most 
controversial, in deciding gay marriage-related issues are the state courts, particularly the 
supreme courts.  In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa, for example, the state supreme 
courts ruled that excluding same-sex couples from access to equal marriage violated the 
constitution, opening the door for those marriages to take place.  In many situations, the 
courts have acted as restraints on the efforts of activists, providing the legal boundaries in 
which this issue will be decided.  At lower levels, courts have heard arguments and served to 
gauge the viability of the issue in question, and sent the onus of action elsewhere.  Initiatives 
have bounced from the people, to the courts, to the legislatures, and back again.  The 
advocates of gay marriage tend to see state courts as an ally more so than opponents do, 
mainly because the courts, in theory, are required to decide on legal merit and not public 
opinion (though the dissenting justices in California may have suggested that public opinion 
is a legitimate concern).  Opponents, on the other hand, know that they have public opinion 
in their favor (for the time being), and thus prefer to advocate putting the marriage question 
to the people.  This dynamic is precisely where the “activist judges” mantra comes from in 
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Bush’s State of the Union address.  The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the legal 
arguments for and against gay marriage, but rather to place the institution responsible for 
making that decision within a framework that properly evaluates the players in the gay 
marriage debate.  The courts are a political institution, and thus figure into my framework to 
see precisely what role they will play in the outcome of this debate. 
An analysis of the courts has two basic parts to consider: the constitutional 
framework for the decisions, both majority and dissent; and the justices as political entities.   
The goal of the gay marriage effort is, specifically, to allow marriages between same-sex 
couples to be legally recognized by the state apparatus.  Practically, this means equal 
recognition of the relationship and the rights afforded to married heterosexual couples.  As a 
matter of principle, it means recognizing that homosexuals are equal to heterosexuals and 
ending the perceived discrimination against the former.  The courts, as the country’s 
judiciary branch, clearly have a significant role is this process: interpreting pre-existing laws 
and deciding whether or not the advocates of gay marriage have a constitutionally legitimate 
claim.  In my analysis, the majority and minority opinions of major gay marriage cases have 
been based on a few different legal rationales: right to privacy, right to marriage, deference to 
the people and legislatures, and the civil union alternative.  The court may view these 
elements radically differently, either between states or within the court itself.  These 
differences are accounted for by assessing the judiciary, particularly the high courts of the 
state, as political entities. 
Justices get their jobs by either appointment or election.  In either case, politics 
almost inevitably plays a part in the way in which a judge gets to the bench.  This does not de 
facto translate into a politically biased judiciary by any means, but because there are some 
C. Madigan 
40 
prescriptions on court power, justices must at least consider their actions in the greater 
political context.  In the case of justices appointed by the governor or other political 
leadership, a very conservative or very liberal governor might select appointees based on an 
ideologically similar background under the assumption that they would rule in a way the 
governor favors.  Concerns about impeachment are also viable; if the judiciary radically 
departs from the will of the people, the possibility that a justice could be impeached exists, 
though there is a smaller likelihood of this.  Finally, the justices themselves are the greatest 
question mark in this discussion.  They could rule on seemingly political grounds, or deviate 
from previous tendencies on certain kinds of issues.  There is no guaranteed way of 
predicting how a judge will rule, and that makes the court perhaps the most interesting 
element in the fight for marriage equality. 
 
Political leadership 
 Those running a state government play a smaller role in determining the outcome of 
marriage initiatives, but they are important nonetheless.  A state governor has a hand in 
dictating the flow of political processes in his or her state, and is in a position to lend support 
to either side of the effort.  A governor also has to sign bills into law, meaning that a well-
chosen veto could really throw a wrench into a given initiative, as Schwarzenegger proved in 
California.  Leadership within the legislature is also important.  Speakers of the House, for 
instance, make strategic choices about the schedule and content of House sessions, which can 
be instrumental in the success of a bill, as we will see in the chapter about Massachusetts.  
The leadership is also influential when it comes to assembling coalitions in support of or 
opposition to an initiative, particularly of junior legislators.  The elected officials who are 
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willing to introduce and/or sponsor bills also qualify as political leaders, as they put their 
reputations on the line for an issue that is highly controversial and emotionally evocative.  
The individuals who act as political leaders may very well change the character of a debate in 
an irrevocable manner, affecting the long-term prospects of gay marriage in that state and 
beyond. 
 
Part III: Variables 
 The third and final part of my model is about the variables in the pro and anti gay 
marriage movements.  Simply put, an outcome cannot be determined by demographics and 
political institutions alone.  Rather, there are unique pieces that, while perhaps tied to the first 
two parts of the framework, act independently and unpredictably.  Time is the most obvious 
and perhaps most important variable to consider.  When a bill or referenda is proposed 
matters, as does the timing of the next election, for instance.  The election matters, as well.  If 
it is a major election-one with notable positions to be filled-there may be a larger turnout, 
influencing the voter dynamic.  This may also hold true for an election where gay marriage is 
only one of a number of issues about which a certain voter bloc feels passionately, potentially 
tipping the scales for or against the proposition in question.  Social and financial capital are 
important variables to consider.  The ways in which a group structures itself and mobilizes on 
a particular issue tend to determine how effective that group is at getting its position across.  
Bringing in the best minds and creating the most brilliant advertising scheme (among other 
things) requires money, and a lot of it.  Opponents of gay marriage have proven particularly 
adept at fundraising, which may have tipped the scales in California in 2008.  In the case 
study chapters, emphasis will be placed on three variables – timing, social capital, and 
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previous history of anti-discrimination laws – but other factors in state-specific scenarios will 
also be considered. 
 
Conclusion 
 The analytical framework explained in this chapter consists of three fundamental 
parts: demographics, political structures, and variables.  In order to see how this construction 
unfolds in practice, the rest of this paper will apply the model to four state case studies, the 
first three of which have already dealt with a specific gay marriage-related initiative, and 
ruled definitively on it.  While the outcomes of these decisions are not set in stone, I chose 
the states included in part because of the unambiguous nature of the decisions at the time.  
Massachusetts has had gay marriage for the better part of five years now and there is little 
indication that things will change any time soon.  More than a decade has passed since 
Vermont created civil unions as a legal alternative to marriage, and that state’s status quo has 
remained static over the years.  California voted on gay marriage in the 2008 election, 
making their responses the most recent and the most dynamic.  California passed Proposition 
8 by only the slimmest of margins, leaving ample room for continued discourse and action on 
this issue.  I will look at each state in turn and, using the model as a lens, analyze the gay 
marriage trajectory in order to determine what the right mix of factors is to legalize same-sex 
marriage. 
 The fourth case study in this paper is Maine, which currently has a DOMA, but is 
going to take up sponsored legislation sometime in the spring that would legalize same-sex 
marriage.  If the effort succeeds, New England would be a sort of haven for gay couples, with 
all six of those states protecting same-sex unions in some capacity; Massachusetts, 
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Connecticut, Vermont, and Maine all with gay marriage, and the other states considering 
similar legislation.  I will use my framework to predict how the Maine legislature will rule on 
the issue; thus, Maine is my prediction state.  With the data and analysis from the four case 
studies, I will have a more complete picture of exactly what it will take to achieve marriage 
equality in this country. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
MASSACHUSETTS 
 
 
 
 
 “Apparently, there! were people in a Congressional district in Indiana who now expected 
me to produce a "radical homosexual agenda." And I didn't have one. I do have things I 
would like to see adopted on behalf of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people: they 
include the right to marry the individual of our choice; the right to serve in the military to 
defend our country; and the right to a job based solely on our own qualifications. I 
acknowledge that this is an agenda, but I do not think that any self-respecting radical in 
history would have considered advocating people's rights to get married, join the army, 
and earn a living as a terribly inspiring revolutionary platform.” 
 -Congressman Barney Frank, D-MA, Christian Science Monitor, 2008 
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 The success of the gay marriage effort in Massachusetts in many ways defines and 
maintains the efforts to achieve legalization in the rest of the country.  Though it is 
impossible say exactly what would have happened had the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
ruled against the plaintiffs, there is no doubt that ruling in their favor gave a boost to 
advocates.  In effect, Massachusetts provided a surge in morale, an example of success, and a 
basis for showing the rest of the country that allowing gay marriage does not undermine the 
very fabric of society.  Massachusetts was in some sense a fairly obvious place to push for 
marriage equality.  There are few states that can match Massachusetts for progressivism, with 
its very liberal population and Democrat-dominated Congress and Supreme Court.  The 
people tend to be well educated and not particularly religious, significant traits when dealing 
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with an issue such as gay marriage.  The gay marriage effort in Massachusetts began with 
seven couples challenging the denial of marriage licenses from the state, resulting in the 
now-famous case, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.  After the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the couples, the issue was effectively passed on to the 
legislature for further action.  Gay couples began getting married while opponents of the 
ruling collected signatures for two state constitutional amendments, both of which ultimately 
failed in the legislature.  Currently, gay marriage has become a largely accepted fact in 
Massachusetts, and it seems unlikely that efforts to make it illegal will be successful or even 
promoted from now on.  There is ample evidence that the example provided by 
Massachusetts led to the successful legalizations of gay marriage in Connecticut and 
Vermont.  That successful outcome stemmed directly from the people of Massachusetts and 
its political institutions, and the second part of this chapter will analyze those factors at 
length, using the framework developed in Chapter Three.  The events that make up the gay 
marriage timeline in Massachusetts are all specifically tied to the unique context in which 
they occurred, a clear product of the people and institutions that make up the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts. 
 
Why Massachusetts? 
In 2001, seven Massachusetts same-sex couples went to their respective town clerks 
and applied for marriage licenses, which were denied.  They subsequently sued the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health, responsible for administering the marriage 
licenses, in Suffolk Superior Court.  Superior Court Judge Thomas E. Connolly threw out the 
case, saying that there was no constitutional rationale for assuming marriage is a right.  
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Connolly wrote, “This court cannot conclude that a ‘right’ to same-sex marriage is so rooted 
in the traditions and collective conscience of our people that a failure to recognize it would 
violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and 
political institutions.  Neither…is a right to same-sex marriage…implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed.”1  
Connolly made clear that the issue was one for the legislature and not the courts, but the 
seven couples appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which agreed to hear 
the case. 
The SJC’s willingness to hear the plaintiff’s case drew national and international 
attention.  A number of state attorney generals from other states opposed the plaintiffs, 
including the AGs from Utah, Nebraska, and South Dakota, while many state bar 
associations supported them.2  Until 2003, same-sex marriage had become a back-burner 
issue in the early years of the 21st century.  The Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs) had 
been passed, civil unions had been created in Vermont, and gay couples resorted to settling 
for alternatives to marriage.  When the seven couples applied for marriage licenses, there had 
clearly been efforts set in motion by the law firm Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders 
(GLAD), among others.  On its website, GLAD explains the reasoning behind its decision to 
push for gay marriage in Massachusetts: 
GLAD filed this suit in order to protect these couples, and in some cases, their 
children, with the legal framework of protections and obligations offered only by 
civil marriage. Massachusetts has a strong track record of civil rights leadership on 
many issues. Residents of Massachusetts know that gay and lesbian families are part 
of the fabric of the Commonwealth and the majority believes in fairness and equality 
for LGBT people. The state Constitution contains strong equality guarantees and the 
Court has consistently treated the Constitution as offering protections to minorities. 
The Legislature has also passed laws on issues of concern to LGBT people, 
including job protection, hate crimes, and student rights.3 
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GLAD makes explicit that choosing the right mattered when it came to pressing forward with 
a marriage lawsuit.  The explanation provided simply would not hold true in a large number 
of other states, particularly the legal and historical placement of civil rights found in 
Massachusetts.  For the purpose of this paper, it is also significant that GLAD identifies both 
people and political institutions as equally important elements of its approach.   
 With the representation of the GLAD attorneys, the seven couples pressed forward 
and appealed Connolly’s ruling to the Supreme Judicial Court.  A large number of amicus 
briefs were filed in the case by a diversity of individuals and groups, which provide insight 
about the positions taken by the opposing sides.  One brief was filed by a coalition of anti 
same-sex marriage groups, led by the Massachusetts Family Institute (MFI), the leading 
opposition group to same-sex marriage legalization.  Though the brief was filed after the SJC 
had ruled on Goodridge, its content helps clarify the argument against the plaintiffs.  The 
brief’s argument has three tenets, the first of which is that “the Goodridge decision upsets the 
constitutionally mandated balance between legislature and courts,” which is a call to avoid 
the activism of judges and put the vote to the people.4  The MFI’s second point of opposition 
was that the instruction in the opinion “seems to direct the Legislature to graft a legal 
institution onto a social relationship for which it was not designed.”5  The logic here is that 
marriage was created to be a heterosexual institution, and that the construct of marriage 
defined as such does not apply to the “significantly different” relationships between same-sex 
couples.6  Finally, the MFI’s brief rejects the time frame of the court’s recommendation, 
arguing that the period allowed for deliberation by the legislature is “unrealistic.”7  MFI’s 
position is based on the fact that the 180-day recommendation was too short, and while they 
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do not say it, the group and its allies need more time to develop a petition for a constitutional 
amendment.   
Another brief, written on behalf of a group of law professors in support of gay 
marriage, explained why the court should invalidate unconstitutional marriage laws.  Much 
like the MFI brief, this amicus brief has a three-point argument as to why the court should 
indeed be involved in deciding the outcome of the gay marriage issue.  Firstly, the brief 
argues that due to an obligation to evaluate the constitutionality of laws and a history of 
deciding issues of similar character, the court “should exercise its authority to declare the 
marriage statutes unconstitutional…”8 This point underlies a fundamental dispute between 
the two sides: one side sees marriage as equal for everyone and the other side views marriage 
as entirely different for heterosexual and homosexual couples; their constitutional 
understandings of the issue are rooted in this disagreement.  The brief continues, arguing, 
“the Court should remedy the constitutional violation by extending marriage statutes to same 
sex couples.”9  This is the so-called activism conservatives have decried, but that proponents 
deem necessary to rectify the problem.  The third component of the argument is that civil 
unions in the model of Vermont are an insufficient alternative to marriage, and this final 
point raises an essential problem of gay marriage.  Are civil unions a constitutional 
alternative to marriage?  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would subsequently 
answer that question in the negative. 
Led by Chief Justice Margaret Marshall, the court ruled 4-3 that there are no 
constitutional grounds for excluding same-sex couples from marrying.  In her decision, 
Marshall objected to the defense’s arguments about traditional marriage, procreation 
requirements, and raising children.  In response to the accusation that the court was 
C. Madigan 
 
49 
overstepping its bounds and trespassing on the territory of the legislature, the Chief Justice 
wrote, “To label the court's role as usurping that of the Legislature…is to misunderstand the 
nature and purpose of judicial review. We owe great deference to the Legislature to decide 
social and policy issues, but it is the traditional and settled role of courts to decide 
constitutional issues.”10  As a result of this conclusion, Marshall gave the legislature 180 days 
to accordingly change existing law to reflect the inclusive marriage definition in response to 
the court’s ruling.  This final point was particularly outrageous to MFI and its allies, as they 
noted in the amicus brief they filed with the court.  Nonetheless, on that Tuesday in 
November, the SJC markedly changed the marriage discourse both within Massachusetts and 
the wider United States. 
 After the ruling, opponents began organizing behind a proposed constitutional 
amendment to the Massachusetts state constitution that would establish marriage as between 
one man and one woman only.  Led by the Massachusetts Family Institute, opponents of gay 
marriage said that “they [were] counting on a backlash to the legalization of same-sex 
marriages in Massachusetts to help them marshal public support” for the amendment.11  This 
strategy was a proven one: the Hawaii Supreme Court’s ruling in Baehr v. Lewin in favor of 
same-sex couples resulted in the almost immediate passage of the Federal Defense of 
Marriage Act, and a number of state-level DOMAs, as well.  The passage of the DOMA had 
support from both houses of Congress and President Clinton, and reflected their concerns 
about threats to the “traditional” institution of marriage, state rights, and moral issues.  In 
1996, Representative Bob Barr of Georgia, flanked by 117 co-sponsors to H.S. 3396, headed 
the effort to pass the Defense of Marriage Act, and he made no secret of the fact that the 
legislation was in direct response to Hawaii’s actions.  The background information of the 
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bill from the House committee reads: 
H.R. 3396 is a response to a very particular development in the State of Hawaii. As 
will be explained in greater detail below, the state courts in Hawaii appear to be on 
the verge of requiring that State to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The 
prospect of permitting homosexual couples to `marry' in Hawaii threatens to have 
very real consequences both on federal law and on the laws (especially the marriage 
laws) of the various States.12 
 
The response to the Baehr ruling illustrates two important dichotomies in the gay marriage 
discussion: action and reaction, and individuals and institutions.  On the federal level, there 
was an outcry to Hawaii, which resulted in more severe and explicit marriage restrictions 
than existed before.  In Massachusetts, opponents of gay marriage mobilized in response to 
the Court’s decision in Goodridge the same way, in the hopes of producing a constitutional 
amendment with the same prohibitive effect the DOMA did.  This led to an interaction 
between people and various elements of the state apparatus, with all sides jostling for the 
advantage.  As we will see, political institutions may have been decisive in determining the 
outcome, to the benefit of gay marriage supporters, in the aftermath of Goodridge. 
 The Massachusetts Family Institute, led by Kris Mineau and supported by then-
Governor Mitt Romney, organized the effort to get a constitutional amendment to the people.  
Two amendments were proposed, the first of which created civil unions (a so-called 
“compromise amendment) and the second of which established marriage as exclusively for 
heterosexual couples.  The Massachusetts legislature barely passed the first amendment in 
March 2004, which many lawmakers supported only because they felt that it was better than 
nothing.  James H. Fagan, representative of Taunton, said after the vote, “This amendment 
stinks, but at least gives the people a chance to vote for something," a statement indicative of 
the discomfort and reluctance many legislators felt.13  As the time for the legislature to vote 
on this amendment drew closer, however, opponents of gay marriage felt that the likelihood 
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of passage was diminishing; moderate legislators changed their minds about supporting a 
marriage alternative, while more conservative legislators decided to support a more stringent 
amendment.  Opponents proposed a new amendment, which read, “When recognizing 
marriages entered into after the adoption of this amendment by the people, the 
Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall define marriage only as the union of one 
man and one woman.”14  The coalition of Voteonmarriage.org, which consisted of MFI, the 
Coalition for Marriage & Family, and Catholic Citizenship, submitted the amendment to 
Attorney General Thomas Reilly with more than double the required signatures before the 
December 7, 2005 deadline.  Over the next two years, the marriage amendment was in 
political limbo, as we will see in the “Political Structures” section of this chapter. 
 As it stands now, gay marriage is an accepted (or for some, tolerated) part of life in 
Massachusetts.  While the possibility still remains that an amendment banning gay marriage 
could be reintroduced, the likelihood of its passage is almost nil.   The success of a gay 
marriage initiative in Massachusetts was due to a particular balance of citizens and political 
institutions working both together and in response to one another, in order to ensure the 
passage of such a landmark law.  The rest of this chapter looks at those people and 
institutions, and how together they made possible gay marriage in Massachusetts. 
 
Applying the Framework 
Demographics 
 Massachusetts is often painted as a liberal haven, and with good reason.  In the last 
ten presidential elections, Massachusetts has gone for the Democrat in eight of them, and 
barely going Republican in the other two, voting for Ronald Reagan both times.15  In a recent 
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Gallup study, Massachusetts ranked third behind the District of Columbia and Rhode Island 
as the most democratic state.16  The legislature consists of 200 members, 160 in the House 
and 40 in the Senate, and Democrats make up a supermajority in both.*  In fact, no other state 
has a Democratic majority as large as the one in Massachusetts.  Thus, the “blueness” of 
Massachusetts is quite solid.  This liberal leaning does not necessarily translate into 
unhesitating support of gay marriage, however.  As the Pew surveys show, only thirty-seven 
percent of Conservative and Moderate Democrats support gay marriage, while forty-eight 
percent oppose it.17  This reality held true in Massachusetts, as well.  A poll conducted by 
The Boston Globe in the spring of 2004 found that forty percent of those surveyed supported 
gay marriage, while forty-five percent either wanted to ban gay marriage outright or replace 
it with civil unions.  This does not cast Massachusetts as wholeheartedly accepting of gay 
relationships.  On the other hand, since that second group of gay marriage opponents is 
divided, this shows that a substantial plurality of Massachusetts residents were supportive of 
gay marriage, and a possible majority was at least supportive of legal homosexual 
relationships.  This implies that there was at the very least a tendency toward tolerance and a 
population willing to consider the possibility of gay marriage.  That fact is central to 
understanding how the process of achieving gay marriage successfully unfolded in 
Massachusetts: a tolerant citizenry that, despite their reservations, were not inclined to rashly 
oppose the possibility of gay marriage in their state. 
 The demographics of those people reflect that subtle tendency toward supporting or 
tolerating gay marriage.  My framework uses age, religious affiliation, gender, and political 
persuasions as traits that have a significant impact on one’s feelings about gay marriage, and 
                                                
* 142 Democrats and 16 Republicans in the House.  35 Democrats and 5 Republicans in the Senate.  A three-
fifths supermajority would be achieved with 96 Representatives and 24 Senators. 
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in looking at the Massachusetts data from the 2000 Census, the picture is one of a 
hesitatingly open population. 
 
Age 
 As we saw in Chapter Three, gay marriage support follows a very consistent trend 
among different age groups, with younger people (18-29 year olds) supporting gay marriage 
at nearly twice the rate their older counterparts (65 and older) do.  Among four different age 
groups, support for gay marriage falls as the surveyed groups get older, while opposition 
rises accordingly.  The fact that the younger groups “don’t know” or are “unsure” at 
significantly lower levels than the older groups is also important to keep in mind when 
looking at Massachusetts-specific data.  In Massachusetts, there is a substantial number of 
young people and a much smaller number of older people (Figure 4.1). More than half of the 
population is between eighteen and fifty-four, and a full forty percent are between eighteen 
and forty-four.  This constitutes a potentially powerful voting bloc of people who tend to 
more accepting of gay marriage than other groups. 
Age Group 
% of  MA 
Population 
18-34 23.70% 
35-54 30.50% 
55-64 8.60% 
65+ 13.50% 
Figure 4.1 
 
The oldest two groups, the 55-64 and 65+ groups, constitute just over twenty-two percent of 
the population.  The youngest group outnumbers the eldest by ten percent, a difference of 
645,954 people.  This discrepancy is important for a number of reasons, one of the most 
important of which is voting.  When all other factors are equal, the 65+ demographic 
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registers at nearly six times the rate of 18-24 year olds nationally, meaning that a larger 
number of young people have to register and vote in order to keep up with the older part of 
the population. Those who are 25-44, however, are twice as likely as the 18-24 year olds to 
register to vote, and they tend to reflect a tolerant position towards gay marriage (40% in 
favor, 48% in opposition).18  This still leaves tolerance or support ahead of opposition, albeit 
tenuously, in Massachusetts as far as age is concerned. 
 
Gender 
 There is a significant discrepancy between men and women when it comes to their 
support of gay marriage, and the distance continues to grow, according to Pew surveys.  The 
fact that a plurality or women favors gay marriage, while a majority of men oppose it, makes 
gender a demographic factor to consider.  In addition, women tend to vote at a much higher 
rate than men do, giving them two characteristic advantages as far as supporting gay 
marriage goes.  There is an approximately two percent difference (in the 2006 national 
elections) between male and female voter turnout nationally: 48.6% of women voted, 
compared to 46.2% of men.19  In Massachusetts, 51.8% of the population is female, 
compared to 48.2% male.20 When taken in conjunction, these two facts give the more 
supportive women a slight edge over the men in Massachusetts. 
 
Religious Affiliation 
 More so than perhaps any other trait, religion determines an individual’s perception 
of and feelings toward gay marriage with rigidity and predictability.  Surveys, studies, and 
polls all show that the more one attends church, particularly those of conservative 
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denominations, the more one believes homosexuality to be a choice, unnatural, and sinful, all 
of which lead to opposition to gay marriage.  In fact, the demographic group that most 
staunchly opposes gay marriage is a religious one: evangelical Protestants.21  Religion in 
Massachusetts, or the lack thereof, undoubtedly influenced the terms and character of the gay 
marriage debate.  While one Catholic organization was part of the Voteonmarriage.org 
coalition, and some other members of the church leadership spoke out, religious voices were 
unable to dominate the discussion.  This may also be due to the fact that Massachusetts, as a 
state, is not particularly religious at all.  In a survey that asked, “Is religion an important part 
of your daily life?” Gallup ranked Massachusetts fourth on the list of the top ten least 
religious states.  It only fell behind New England neighbors Vermont, New Hampshire, and 
Maine, in that order.22 
 In 2007, Pew conducted a landmark study of religion in the United States called the 
“U.S. Religious Landscape Survey,” which determined the way in which people identified 
themselves religiously.  Using that data in comparison with specific surveys about gay 
marriage opinion, it is clear that Massachusetts was clearly well situated in terms of a gay 
marriage success when it came to religion.  Of the five surveyed religions – evangelical 
Protestants, mainline Protestants, historically black Protestants, Catholics, and unaffiliated – 
Massachusetts ranks below the national average in the three most opposed religions, far 
above the national average for the ambivalent one, and is right about average for the fifth, 
and most supportive faith (Figure 4.2).23 Massachusetts has a small number of evangelical 
Protestants, particularly those that are white.  This means that there is a smaller group able to 
mobilize for or against issues on explicitly religious grounds, or even vocalize a strong 
message to the wider public.  The mainline Protestants, of which Massachusetts has a more 
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typical number, are far less opposed than their evangelical counterparts, which make them, at 
least in theory, less of an obstacle for a gay marriage initiative. 
a 
Religion/Denomination State Country 
Evangelical Protestant 11% 26% 
Mainline Protestant 15% 18% 
Hist. Black Protestant 2% 7% 
Catholic 43% 24% 
Unaffiliated 17% 16% 
Figure 4.2 
 
Catholics’ feelings about gay marriage are very similar to those of mainline Protestants, and 
Massachusetts not only has a large population of Catholics, but is also a state that has been 
dominated by Catholic politicians for more than a century.*  A Catholic group was one of 
three making up the Voteonmarriage.org coalition supporting the gay marriage ban, and 
much of the Catholic leadership came out in vocal opposition as well.24  Nonetheless, many 
other Catholic broke rank with the diocese, and the two different approaches represent well 
the break within the wider Catholic population. 
 The final group, the unaffiliated portion, may consist of a variety of people with 
different opinions, although it is a logical assumption that without strong religious conviction 
in either direction, that these people would be somewhat less opposed to gay marriage than 
their more fervently religious counterparts.  While unaffiliated does not necessarily translate 
directly to secular or atheist, it is important to note again here that those in the latter 
classifications are far more supportive than most when it comes to issues of gay rights. 
 
 
                                                
* Notable among these are President John F. Kennedy and the rest of the Kennedy family; John Kerry; Thomas 
P. O’Neill; and Maurice J. Tobin. 
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Political Affiliation 
 In Massachusetts, blue is the rule: Democrats outnumber Republicans by nearly three-
to-one.25  A person’s party is no guarantor as far as opinions about gay marriage go, but the 
leanings of Democrats in favor of marriage or marriage alternatives is markedly higher than 
those of Republicans.  With a legislature dominated by a progressive party, the gay marriage 
ban had a more uphill battle than it likely would have had in more conservative legislatures.  
On the other hand, the two Democratic Speakers of the House, Tom Birmingham and Robert 
Travaglini, opposed gay marriage and only with a later combination of a pro-gay marriage 
Speaker, Senate President, and governor, did the ban ultimately get defeated in its second 
vote.  While politics provides some indicator of opinion, it is by no means ironclad. 
 
Political Structures 
The political institutions played an instrumental role in how the gay marriage effort 
worked out in Massachusetts, particularly in conjunction with the demographics of the 
population.  While the population as a whole generally leans in a progressive direction, the 
success of gay marriage cannot be attributed solely, or even mostly, to the sentiments of the 
people.  Rather, the political institutions managed the issue in a way that coaxed the 
population into acquiescence and ultimately, acceptance.  This political effort involved a 
uniquely constructed state constitution, a progressive group of Supreme Court justices, and a 
Democratic congress that, under the leadership of an active Speaker of the House, all made 
the legalization succeed.  These political opportunities presented by Massachusetts are 
significant.  The Supreme Court was willing to take a risk in ruling as it did for Hillary 
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Goodridge and the other plaintiffs on the case.  Once it had made the decision, more politics 
came into play as opponents attempted to send the issue to the public for a vote.  This 
involved two different proposed constitutional amendments, neither of which ever made it to 
the public for a vote because of the barriers in place in the Massachusetts constitution against 
easily amending it.  The fact that an election took place during the legislative debate made an 
important difference for two reasons.  Firstly, the election did not turn into a referendum on 
gay marriage, giving legislators more confidence in supporting the Goodridge ruling.  
Secondly, the election was significant because it brought more supportive representatives 
into government, as well as making a staunch proponent of gay marriage the new Speaker of 
the House.  Without each of these institutional structures in place, gay marriage in all 
likelihood would be illegal under the Massachusetts constitution instead of being a highly 
touted example of tolerance and equal rights. 
When the Supreme Judicial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s in Goodridge, a 
series of legal and legislative reactions were put in motion.  The ruling gave the legislature 
180 days (from November 18, 2003) to change the existing marital laws to reflect the Court’s 
conclusion that gay couples have a constitutional right to marriage.  There was very little for 
the legislature to interpret from the ruling, but the court’s instruction set off a firestorm of 
debate both within the legislature and among the people.  According to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, in order to amend said document, there must either be a constitutional 
convention or a petition signed to make the legislature take up the amendment.  On February 
11, 2004, the legislature convened in a constitutional convention, lead by Senate President 
Tom Birmingham, an opponent of same-sex marriage.  After a series of votes over the course 
of weeks, the legislature approved of the compromise amendment, making gay marriage 
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illegal but creating civil unions as an alternative by a margin of four votes: 105-92.26  This 
amendment had to be re-approved the following year in order to be set to the people for a 
vote; however, the following year, same-sex marriages had been happening for several 
months and the public seemed generally more accepting.  In addition, more conservative 
lawmakers chose to support an alternative amendment, one that did not create civil unions 
and banned gay marriage outright.27  This, in effect, defeated the first amendment and set the 
stage for the more restrictive amendment to be taken up, but also allowed for more time for 
same-sex marriages to continue taking place.  The new initiative was sponsored by citizens 
of the Commonwealth, meaning that it only required one quarter of the legislature to approve 
it in two consecutive years.  If a lawmaker has sponsored the amendment, it would have 
required a simple majority in the constitutional convention.   Instead of 101 votes, the 
amendment only needed fifty, a markedly smaller number and, theoretically, an easier 
number to achieve for supporters of the amendment.28  
The Massachusetts Family Institute, acting with two other groups in a coalition called 
voteonmarriage.org led the charge in getting the requisite number of signatures to put the 
amendment to the legislature.  They submitted more than twice the required number to the 
Attorney General and the proposed amendment was then taken up by the legislature, under 
new leadership.  The legislature continued to stall and opponents of the amendment 
supported the delay, until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled in Schulman v. 
Reilly that the legislature did in fact have a constitutional obligation to vote on all voter 
initiatives by end the of the current session, effectively forcing the legislature to act.29 On the 
last day of the session, January 2, 2007, the legislature voted 134-62 to keep the amendment 
on the legislature’s agenda for the following year.30  Those intervening months, mandated by 
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the Massachusetts Constitution, proved to be vital for proponents of gay marriage, because 
the span allowed them time to mobilize opposition to the amendment.  In addition, same-sex 
marriages continued in the meantime, giving the wider society, who were generally 
undecided or opposed, an opportunity to recognize that gay marriage was not the threat that 
activist opponents made it out to be.   
While party affiliation does not necessarily translate into a given position on gay 
marriage, Democrats are still more likely to support it than not.  Furthermore, a Democrat 
majority means that both the House and Senate leadership are Democrats as well, and in this 
case, both were pro-gay marriage.  Under the leadership of Speaker of the House, Sal 
DiMasi, Senate President Therese Murray, and newly elected Governor Deval Patrick, 
lawmakers spent the five months between votes listening to constituents and lobbyists 
advocate for the defeat of the amendment.31  The groundswell that had begun with the 
compromise amendment continued, increasing in intensity between the two sessions.  One of 
the nine legislators that switched votes between January and June rejected suggestions of 
trading votes or other dubious behind-the-scenes behavior.  Representative Richard Ross, 
Republican of Wrentham, said, “Nine thousand of them have now married, who have 
blended into society, who have hurt no one.  I just couldn't see exposing them to all of that 
stuff over the next two years.  I know there's going to be a lot of folks that I need to 
apologize to in my district…Whatever happens I'm moving forward. I know I did the right 
thing.”32  Representative Ross’ attitude represents that of other lawmakers and people in the 
state.  In addition, while people may have been opposed to allowing same-sex marriage, 
amending the constitution is a significant step, and that may have served as a deterrent for 
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some, making the SJC’s ruling that much more important in getting the process going 
because it framed the issue in a pro-gay marriage light. 
 The Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling gave proponents an opportunity to show that 
same-sex marriage would not undermine the moral foundations of society, nor have any 
other negative impacts on the day-to-day lives of Massachusetts residents.  When one 
considers the ruling in conjunction with the requirements to amend the Massachusetts 
Constitution, the significance of the Court’s ruling is even more clear: attempting to amend 
the constitution took more than three years, during which same-sex couples were able to 
marry peacefully.  The barriers in place forced the legislature to ensure that it was making 
the right decision and gave constituents the opportunity to evaluate the practical impact of 
gay marriage on their lives and make an informed, personal decision on those grounds.  The 
change in public opinion toward this issue illustrates how important the two-consecutive-
sessions rule was: in March 2005, 56% of Massachusetts adults supported gay marriage, 
compared to only 40% the year before.33  The difference in that period was that gay couples 
were allowed to marry before the legislature acted, allowing residents, many of whom were 
disposed to be tolerant, to adjust to the idea and accept it as a normal and acceptable part of 
life.  This is just what the procedure intended: a so-called “scrutiny period” within the 
states’ constitutional framework.  Without the SJC’s controversial ruling, an arduous 
constitutional amendment process, and a progressive body of lawmakers, there is little 
reason to think that gay marriage would be a legal and conventional part of Massachusetts 
society.  
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Variables 
The third part of the framework considers variables, and Massachusetts certainly has 
a few unique traits that added to gay marriage’s success.  Pew data shows, for instance, that 
better-educated people tend to be more supportive of same-sex marriages than those who are 
less educated.34  Massachusetts is home to a large concentration of some of the best colleges 
and universities in the world, which makes the Bay State a sort of intellectual haven. 
According to a 2004 study by the United States Census Bureau, 35.5% of people 25 and 
older are college graduates in Massachusetts, the highest rate for any state in the country.35  
Professors at Massachusetts law schools, such as Laurence Tribe of Harvard, submitted 
amicus briefs on behalf of the plaintiffs.  Another consideration is the fact that Massachusetts 
had sex-based hate crime legislation on the books before many other states, as well as 
benefits laws affording same-sex partners some of the same protections their heterosexual 
counterparts received in the workplace.  This indicates that there was a pre-existing 
acknowledgment that all people are entitled to certain protections, regardless of their sexual 
orientation.   
 
Conclusion 
 The successful bid to legalize gay marriage in Massachusetts leads to several 
observations about why it was, in fact, a success.  There are three main factors that seem to 
have been the most influential: the positive initiation from the Supreme Judicial Court, the 
so-called “scrutiny period,” and a tolerant citizenry.  When the SJC ruled in Goodridge, the 
legislature understood the ruling as mandating that marriage laws had to include same-sex 
couples.  Consequently, the issue before the legislature was not about how to legalize same-
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sex unions, but rather whether or not to amend the constitution to ban those relationships.  
Though opponents of Goodridge saw the amendment process as the only recourse available 
to them, many citizens and lawmakers saw that step as too extreme.  In this way, the 
legislature acted as an intermediary between the people and the courts.  Without such an 
explicit endorsement of same-sex unions from the SJC, it is unlikely that the Massachusetts 
legislature would have taken up the issue, or that it would have endorsed marriage rather than 
a domestic partnership alternative.  The “scrutiny period” ensured that lawmakers would not 
act rashly on an emotional and controversial issue.  Had an amendment gone right to the 
people for a vote, there is almost no question that it would have passed, dealing a setback to 
supporters of gay marriage.  While some posit that the Massachusetts Constitution is still too 
easy to amend, in this case, the protections in place held.  Finally, the people of 
Massachusetts proved to be tolerant and rational in their approach to the gay marriage issue.  
While they did not overwhelmingly endorse the idea from the beginning, they too benefitted 
from a scrutiny period in which to consider the implications of same-sex marriage.  
Ultimately, the conclusion that many people drew was that gay marriage was not a threat to 
the stability of society, and as a result, active opposition to gay marriage is almost non-
existent in Massachusetts today. 
 Since Goodridge, Connecticut, Iowa, and Vermont have legalized gay marriage, and 
several other states are considering following suit.  Vermont dealt with a same-sex union 
initiative several years before Massachusetts, and in the process created an alternative system 
of benefits called civil unions.  In the next chapter, Vermont’s experience with a same-sex 
union initiative will be considered on its own, as well as in comparison to Massachusetts’.  
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The comparison will be instructive in further understanding what makes marriage initiatives 
likely to succeed in other states. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
VERMONT 
 
 
 
 
 “That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and 
security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or 
advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that 
community.” 
 -Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, Chapter I, Article 7 
 
“The entire state of Vermont has been talking about the place of gay and lesbian people 
within our community.  I doubt that that has ever happened to this degree in any other 
political jurisdiction anywhere, ever. And that is a healthy thing.” 
 -William J. Lipper, D-Hinesburg, the only openly-gay Vermont legislator 
66 
 
 
 No state in the country has had extensive protections for same-sex couples longer 
than Vermont has.  In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court heard arguments in Baker v. State, a 
lawsuit that challenged the prohibition of extending marriage certificates to same-sex 
couples.  The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, invoking at Common Benefits Clause of 
the Vermont Constitution, setting off a debate in the Vermont legislature that surpassed 
Massachusetts’ in terms of negativity and passion.  Vermont recognized gay unions as legal 
in the midst of the Defense of Marriage Amendment backlash gripping most of the rest of the 
country, and in spite of expressed opposition from a majority of the population.  The timing 
of Vermont’s same-sex union debate makes the events more significant in the overall 
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discussion.  The 1999-2000 period places Vermont in between the passage of the federal 
DOMA, and the sweeping success in Massachusetts from the Goodridge case.  In this 
respect, Vermont marks the middle ground, both literally and figuratively.  Furthermore, 
demographically Vermont is a sort of hybrid state in that there is a more rural and 
conservative part of population, as well as an imported, urban, liberal sector as well.  These 
two groups of Vermonters clashed heatedly over the same-sex marriage issues.  In some 
respects, Vermont’s demographics look very much like Massachusetts’ and yet markedly 
different as well.  This demographic and political dichotomy paved the way for a highly 
contested debate, one that was fraught with animosity and tension from the start. 
 In this chapter, I will detail the timeline of events leading up to the Baker lawsuit, the 
case itself, and its legislative aftermath.  Of particular note are the specific parts of the 
political process used, the response of the public, and the impact of the 2000 election on 
Vermont civil unions.  In applying the framework, we will see “two Vermonts,” one far more 
conservative and traditional in its views of marriage than the other.  The state supreme court 
provoked a legislative debate about how to address same-sex unions, which it did within the 
perimeters provided by the “tolerant citizenry.” Although the outcome of the gay marriage 
effort in Vermont resulted in civil unions and not marriage, the process there and in 
Massachusetts is similar and can be judged against each other because of the fact that both 
challenged the marriage norm at the time of the court decisions.  Vermont created civil 
unions where none had existed before while Massachusetts was the first to legalize gay 
marriage.  As the first states to take these first steps, their experiences are instructively 
compared.  The third part of the framework – variables – addresses Vermont’s previous gay 
rights legislation and the advocacy of one openly gay legislator.  The final part of this chapter 
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looks specifically at the differences between Massachusetts and Vermont in order to identify 
the factors that led to the creation of new legal structures for same-sex couples in those 
states. 
Vermont: The First 
 The approach Vermont took for dealing with gay marriage resulted in civil unions, a 
compromise between both ends of the gay marriage spectrum.  On the one hand, same-sex 
couples are entitled to almost all of the benefits of heterosexual married couples, but on the 
other hand, they do not get to be married, per se.  Civil unions have been viewed by the 
general public as a satisfactory alternative to gay marriage for quite some time, as Pew 
Forum surveys show that legal agreements giving same-sex couples the same rights as 
marriage are far more popular than marriage itself, particularly among groups likely to 
oppose gay marriages.1  In Baker v State, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that while all 
couples regardless of sex are entitled to the benefits of marriage, there was no fundamental 
right to marriage for same-sex couples unless the legislature created that right.  The Vermont 
legislature then had to act accordingly, creating the designation of civil union as a way of 
making same-sex couples “spouses” under Vermont law.2  For some, civil unions are an 
acceptable alternative, while others think that they perpetuate exclusion and discrimination.  
For instance, William Eskridge of Yale supports civil unions as one step in a process towards 
achieving full marriage rights.3  On the other hand, Michael Mello of the Vermont Law 
School argues that civil unions are not sufficient because separate is not equal.4  In Vermont, 
this divide between supporters of gay rights manifested itself among legislators and the wider 
population.  Interestingly, the one openly gay member of the Vermont legislature supported 
the civil unions bill while it was in the House Judiciary Committee, while another straight 
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member opposed it because the bill, in his view, did not go far enough.5  There were, in fact, 
three types of people voicing their opinions about the legislature’s efforts: those who 
opposed any kind of same-sex unions, those who supported marriage exclusively, and those 
who were willing to compromise with civil unions. 
On November 18, 1998, arguments began before the Vermont Supreme Court in 
Baker v. State of Vermont, filed on behalf of three same-sex couples that wished to marry.  
The arguments were a lively affair: “Seldom does the court become so immersed in the case 
before it…Lawyers had an hour to make their case. Normally they get half that, sometimes 
just a quarter.  On Wednesday, they had to share it pretty much equally with the three men 
and two women in black robes,” who asked frequent questions and challenged attorneys for 
both sides.6  After about a month of deliberation, the court ruled that homosexual couples are 
entitled to the same legal benefits as heterosexual couples are.  In the decision, written by 
Chief Justice Amestoy, the court concluded: 
Under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution... plaintiffs may 
not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections afforded persons of the 
opposite sex who choose to marry.  We hold that the State is constitutionally 
required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that 
flow from marriage under Vermont law.  Whether this ultimately takes the form 
of inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel "domestic 
partnership" system or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the 
Legislature.  Whatever system is chosen, however, must conform with the 
constitutional imperative to afford all Vermonters the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the law.7 
 
The decision later points out that the court did not rule on whether or not the plaintiffs had a 
constitutional claim for marriage, but rather that they were constitutionally entitled to the 
benefits and protections of marriage.  This was a crucial distinction because it allowed the 
legislature far more flexibility in its subsequent course of action.  Professor Greg Johnson of 
Vermont Law School, who testified before both houses of the legislature when it took up the 
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issue, noted that the Vermont legislature had five possible options after Baker.8  Johnson 
observed that two of the options involved the legislature stalling on or avoiding the issue 
while appearing to be productive; two options were either the creation of civil unions or 
same-sex marriage; and the last was option the abolition of state involvement in religious 
marriage and instead providing civil marriage to all couples, straight and gay. 
 The first two options appeared never to be viable, while the abolition of marriage for 
heterosexual couples was also a non-option.  Given the fervent opposition to the Baker 
ruling, the legislature had to tread carefully in how it chose to interpret and act upon the 
decision.  A majority of Vermonters disagreed with the decision, and plurality supported a 
constitutional amendment defining marriage as between one man and one woman.9  It was in 
this environment of opposition that the House Judiciary Committee began debate about how 
to respond to Baker on February 9, 2000, voting 8-3 for an alternative legal structure that was 
not marriage.  This turned into bill H. 847, drafted by the Chairman of the House Judiciary, 
Republican Thomas Little.  Section 2 of the bill that passed the full House reads: 
(a) The purpose of this act is to provide eligible same-sex couples the opportunity 
to receive the legal benefits and protections and be subject to the legal 
responsibilities that flow from civil marriage. Civil unions provide a legal status 
with the attributes and effects of civil marriage, so that state law conforms to the 
requirements of the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. 
(b) This act also provides eligible blood-relatives or relatives related by adoption 
the opportunity to establish a reciprocal beneficiaries relationship so they may 
receive certain benefits and protections and be subject to certain responsibilities 
that are granted to spouses.10 
 
Though the bill still had to go through the Senate, the Vermont House of Representatives had 
just created the most extensive framework of legal protections for same-sex couples in the 
world. 
 The Senate Judiciary Committee received H. 847 and immediately talk began about 
the barriers to the bill’s success. By this point, opponents of Baker and the House’s civil 
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unions bill had organized into a vocal and aggressive group called Take It To The People, 
also known as TiP.  According to their website, TiP promotes “traditional marriage” between 
a man as a woman, to provide “the most productive and nurturing environment for 
children.”11  The organization’s goals include educating the public on the value of traditional 
marriage, overturning laws that support gay unions, and working for state and federal 
legislation that reflect the will of the people.12  When the Senate Judiciary Committee took up 
H. 847, TiP began running ads that suggested the so-called gay agenda being promoted by 
the Vermont state government included cutting the defense budget to fund AIDS care and sex 
change operations, as well as using tax payer money to pay for artificial insemination for 
gays.  Governor Howard Dean denounced the ads as “preposterous,” “asinine,” and 
“fatuous.”13  The ads serve as clear evidence of how vicious the debate over gay union rights 
had become in Vermont, as well as the opponents’ strategy used to start mobilizing like-
minded voters if the institutions shifted the issue to the voters. 
 The Senate Judiciary began debate on the civil unions bill in a context of fierce 
debate, and immediately two of the six members said they were not supporting the bill; they 
were, instead, supporting a constitutional amendment banning same-sex unions.14  Over the 
course of three weeks, the committee heard from a wide array of witnesses on the issue, from 
within their own ranks and the community at-large.  On April 10, 2000, the committee had 
come up with two slightly different drafts of a bill: one used the civil unions language of the 
House, and the other referred to the union as a “domestic partnership.”  The date the bill 
would into effect was the same for both, and eight months later than the House’s proposed 
bill.  In addition, the Senate bill included a residency requirement, which excluded same-sex 
couples from getting a civil union in Vermont if their home state did not recognize that 
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union.15  Perhaps more important than the substance of the changes themselves was the fact 
that a changed bill would have to go back to the House for a re-vote, and there was no 
guarantee that, given the upcoming election and pressures from opponents like TiP, that the 
bill would get the support again.16 Finally, the Senate Judiciary Committee referred its bill to 
the full Senate, along with two constitutional amendments.  One amendment would overturn 
Baker by defining marriage as legally between a man and woman, as well as give the 
legislature exclusive authority over marriage-related issues.  The other would simply have 
defined marriage as a heterosexual union, and thus not overturn the Vermont Supreme 
Court’s decision.17  The first amendment was defeated 21-9 and the second lost 17-13, while 
the actual civil unions bill was passed 19-11 on April 19, 2000, divided largely along party 
lines.18 
 The different language in the Senate bill meant that it had to go back to the House for 
a final vote before it could become law.  On Tuesday, April 27, the bill returned to the 150 
legislators for a vote.  The session opened at 10 am for debate and for the next three hours, 
mostly opponents of the bill dominated the dialogue.  When it came time to vote again, a 
largely segregated audience – those with pink ribbons supporting same-sex unions, and those 
wearing white ribbons in support of “traditional” marriage – watched lawmakers vote.  The 
final tally was 79-68 for the bill, with two representatives switching to “yes” from their 
March “no” votes.19  Some representatives who voted against the bill left the chamber after 
tallying their vote, knowing that the bill was going to be passed.  The president of Take It To 
The People, Michele Cummings, responded, “The House's passage of this bill marks the 
close of only one chapter in our crusade to preserve traditional Vermont family values,” and 
the head of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, the Reverend Kennetth A. Angell, 
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grieved, “History was not made today, it was unmade…Centuries of cultural and religious 
respect for traditional marriage between a man and a woman have been undone.”20 On the 
other hand, two of the plaintiffs in the Baker case, Nina Beck and Stacy Jolles, were also in 
the gallery to watch the historic vote.  Ms. Jolles turned to Ms. Beck and said, “C.U. me!” in 
response to the bill’s passage.
21
 
 With that, H. 847, “An Act Relating to Civil Unions,” went to Governor Howard 
Dean’s desk that afternoon and was signed into law, marking the official creation of civil 
unions in Vermont.  The battle was not over just yet, however, because the governor and all 
180 lawmakers were up for election that November of 2000, and opponents of the civil 
unions bill promised to make bill the central issue of the election campaigns.  Right after the 
House’s vote, Cummings, president of TiP, promised, “The next chapter begins tomorrow, 
when our organization meets to discuss the only opportunity Vermonters are being given to 
express their will: the November elections.”22  Ruth Dwyer campaigned for the GOP 
gubernatorial nomination on an opposition to civil unions platform, and securing that 
nomination made it clear that the governor’s race would be about civil unions.  As Michael 
Mello of the Vermont Law School observes, “the same was true of the races for the Vermont 
House and Senate.  The Democrats held slim margins in both chambers.  The Republicans 
saw civil unions as their chance to gain control.”23  And gain control they did, at least in the 
House.  After election day, the Democrats clung to a two-vote lead in the Senate, and Dean 
barely defeated Dwyer to hold onto the governorship.  In the House, however, Republicans 
resoundingly defeated Democrats, taking over 83 of the 150-seat House and gaining a 16-
vote margin.  Frank Bever of the Rutland Herald, called it a “GOP rout.”24  The new strength 
of Republicans gave opponents of the civil unions bill hope that it could be repealed, and the 
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following spring, the House tried to do just that.  The representatives took various votes on 
either eliminating civil unions entirely or reducing the benefits associated with them.  
However, the Senate refused to consider taking up the issue, and by the end of the 2001 
legislative session, civil unions legislation remained intact, effectively marking an end to the 
most intense efforts to eliminate same-sex unions.25 
 The effort to legalize same-sex unions in Vermont was far more controversial, and the 
outcome more tenuous, in Vermont than in Massachusetts.  In using my framework to 
evaluate the factors that impacted this process, one can see a number of similarities and 
differences between the two states that seemingly had an impact on the different routes the 
legislatures took in responding to their respective supreme court’s rulings.  There is a certain 
amount of overlap when it comes to demographics and politics, but Vermont proved to be 
unique in its handling of gay marriage initiatives, namely by inventing civil unions as a 
parallel construct.  In the next section, I will look at the model’s application to Vermont, and 
then compare the data from the model to Massachusetts to determine which factor, or factors, 
resulted in one deciding to permit marriage and the other to create a marriage alternative. 
 
Applying the Model 
Demographics 
 In many respects, Vermont’s population looks very much like that of Massachusetts.  
The people are predominantly white, non-religious, and Democratic.  Nonetheless, a majority 
people opposed the ruling in Baker and fought passionately to prevent the legislature from 
legalizing marriage or civil unions for same-sex couples.  It would seem that there are what 
Mello calls, “two Vermonts.”  He writes: 
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The first Vermont consists of people whose families have lived here for 
generations.  With many exceptions, this Vermont tends to be conservative, 
traditional, and rooted in the values of rural America.  The second Vermont 
consists of…transplanted urbanites from places like Boston, New York City, 
or…Washington D.C.  With many exceptions, this Vermont tends to be liberal, 
nontraditional, and rooted in the ethos of the city…On many issues…the two 
Vermonts coexist comfortably.26 
 
One issue that brought out the rift between the two, however, was gay marriage.  In looking 
at the population data for Vermont, one must keep in mind that appearances can be 
deceiving.  The two different “kinds” of people in Vermont forced a different course of 
action than what would happen five years later in Massachusetts, despite surface similarities 
between the two states.  Nonetheless, polling data from the month after the Baker ruling 
found that only 52% of respondents opposed the ruling which, though a majority, reflects the 
possibility for tolerance among the wider population, as was seen in Massachusetts.  In fact, 
Del Ali, the president of Research 2000, which conducted the poll, said “If I’m lobbying for 
same-sex marriage, I’d look at Vermont as pretty good ground for getting equal rights, civil 
rights.”
27
  Significantly, the poll “found about two-thirds of Vermonters in the middle. They  
either agreed or disagreed with the court's ruling, but not strongly. And these people in the 
middle were about evenly divided: 32 percent agreed with the court and 34 percent 
disagreed.
28
  This flexibility or openness to change reflects the likelihood that, when 
provoked by law, the people were in a position to accept over time the new marriage 
paradigm, making the initiative ultimately successful.  This is the “tolerant citizenry” concept 
that proved so crucial in Massachusetts.  In response to the poll’s results, the chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee, Thomas Little, said that he thought there a number of people on 
either extreme, but also that there “a vast pool of people somewhere in between.” Finally, 
one must keep in mind that Vermont’s actions on same-sex unions not only came on the 
heels of the federal DOMA and a nationwide backlash to Hawaii’s efforts, but also made 
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Vermont the first state to have protections for gay couples.  It should be unsurprising that the 
people were more hesitant or opposed than the population is today (59% opposed to 
legalizing gay marriage in 2003 compared to 49% today).
29
 
 
Age 
 In the most recent census, more than half of Vermonters were between the ages of 18 
and 54, and just over twenty percent were between 18 and 34.
30
  The generally more 
supportive young people make up a substantial bloc of the population, outweighing the oldest 
group by about nine percent.  However, the youngest bloc of voters, aged 18-24, vote at a far 
lower rate than the rest of the state, particularly in Vermont.  In fact, in the 2000 election, 
only 36% of 18-24 year olds turned up to vote, compared with 75% of those aged twenty-five 
and older.  That is a 39% difference, eleven points higher than the national average in that 
election.
31
  This may explain, in part, why so many civil union-supporting Democrats lost 
their seats in the Vermont House in that election.  Without the support of younger, more 
progressive voters, candidates had to face mostly older and more conservative voters in the 
election.   
 
Gender 
 Women tend to be more tolerant and supportive of gay rights issues than men are, but 
that divide was particularly acute in Vermont.  In general, women support gay marriage in 
slightly larger numbers than their male counterparts, but only by a margin of about three 
percentage points. A survey conducted on behalf of the Rutland Herald in January 2005, 
however, revealed that men disapproved of the court’s ruling in greater numbers and more 
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fervently than women.  Whereas 23% of men “strongly disapproved” of the Baker decision, 
and another 39% “disagreed,” women were evenly divided, 43% between agreeing and 
disagreeing with the ruling.
32
  Though less stark, the division also appeared when asked 
about support for a constitutional amendment to define marriage as between a man and a 
woman; a majority of men supported such an amendment (54%), while there was a 
statistically insignificant difference between women who opposed the amendment than who 
supported it (47% and 45% respectively).    
 
Religious Affiliation: 
 At first glimpse, Vermont’s religious landscape appears to be highly conducive to 
tolerance for gay marriage initiatives.
*
 In the 2009 Gallup survey measuring the religiosity of 
the fifty states, Vermont ranked as the least religious state in the country, based simply on the 
question, “How important is religion in your daily life?”
33
  Only 42% of Vermonters 
answered that question in the affirmative.  Assuming that sentiment has not changed 
dramatically in the last decade, the lack of religious presence in Vermont is significant.  This 
is not to say that religious leaders and organizations do not mobilize or have a substantial 
authority.  In fact, one of the most vocal opponents of the civil unions bill was the head of the 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, the Reverend Angell.  When the House passed the 
Senate’s version of the bill, Representative George R. Allard responded, “This is a sad, dark 
day for the state of Vermont, and may God help us all.”
34
  The Chairman of the Rutland City 
Democratic Party, in his letter of resignation, wrote: 
I believe the main purpose of marriage is the procreation of human life, God’s 
way of continuing the process of creation.  I believe that true constitutional law 
                                                
* The Pew Religious Landscape Survey for Vermont also includes New Hampshire’s religious profile.  This is 
unlikely to affect the Vermont data because New Hampshire and Vermont are so demographically similar. 
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must have its foundation in the moral law.  Consequently, same-sex marriage is 
impossible both theologically and biologically…May almighty God have mercy 
on Vermont.”
35
 
 
Clearly, there was potent opposition from religious individuals and groups on this issue. 
 Vermont has a minimal religious profile.  There is a low percentage of evangelical 
Protestants and high number of unaffiliated people, while having just above the national 
average of Catholics and mainline Protestants (Figure 5.1).
36
 
 
Religion/Denomination State Country 
Evangelical Protestant 11% 26% 
Mainline Protestant 23% 18% 
Hist. Black Protestant < than .5% 7% 
Catholic 29% 24% 
Unaffiliated 26% 16% 
Mormon 1% 2% 
Figure 5.1 
 
Unsurprisingly, given how white the state is, Vermont has almost no black Protestants, a very 
conservative group when it comes to issues of homosexuality, a product of both racial and 
religious opposition.  A very small concentration of evangelical and historically black 
Protestants means that they are probably a minimal force within the state.  Nonetheless, a 
Baptist minister from Williston sent out unsolicited letters to more than 81,000 Vermonters 
in March, 2000, in which he railed on the “radical Homosexual Lobby” and encouraged the 
recipient to contact his legislator and prevent that lawmaker from allowing “God’s sacred 
covenant between a man and a woman [to] be replaced by Vermont’s celebration of same-sex 
‘unions.’”
37
 Even if the Biblical language did not necessarily resonate with people, the 
language of morals and tradition very likely did.  This indicates that, despite the minimally 
religious population, the mere presence of passionately opposed individuals or churches can 
have a genuine impact on the debate.  As Del Ali noted, “a real homophobic organization 
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with millions of dollars could really turn it into something ugly.”
38
  Though predominantly 
drawn from religious beliefs, opposition to same-sex unions exists in all groups and 
consequently, opponents mobilize using a language that reaches out to all people who oppose 
same-sex unions, regardless of why.   
In Vermont, the Catholics are the ranking faith of opposition, by sheer number and 
organization.  The Reverend Kennetth Angell of the Burlington diocese was quoted 
frequently in newspaper articles when the Vermont legislature was debating the civil unions 
bill.  Pressure from the religious community showed itself by way of lobbying, prayer vigils, 
and other religious demonstrations at the State House, and testimony to both houses of the 
legislature.   On April 6, 2000, Representative Nancy Sheltra organized a rally in front of the 
state house, at which Republican presidential candidate Alan Keyes was due to speak.  
Keyes, a black Roman Catholic, compared homosexuality to rape, pedophilia, and adultery, 
shouting: 
And if one of the moral principles is that "thou shalt not lie with a man as with a 
woman. It is an abomination," if one of the moral principles strictly enjoins 
against certain kinds of sexual behavior (adultery outside of marriage, whatever it 
might be), then if the government steps in and says, "No, you cannot show 
intolerance for that behavior," the government is, in fact, dictating the 
abandonment of religious conscience and belief. And in our society, the 
government has no legitimate authority to dictate in this area.39 
 
Using inflammatory religious rhetoric, Sheltra, Keyes, and Angell mobilized thousands of 
people into actively opposing the actions of their elected representatives, which translated 
into a political liability for many of them.  In Vermont, conservative values are the most 
common, and even though they may not all be based explicitly in religious doctrine or ideas, 
by drawing parallels between the Bible and personally held perspectives on gay marriage and 
civil unions, religious leaders were able to shape the character of the opposition to the civil 
unions legislation. 
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Political Affiliation 
 Vermont is very Democratic state, although the people tend to be more moderate and 
conservative Democrats than perhaps are to be found in Massachusetts.  In 2008, Democrats 
make up 58.9% of the state, compared with 26.2% of Republicans, making Vermont fourth 
most Democratic state in the union.40  Given that conservative and moderate Democrats 
support gay marriage at rate half that of their liberal counterparts, the Democratic majority in 
Vermont could be misleading.  Only 37% of conservative/moderate Democrats favor gay 
marriage, while 75% of liberal Democrats are in favor and even 43% of Independents favor 
gay marriage.41  It is instructive to look at the 2000 election in which Vermonters cast their 
ballots for a new president, as well as for the governor and all of the state senators and 
representatives.  Of the fourteen counties, five voted for George W. Bush, although only one 
by a majority (Essex).42  Of those counties, four Vermont state senators cast votes in 
opposition to the civil unions bill, while the other four came from counties that voted for Al 
Gore.43  In Orange County, for example, Bush won a plurality of the vote and the county, 
while Senator MacDonald, who had voted for the civil unions bill was ousted. On the other 
hand, in Grand Isle, people voted for Bush but did not oust Senator MacDonald, another bill 
supporter, from office. 44  This indicates that while Republicans tended to oppose the bill, 
there was by no means a definitive mandate from the GOP, which goes back to Mello’s 
observation about “two Vermonts.” 
 Party allegiances played a more significant role among the lawmakers themselves, 
particularly in the Senate.  The bill, H.847, received a 10-1 vote out of the House Judiciary 
Committee, led by the Republican chairman; five Republicans, four Democrats, and one 
Progressive voted for it.45  On the other hand, on the Senate Judiciary Committee, the vote 
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was divided down party lines, four Democrats in favor, two Republicans against.46  In 
addition, of the nineteen votes in favor of the bill in the full Senate, seventeen of them were 
from Democrats and only two from Republicans.47  Finally, most of the representatives who 
lost their seats in the November election were Democrats who had supported the civil unions 
bill.48  Clearly, despite the fact that the vast majority of Vermonters identify as Democrats, 
many voted against their party in large part due to the lawmaker’s vote on the civil unions 
bill. 
Political Structures 
 There is no question that without support from Vermont political institutions, passage 
of a same-sex union bill would have had little or chance of success.  After the Baker ruling, 
52% of those polled opposed the decision, and there was almost three times as many people 
who “strongly disagreed” with it as there were people who “strongly agreed.”
49
  Despite 
fervent demonstrations from opponents, lawmakers went ahead with the instruction in the 
Baker opinion to create some sort of legal protection for same-sex couples.  The influence of 
political institutions can be seen at every step of the process from lawsuit to legislation to 
law.  Firstly, Baker was in the judicial system right after Hawaii rejected a referendum on 
gay marriage and on the heels of a national wave of Defense of Marriage Acts.  Opposition to 
gay marriage was high, and given that widespread negativity, there was little motivation on 
behalf of more progressive lawmakers to challenge the marriage status quo.  The fact that 
same-sex union rights were brought before the Vermont judiciary and not the legislature first 
is a significant political decision made by the proponents of same-sex unions.  The legislature 
would have been far less likely to create civil unions or legalize gay marriage than a judicial 
body charged with evaluating the law and not answering the wider public. 
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 The Vermont Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs because of a clause that is 
unique to the Vermont Constitution: the Common Benefit Clause, which reads: 
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, 
and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular 
emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who are 
a part only of that community; and that the community hath an indubitable, 
unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform or alter government, in such 
manner as shall be, by that community, judged most conducive to the public 
weal.50 
 
William Eskridge explains that the significance of this clause was due to “its distinctive 
history…which antedated the federal equal protection clause by almost one hundred 
years…[The Chief Justice] read the…clause as applying in generally the same way whatever 
the state classification,” and that included gender and sexual preference.51   
 The Baker opinion, in an attempt to avoid accusations of judicial activism*, explained 
that the Court does “not purport to infringe upon the prerogatives of the Legislature to craft 
an appropriate means of addressing this constitutional mandate, other than to note that the 
record here refers to a number of potentially constitutional statutory schemes from other 
jurisdictions.”52  Accordingly, the House Judiciary Committee began the process of writing 
H.847, led by the Republican chairman who supported civil unions.  A Republican leader 
helped avoid partisanship in order to get the bill off the ground, which further set an example 
for the full chamber.  After two hearings on the issue, the committee voted 8 to 3 to create 
some legal alternative to marriage for same-sex couples, recognizing the acute opposition to 
extending marriage to include gays.  H.847 passed the committee 10 to 1, and as Mello 
explains, this action was quite courageous: 
Given the volatile political aspects of the same-sex union question, one could 
                                                
* Several accusations of judicial activism were made from all parts of the state and country, as well as a genuine 
movement to impeach all of the justices in Chief Justice Amestoy’s majority.  Nothing came of these efforts, 
however. 
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have understood the committee’s choice had it decided to do nothing more than 
what the state’s highest court had mandated: that legislators just follow the 
constitutional law of Vermont.  The committee didn’t take that easy way out.  To 
the contrary, Chairman Little said pointedly that his committee had passed H 847 
because “it was the right thing to do.”53   
 
While it may not seem like a political structure per se, willingness to take a political risk on 
behalf of officials cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.  Without the first efforts of the 
committee, the civil unions initiative would have died.  The fact that the committee almost 
unanimously endorsed H 847, with Democrats, Republicans, and a Progressive speaking 
together, also probably sent a message to the rest of the House about the nature and 
significance of the bill.  Having the bill begin in a small, bipartisan committee may have 
done wonders for its chances. 
 In the full House, there was far less consensus.  The Vermont Constitution requires 
that every bill be voted on twice, and during the first vote amendments can be offered.  While 
some of the more extreme amendments were defeated (both the amendment to ask 
Vermonters to vote on having a constitutional amendment and the amendment to legalize gay 
marriage were handily voted down), an amendment that said, “Marriage means the legally 
recognized union between one man and one woman” did pass.  Although the bill already 
excluded same-sex couples from marriages, the amendment, in effect, added a DOMA to H. 
847, and its addition added three votes for the bill.54  The amendment allowed lawmakers to 
comfort and to reaffirm to their constituents that “traditional” marriage was not, in fact, at 
risk.  This was a tactic to both pass the bill and try to limit political collateral.  If it were not 
for the two-part voting and amendment procedure, the civil unions bill may not have passed 
and gone on to the Senate. 
 Apprehension about the bill’s passage was much higher in the other chamber of the 
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Vermont legislature.  Mello identifies “three factors [that] made the bill especially vulnerable 
in the Senate.” The first had to do with numbers: the Senate had thirty members as opposed 
to the one hundred and fifty members of the House, which “presented a smaller and more 
focused target against which opponents could direct their resources.”  Secondly, the Senate 
had the power to propose constitutional amendments, which the House did not.  Finally, the 
Senators had to take up the bill closer to election time.55  (Interesting, then, the Senate 
ultimately survived the 2000 election more intact than the House, maintaining its Democratic 
majority, while the House switched over to Republican control.)  Initially, there was much 
higher optimism that the Senate would support the bill than there had been for the House, but 
as time had gone on, opposition had become more vocal and antagonistic.  Supporters of the 
bill remained confident that it would pass, despite lobbying from opponents.  Several 
constitutional amendments to ban or limit civil union benefits were proposed, though none 
gained much traction, because many senators felt that had the Vermont Supreme Court 
wanted the issue to disappear – the goal of a constitutional amendment – it would have ruled 
accordingly.  Rather, “the state Supreme Court…was right to force the political process to 
grapple with the issue.”56 The Supreme Court put the issue to the other political structures 
with confidence that they would hold true to its ruling, in spite of heated opposition.  The bill 
passed the Senate thanks to the leadership of Chairman of the Senate Judiciary, Richard 
Sears, who ensured that threats to the bill’s success were minimized by emphasizing “the 
duty of the legislature to comply with the Baker court’s mandate to equalize the rights of 
same-sex couples…”57 The fact that a charismatic and supportive leader chaired the Senate 
Judiciary Committee had an obvious impact on the rest of the Senate.  Sears navigated the 
bill through the Senate, primarily because he was in the right position to do so.  Whereas in 
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Massachusetts, Speaker of the House DiMasi supported the gay marriage bill, Chairman 
Sears took the civil unions bill through the Senate successfully.  His decision to make the 
surface changes to the bill did not backfire, as the bill made it through a second House vote. 
Opponents of the bill used a two-part strategy while the bill was in the Senate, linking 
the bill to the anti-gay marriage constitutional amendments, and getting small changes into it 
so that the bill would have go back for a vote by the House’s more tenuous coalition.58  The 
first part of the strategy failed but it partly succeeded in the second objective.  The bill that 
went to the full Senate contained a number of superficial changes, which meant that if it 
passed the full Senate, it would have to go back to the House for approval.  This was an 
attempt by the Judiciary Committee to appease opponents while not altering the character of 
the proposed legislation.  Though ultimately a failure, the opposition’s strategy shows a 
genuine appreciation for the political structures at play in the debate over civil unions.  
Linking the amendments to the bill would make it far more controversial and potentially 
change its character, while knowing that the bill had less success in the House, they pushed 
to get it back there.  While they did not agree with the outcome of the civil unions initiative, 
opponents clearly tried to use various political structures to their advantage during the debate 
and voting.  Furthermore, after the bill’s passage, many of the same people worked to defeat 
the bill’s supporters at the ballot box in November in the hopes of repealing the bill.  In the 
end, the political structures in place provided lawmakers enough protection to ensure the 
successful passage of the civil unions legislation, though many of them lost their jobs in the 
process.  Without the affirmative support and directions from the Vermont Supreme Court 
acting on the basis of a unique constitutional clause, there is little reason to think that 
legislators would have challenged the “traditional” marriage paradigm.  Because of the 
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challenge to that paradigm, though, lawmakers provided legal, institutionalized benefits to 
same-sex couples, an unprecedented step in the United States and the world. 
 
Variables 
 There are two variables that may have tipped the scales in favor of same-sex union 
legislation in Vermont.  The first is Vermont’s history of protecting personal rights.  The 
Constitution of the State of Vermont lists a series of protected rights for individuals, ranging 
from “fundamental principles and virtues necessary to preserve liberty” and “all persons born 
free; their natural rights; slavery prohibited.”59  With a strong track record of protection for 
minorities and other marginalized people in society, Vermont’s tradition of strong rights 
helped lawyers and supporters of the civil rights bill argue their case.  Secondly, the bill had 
William H. Lippert, a Democratic representative, a member of the House Judiciary 
Committee, and the only openly gay lawmaker in the Vermont legislature.  Lippert made 
impassioned pleas throughout the debate process on behalf of himself, his family, and his 
fellow members of the GLBT community.  In one memorable instance, before the full House 
was due to vote, Lippert stood before his colleagues and said, “Don’t tell me what a 
committed relationship is and isn’t…There is no love and no commitment greater than what 
I’ve seen and what I’ve known.”  A conservative Republican colleague jumped up after 
Lippert concluded, saying, “I’ve just heard the greatest speech I’ve heard in my 30 
years...And that’s why I’m glad to be friend of [Lippert] and that’s why I’m glad to be on his 
side.”60 
The Neighbors: Vermont and Massachusetts 
 A comparison between the Vermont and Massachusetts experiences with gay 
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marriage initiatives is highly instructive, as it helps develop a clearer idea of what factors are 
significant for a successful bid to legalize same-sex unions.  To begin with the obvious, both 
states were firsts in how they dealt with the issue, one creating civil unions and the other 
extending marriage to gay couples.  Both were groundbreaking and set examples for other 
states regarding the legal and political process, as well as the social consequences, or lack 
thereof.  More specifically, however, three shared factors stick out: the role of the state 
supreme court, the Democratic legislature acting as an intermediary, and a tolerant citizenry.   
 The highest courts of both states provoked respective states: without their rulings in 
favor of extending legal benefits to same-sex couples, the legislators would have been highly 
unlikely to address the issue voluntarily.  The judicial mandate forced the legislature into 
action and gave lawmakers something of an excuse to give to their constituents; they could 
say they did not want to take up the issue but that they were required to do so by law.  This 
did not necessarily forgive their subsequent votes, but the courts’ decisions were paramount 
in the whole process.  In an article for the New York Times about how effective courts are at 
bring about social change, one conservative legal expert explained the significance of the 
Vermont Supreme Court’s decision.  Jay Sekulow argued: 
Vermont's finding that gay couples were discriminated against could reasonably 
have led the justices to rule that gay couples should simply be granted marriage 
licenses. But the justices did not, though one dissenting justice said they should 
have. That reluctance…stemmed from the awareness that Vermonters were not 
ready for gay marriage -- and, according to public opinion polls, most 
particularly do not believe that the decision about gay marriage should be made 
by the courts rather than the people or the lawmakers.61 
 
The same logic applies to what the court did in Massachusetts: push the legislature as far as it 
reasonably in a specific direction and let lawmakers take over.  Without this initial nudge, 
though, I argue that efforts in both states would have failed.  In Vermont, the state Supreme 
Court recognized the limits to the legislature’s willingness to challenge the marriage 
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paradigm and its patience paid off, first with civil unions as the legal equivalent of marriage, 
and now with the recent granting of full marriage to same-sex couples. 
Secondly, both Massachusetts and Vermont had Democrat-dominated legislatures, in 
the Senate and in the House, willing and able to act as the buffer between the court and the 
people.  The legislature acted as the rational body that kept the Baker ruling from going too 
far, and the people from acting on a backlash impulse.  While political affiliation does not 
necessarily rule the day, Vermont’s partisan support for the civil unions bill is notable in 
particular.  A different makeup of the legislature in either state could have changed the 
outcome of the initiative.   
Finally, polls indicate that at the time of the respective Supreme Court rulings, the 
populations of both Vermont and Massachusetts were not exceptionally open to the idea of 
same-sex unions.  In both states, only about two-fifths of the population supported the court 
rulings (38% in Vermont and 40% in Massachusetts) in polls right after the decisions came 
down.  Furthermore, Vermont’s greater opposition is to be expected given that no other state 
could model successful same-sex unions.  Nonetheless, once legislation took effect, people 
became less vocal about their opposition and slowly became more accepting of the new 
relationship paradigm.  Four years after the civil unions bill passed in Vermont, forty percent 
supported marriage and thirty-seven supported civil unions, a dramatic increase.62  After only 
one year, Massachusetts saw a sixteen percent increase in support for gay marriage, from 
forty percent to fifty-six percent.63  Though they may not have been supportive at the time, 
people of both states clearly grew to accept the idea when they were presented with no other 
choice.  In fact, Vermont’s legislature successfully legalized gay marriage in April 2009, a 
possibility that was absolutely unacceptable only a decade ago. 
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Though Vermont ultimately legalized gay marriage, Massachusetts did it right away.  
Why the two states had different outcomes, however, is due to two main factors: the 
legislature’s mandate from the court and the political backlash to the court’s decision.  In the 
Goodridge decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that there was no 
constitutional justification for excluding same-sex couples from marriage and that the 
legislature needed to adjust marriage statutes according to that ruling.  Debate in the 
Massachusetts General Court was about a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage, 
and not what to do about the SJC’s ruling.  In Vermont, on the other hand, the Supreme 
Court said that under the Common Benefits Clause, it was unconstitutional to exclude same-
sex couples from the legal benefits associated with marriage, and not necessarily marriage 
itself.  The Vermont interpretation of the plaintiff’s case left the door open for a marriage 
alternative (i.e. civil unions or domestic partnerships); the Massachusetts SJC’s interpretation 
did not.  This distinction is absolutely crucial.  The Vermont legislature had more flexibility 
in dealing with the issue and allowed lawmakers to avoid the far more controversial marriage 
route, which Massachusetts lawmakers did not.  In fact, the courts’ rulings also reflect an 
appreciation for the public opinion.  In Vermont, the court did not “force” marriage upon an 
unwilling public, and thus avoided so severe a backlash as to undermine the initiative 
entirely. The SJC, on the other hand, felt comfortable making marriage the only option, 
aware that the only recourse was a constitutional ban that probably was unlikely to be 
supported.  Both courts showed a subtle and nuanced acumen for the context in which their 
decisions were made, although the outcomes were slightly different. 
The fact that the states did not produce the same same-sex union product is also a 
result of the opposition forces involved.  Though we have seen that both states fell into a 
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realm of generally tolerant people, there were powerful, organized groups speaking out 
vocally about the courts’ decisions and the behavior of lawmakers in response.  There was a 
far more outraged group in Vermont than in Massachusetts as far as political mobilization 
goes, which was in part a product of the specific issue, but also due to the timing.  Vermont 
was arguably more “cutting edge” than Massachusetts because of when it went about 
addressing concerns of same-sex couples.  The Baker ruling came right after the wave of 
DOMAs and Hawaii’s failure to secure benefits for same-sex couples.  The country as a 
whole was not supportive of any state-sponsored effort to recognize gay relationships, and 
Vermont proved no different.  Although civil unions passed the legislature, it was not without 
an often vicious fight by advocates on both sides of the issue.  In Massachusetts, there was 
far less mobilization, which may have been do in part to the success of Vermont in dealing 
with the subject four years earlier.  Backlash was less fervent in Massachusetts because the 
only avenue opponents had to pursue was the constitutional amendment, a route not every 
opponent of gay marriage supported.  The different levels of opposition affected how much 
political risk lawmakers felt they were taking and, consequently, the direction in which they 
took the court’s ruling. 
Conclusion 
 In a 2003 editorial published three days after the Goodridge decision, the Rutland 
Herald advised Massachusetts on five lessons it could take from Vermont’s experience with 
same-sex unions.  The paper noted, “there is no escaping this issue,” and advised the people 
of Massachusetts to be respectful and tolerant, encourage dialogue, and to have a 
“willingness to forgo cheap political points…to promote a civil discourse that in the end will 
leave the state a better place.”64  There is truth to the paper’s recommendations beyond 
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Massachusetts and beyond gay marriage, as well.  Vermont and Massachusetts’ cases show 
that timing is critically important in order to gain the support of the people and to have a 
(mostly) civil and productive conversation about the issues.  A recognition that the issue is 
not going away works in the favor of advocates of gay marriage because it gives them the 
option and confidence to push forward, challenging marriage laws in courts across the 
country.  This is not to say that a judicial approach should be undertaken haphazardly, as we 
will see next in California, but rather that by targeting of states that have tolerant citizenries, 
progressive legislatures, and tough constitutional amendment procedures in which to 
challenge those laws, advocates may have more achievements sooner rather than later, as the 
recent example of Iowa might show.  Without the appropriate demographics and political 
structures, Massachusetts and Vermont would not be where they are today, with legal same-
sex marriage. 
 When Vermont became the first place in the world to provide a structure of 
exhaustive legal benefits to same-sex couples, it ensured that gay marriage and its related 
issues were not going away in the United States.  In recent years, the battle has moved to far 
larger and more complex states, in the hopes of building a coalition of supportive states, as 
well as giving legitimacy for a potential federal case.  The gay marriage movement has had 
particular success in the Northeast, but suffered a setback in the November 2008 election 
when Proposition 8 to ban gay marriage in California was approved by voters.  In the next 
chapter, we will see what precisely happened in California and what comparisons can be 
drawn between the Vermont and Massachusetts cases.  From there, we will have an even 
greater understanding of the variables that seem to lead to successful same-sex union 
outcomes and those that do not. 
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“Our nation, historically bursting with generosity toward strangers, remains remarkably 
unkind toward its own. Just under our gleaming patina of inclusiveness, we harbor 
corroding guts. America, I tell you that it doesn’t matter how many times you brush your 
teeth. If your insides are rotting your breath will stink. So, how do you people choose 
which hate to embrace, which to forgive with a wink and a week in rehab, and which to 
protest? Where’s my copy of that rule book?” 
 -Harvey Fierstein, The New York Times, 2007 
 
It also is important to understand at the outset that our task in this proceeding is not to decide 
whether we believe, as a matter of policy, that the officially recognized relationship of a 
same-sex couple should be designated a marriage rather than a domestic partnership (or some 
other termother term), but instead only to determine whether the difference in the official 
names of the relationships violates the California Constitution. 
 -California Supreme Court, In re Marriage Cases, 15 May 2008 
 
 
 
 The spotlight of gay marriage moved from Vermont in 2000, to Massachusetts in 
2004, to out West in 2008, when opponents of gay marriage put Proposition 8 on the ballot, a 
measure that would amend the California Constitution to recognize only heterosexual 
marriages.  Advocates recognized the symbolic importance of the outcome in California.  For 
opponents of same-sex marriage, California represented a large and liberal state, in which a 
successful defeat of gay marriage could show the mainstream that only Northeast enclaves 
supported homosexual relationships.  For supporters, on the other hand, California’s size and 
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generally liberal population made it a logical place to try and show that gay marriage was not 
something radical, limited to a few states only.  In short, both sides desperately wanted to 
win in California in November.  Activists on either side of the gay marriage debate were 
correct in placing so much importance on California as the next battleground for gay 
marriage.  Its size gives it considerable weight when it comes to controversial issues, and 
though generally liberal, California is a very diverse and relatively bipartisan state, making it 
a compelling indicator of where people fall on certain issues.  Proposition 8 was not the first 
time Californians voted on a gay marriage initiative; Proposition 22 in 2000 was California’s 
own Defense of Marriage Act, defining marriage as between a man and a woman only.  The 
issue went back to the voters eight years later because in May 2008, the California Supreme 
Court ruled that exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was unconstitutional.  That 
ruling overturned the gay marriage ban and opened the door for thousands of couples to 
marry from May until November, when they once again lost were excluded.  As of writing, 
the same justices who ruled in In re Marriage Cases have heard oral arguments from 
opponents of Proposition 8, who argue on a broad platform that the amendment is 
unconstitutional.  How the justices will rule in those lawsuits is unclear but there is a very 
real possibility that they will not find for gay marriage.  This chapter looks at how the gay 
marriage issue in California has played out, from ballot initiatives and court decisions, to an 
outspoken governor and charismatic mayor.  Beginning with a brief history of gay marriage 
challenges in California, I will look primarily at the last ten years, during which a number of 
initiatives have taken place and affected the trajectory of the effort.  After the contextual 
section will come the application of the analytical framework, revealing a state very different 
from Massachusetts and Vermont as regards demographics and political institutions.  I will 
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also compare and contrast these three states in order to draw further conclusions about what 
matters the most in achieving gay marriage.  Finally, based on those significant factors, I 
evaluate where California is headed, from the current oral arguments in the California 
Supreme Court and beyond. 
California: The Battleground State 
 California did not specifically define marriage as between a man and a woman until 
1977, when the legislature added language to Civil Code 4100 that made marriage a 
“personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman, to which the 
consent of the parties capable of making that contract is necessary.”1  Prior to that change, 
the code simply read “a personal relation,” although it was assumed to mean heterosexual 
relations only.  That change was relatively uncontroversial and was essentially ignored for 
the next twenty years.  In 1999, California created domestic partnerships, which allowed 
same-sex couples to enter into a legal agreement recognized by the state.  Initially, very few 
benefits were associated with the domestic partnerships, and interestingly, while most people 
have to be of the same sex to enter into such an agreement, an opposite sex couple over the 
age of sixty-two may also enter into the agreement.2  This indicates a greater concern for 
stable households than for same-sex couples, but the legislation was nonetheless a step in the 
right direction for gay couples.  Indeed, over time, the scope of the law has grown and now is 
very similar to the protections provided to married couples, although a few differences do 
remain, such as the requirement that same-sex couples must share a common residence, 
which does not apply to opposite-sex couples.3 
In 2000, opponents of same-sex marriage mobilized to put Proposition 22 to the 
people of California, a measure that would simply reaffirm the changes made in 1977 to 
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family law regarding the ability to marry in California.  The purpose of the measure, 
according to supporters, was to ensure that California would not be forced to recognize same-
sex marriages performed elsewhere.4  Led by Senator William Knight, Proposition 22 
supporters included the Mormon and Catholic churches.  Activists working for the 
initiative’s passage raised $10 million, $300,000 of which came from the Catholic church 
alone, compared to the opposition’s $6 million.5  In the days and weeks leading up to the 
vote, public opinion appeared close and undecided.  In fact, one poll reported that only seven 
percent of voters had made up their minds about the issue in the week before the vote, while 
also showing that the bill had close to fifty percent support.6  On March 7, however, 
supporters of the bill won in a landslide, capturing just over sixty-one percent of the vote and 
reinforcing the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.  The vast majority of 
California’s counties supported Prop 22, with the notable exception of the San Francisco 
area.  Four counties – San Francisco, Alameda, Santa Cruz, and Marin – opposed Prop 22, 
and approximately thirty-nine percent of voters in the whole state followed suit.7  As a result 
of the vote, legislators added Section 308.5 to the Family Code, which read, “Only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”8  While opponents of gay 
marriage thought that Prop 22 was an important validation of public opinion, from a legal 
standpoint, it was an unnecessary initiative that may have ultimately caused the anti-gay 
marriage movement far more headaches than intended. 
The overwhelming support of Proposition 22 from California voters did not have a 
practical impact on the state because it was reinforcing previously codified law.  The push 
did, however, bring the issue to the surface for many pro-gay marriage activists and gave 
them an opportunity to mobilize in response, an opportunity that may not have been available 
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had opponents of gay marriage not wanted to press the issue in the public sphere.  Prop 22 
seems to have done supporters of same-sex a favor, at least in some respects, by drawing 
attention to the issue and mobilizing supporters.  Though relatively little happened 
immediately after Prop 22, in 2004, gay marriage came back into the public’s attention in one 
of the counties that voted against the initiative four years earlier: San Francisco.  In response 
to President Bush’s State of the Union address, in which the president decried the gay 
marriage efforts of states like Massachusetts, newly-elected mayor of San Francisco, Gavin 
Newsom, decided that he would take it upon himself to challenge the California marriage 
laws.  He coordinated the effort with the San Francisco-based National Center for Lesbian 
rights, and over the course of several weeks, Newsom quietly put the wheels in motion to 
administer marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  The first ceremony was performed at 
11:06 am on February 12, 2004 between Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon, a couple who had 
fought for lesbian rights for years and was about to celebrate the fifty-first anniversary of 
their relationship on Valentine’s Day.9 
Newsom’s decision to permit gay marriage came after being in office for only twelve 
days and sparked a lively debate across the political spectrum.  While he personally 
attributed his decision to Bush’s words in the State of the Union, it was also just another in a 
longer series of events: Proposition 22, Lawrence v. Texas, and the Goodridge ruling; a series 
of events that kept gay marriage in the public conscious.  In many respects, gay marriage 
advocates have received attention without having to do anything drastic to gain it.  In an 
article written in the midst of the San Francisco’s gay marriage melee, Carolyn Lochhead 
wrote, “Same-sex marriage -- considered so radical that mainstream gay rights leaders feared 
its emergence in an election year -- has gained a level of visibility that even its most ardent 
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proponents did not imagine just two months ago.”10  Though the time may not have been 
right to do so, a handful of gay marriage proponents pushed the issue forward, from San 
Francisco to the California judiciary in only a few short weeks.  Newsom’s actions sparked 
an intense response from the rest of the state and country, and on March 11, 2004, the 
California Supreme Court halted the marriages in San Francisco.  In Lockyer v. Newsom, the 
state of California challenged the legality of Newsom’s actions, stating, “This proceeding is 
not about the constitutionality of same-sex marriage.  It is not a litmus test on marriage or 
societal values.  This case is about the proper role of public officials in carrying out their 
governmental duties.”11  The court ruled that Newsom had, in fact, overstepped the legal 
bounds of his job but held true to the parameters of the Lockyer case, making no mention of 
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, and deferring to the marriage laws on the books. 
An effort to change those laws began in the 2005-2006 legislative session, when 
Assemblymen Mark Leno introduced Bill AB 19, which would have reverted to the pre-1977 
definition of marriage, simply as a social contract between two people.  This bill passed two 
committees but died in the legislature, falling four votes short of the required majority.12  
Leno introduced another bill shortly thereafter, AB 849, which did pass the Assembly by a 
vote of 41-35 on September 7, 2005, the first gay marriage legislation to be approved by a 
legislative body in the United States.13  Immediately, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 
threatened to the veto the bill, arguing that the courts should decide the issue.14  In response, 
supporters of the bill delayed sending it to the Governor’s desk to give people time to lobby 
him to change his mind.  With a deadline of September 23, gay rights groups planned 
activities that would “highlight various segments of the population that could be affected by 
the bill, such as gay senior citizens, children of gay parents and different ethnic minority 
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groups.”15  Despite their best efforts, Schwarzenegger, though supportive of other gay rights 
legislation, vetoed the bill as promised.  In the end, the Governor’s efforts pleased few.  
Thom Lynch, head of the San Francisco Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Center, 
scoffed, “This is a governor who ran as a progressive Republican, a socially moderate 
Republican, and this is just about politics. He's playing with people's lives for political 
gain…Words alone don't mean a lot.”16  On the other hand, Randy Thomasson, president of 
Campaign for Children and Families, raged, “It's outrageous that Arnold Schwarzenegger has 
signed other radical sexual agenda bills that undermine marriage and push the transsexual 
and homosexual agenda upon other Californians, without any regard for people's moral or 
religious values.”17  Clearly, the Assembly’s efforts to legislate the issue were not going to 
provide resolution to the gay marriage question. 
While Mark Leno and his allies had worked to legalize gay marriage in the California 
legislature, the California judiciary was also addressing gay marriage.  In September 2004, a 
series of cases challenging the marriage laws on behalf of several same sex couples were 
consolidated into one case.  San Francisco Superior Court Judge, Richard Kramer, heard the 
argument, and on March 14, 2005, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs suing for gay marriage on 
the grounds that there was no state interest in keeping marriage an exclusively heterosexual 
institution, and that to do so would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
California Constitution.18  Justice Kramer’s decision was tentative, meaning that it was not 
binding until reviewed further by an appellate court.  In July, a three-judge panel heard 
arguments and in October, the state appeals court ruled in a 2-1 decision that homosexual 
couples have no right to marry in California, and extending that right to those couples would 
require lawmakers or the voters to do so.  Presiding justice William McGuinness, said “We 
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believe it is rational for the Legislature to preserve the opposite-sex definition of marriage, 
which has existed throughout history and which continues to represent the common 
understanding of marriage in most other countries and states of our union.”19  In his dissent, 
Justice Anthony Kline argued that the majority ruling was circular and promoted further 
discrimination because the ruling “demeans the institution of marriage and diminishes the 
humanity of the gay men and lesbians who wish to marry a loved one of their choice.”20  
Divided as it was, the appellate court’s ruling was short-lived, as proponents of gay marriage 
took their fight to the state’s highest court, which unanimously agreed to hear arguments on 
the issue. 
Nearly four years had passed between the California Supreme Court’s ruling that 
Mayor Gavin Newsom acted illegally when he authorized same-sex marriages in San 
Francisco, and the start of oral arguments for In re Marriage Cases in March 2008.  In that 
time, approximately three thousand same-sex couples had married, and a bill that would have 
legalized gay marriage was passed by the Assembly and then vetoed by the governor.  The 
seven-member Supreme Court appeared divided during oral arguments about whether to rule 
actively in favor of same-sex unions or to defer to the state legislature and/or the voters in 
determining how to deal with gay marriages.  The justices challenged lawyers for both sides 
on a range of positions, from comparing gay marriage to interracial marriage, and the 
“traditional” structure of marriage and its function in society.   
 Three questions from the March 4th questioning illustrate the three main concerns of the 
court.  Justice Carol Corrigan asked, “Is it for this court to decide or is it for the people of 
California to decide?” while Justice Kathryn Mickle Werdegar inquired, “Why is this the 
moment of truth as opposed to 10 years from now?”21  On the other hand, Justice Carlos 
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Moreno leveled a potent charge at the Deputy Attorney General, “Are you saying that 
separate is equal here?”22  After hours of oral arguments, the court took another two months 
to issue its ruling.  Led by Chief Justice Ronald George, a 4-3 majority struck down the 1977 
marriage definition (Section 300) and Proposition 22’s added language (Section 308.5).  In 
his 121-page opinion, Chief Justice George wrote:  
In light of the conclusions we reach concerning the constitutional questions 
brought to us for resolution, we determine that the language of section 300 
limiting the designation of marriage to a union “between a man and a woman” is 
unconstitutional and must be stricken from the statute, and that the remaining 
statutory language must be understood as making the designation of marriage 
available both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.23 
 
In the dissenting opinion, the justices felt that the court had overstepped its bounds and 
violated the separation of powers principle.  The dissenting justices opined: 
…A bare majority of this court, not satisfied with the pace of democratic change, 
now abruptly forestalls that process and substitutes, by judicial fiat, its own social 
policy views for those expressed by the People themselves.  Undeterred by the 
strong weight of state and federal law and authority majority invents a new 
constitutional right, immune from the ordinary process of legislative 
consideration.  The majority finds that our Constitution suddenly demands no 
less than a permanent redefinition of marriage, regardless of the popular will.24 
 
(It appears that the dissenting justices do not consider the marriage question one of civil 
rights and/or that the popular will ought to be considered when affording certain groups civil 
rights.)  Though powerful and encouraging for supporters of same-sex marriage, the 
legalization of gay marriage would prove short-lived, as opponents of the ruling submitted 
more than one million signatures for a ballot initiative to amend the California state 
constitution in the upcoming November election.25 
 The California Secretary of State approved the language of Proposition 8 for the 
November ballot, immediately sparking a lawsuit by supporters of gay marriage who argued 
that the proposed amendment was in fact a constitutional revision, and therefore could not be 
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decided by the people alone.26  The California Supreme Court refused to hear the case, 
brought by Equality America, and in doing so removed the last legal recourse available to 
opponents of Proposition 8 to remove that initiative from the November ballot.  Over the next 
four months, activists on both sides of the issue campaigned tirelessly on behalf of their 
position.  In the beginning, it appeared that opponents of the initiative (supporters of gay 
marriage) had the upper hand.  In July, a Field Poll showed that fifty-one percent of likely 
voters surveyed opposed Prop 8, compared to forty-two percent in support.  Only seven 
percent of voters were undecided, which was deemed a very small number for so far in 
advance of the election, and a limited audience for the campaigns to persuade.27  By early 
October, opposition was at fifty-five percent, fourteen percentage points higher than support 
for the initiative.  Only two weeks later, however, following intense advertising by 
Proposition 8 supporters, that difference had dropped to only eight percentage points.28  In 
the days leading up to the election, supporters of Proposition 8 put their hopes on getting a 
last-minute message out via the Sunday pulpit, they also hoped that their initiative would 
benefit from a last-minute surge, as seen with Proposition 22 in California and a gay-
marriage ban in Wisconsin in 2002, in which far more opponents of gay marriage vote than 
the polls indicated.  On the other side, opponents were banking on high turnout for Barack 
Obama putting the “No on 8!” side over the top.29 
 Indeed, support for Proposition 8 was far higher than the polls had indicated, jumping 
from an estimated forty-four percent before the election and ultimately receiving more than 
fifty-two percent of the vote on November 4, 2008.  Though less than the sixty-one percent 
approval Proposition 22 received in 2000, the result was sobering for supporters of same-sex 
marriage in California, who vowed to fight on despite the results.  San Francisco Mayor 
C. Madigan 
 
 
105 
Gavin Newsom said of Prop 8’s supporters, “For those who are celebrating their success ... 
don't be gleeful at the expense of human beings whose lives have been devastated by your 
point of view,” while Kim Buchanan, professor of constitutional law at the University of 
Southern California cautioned, “This fight is far from over ... and it's not unlikely that we'll 
see a group go to the ballot in the future in an attempt to enshrine the right to same-sex 
marriage in the Constitution…It's not going to be an easy battle, though, because there are 
committed people on both sides.”30  Buchanan was quite right; different groups of supporters 
of gay marriage filed legislation within days of the election, challenging the legality of the 
initiative.  Nonetheless, same-sex marriages were made illegal on November 5th, while those 
couples who had married in the months leading up to the election were left unsure of whether 
or not their marriages would continue to be recognized as valid.   
As it currently stands, the approximately 16,000 couples that married between May 
and November will continue to have legally recognized marriages, while the California 
secretary of state gave permission to sponsors to begin collecting the nearly 700,000 
signatures required to get such initiative that would undo Prop 8 on the ballot for 2010.31  
Meanwhile, oral arguments in front of the California Supreme Court began in March 2009.  
Many observers of the arguments speculate that the court will not overturn Proposition 8, 
despite the earlier ruling in favor of gay marriage.  In an article for Time, Michael 
Lindenberger writes: 
Even the lawyers who are asking the court to declare Prop. 8 invalid because it is 
more like a constitutional revision — which would require approval by 
lawmakers as well as by voters — conceded, when asked by the court, that there 
is essentially no precedent in the court's history that directly supports their 
position. “We have a pretty well established body of law pertaining to what is 
and what is not a revision, and those decisions do not give strong support to your 
position that the people couldn't do when they did when they invalidated or 
disagreed with one aspect of the marriage decision," Kennard said. "Our past 
decisional law doesn't support the argument that the people couldn't do what they 
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did.”
32
 
 
The court has up to ninety days to issue a ruling in the case, and while both Chief Justice 
Ronald George and Associate Justice Joyce Kennard apparently wish they could overrule 
Proposition 8, based on their questions to counsel from both parties, there is reason to believe 
that they will not.  Though gay marriage was tantalizing close in California, the effort thus 
far has fallen short of its goal. 
Applying the Framework 
 Why did California end up with such a different process and outcome than did 
Massachusetts and Vermont?  Known for its progressive politics and colorful history, on the 
surface California was a strong, albeit risky, next-step for supporters of gay marriage.  
Several factors in all three parts of the framework – demographic, political structures, and 
variables – affected the outcome of the push for gay marriage, particularly the role the 
California Supreme Court played.  California’s experience was also far more volatile in terms 
of its back-and-forth nature than Massachusetts or Vermont’s experiences, which meant that 
the process has occurred over a far longer period of time.  While there is certainly a 
possibility that gay marriage can be re-legalized by voters in another election, for the time 
being, same-sex couples in California must accept domestic partnerships for legal recognition 
by the state.  Interestingly, voters remained divided about the general idea of same-sex 
marriage after Proposition 8, particularly about the mechanism with which such marriages 
should be treated under the law.  The Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) noted that 
“Among those voting no on Proposition 8 in the November election, only 8% are opposed to 
same-sex marriage – an 11-point decline from [the] October pre-election survey.”33  That 
eight percent probably consists of people who, though they oppose gay marriage, do not want 
C. Madigan 
 
 
107 
to amend the constitution in order to do so.  In addition, no other ballot measure put to 
California voters drew more than five percent of voters, compared to Prop 8’s sixty three 
percent.  In essence, awareness of and support for gay marriage continues to increase in 
California, even with all of the setbacks. 
 The framework used to evaluate Massachusetts and Vermont demographics is slightly 
different for California because there is far more information about how different groups 
voted on Proposition 8 than there was regarding public opinion in either of the two Northeast 
states.  In California, there is only .4% difference between the number of males and females, 
according to the 2000 Census and no polling data about the levels of support for the initiative 
for each gender.  As a result, I have replaced gender in this chapter with a section that looks 
at race/ethnicity and socioeconomic factors that played a far more significant part in 
determining the outcome of Proposition 8 than gender.  This will not affect the comparison 
between the three state case studies due to the fact that gay marriage initiatives never actually 
went to voters in either Massachusetts or Vermont. 
Demographics 
Age 
 Voter turnout among different age groups supported the previous asserted Pew 
conclusions that younger people tend to support gay marriage at a higher rate than older 
people do.  The PPIC study used three groups, 18-34, 35-54, and 55+, and support for 
Proposition 8 increased with age.  In each of the three groups, support for Prop 8 (against gay 
marriage) rose from 43% to 50% to 56% respectively, and opposition to it declined 57% to 
50% to 44%, respectively.34  A further breakdown based on exit polling indicates that 
opposition was highest among 18-24 year olds (64%) and then 25-29 year olds (59%), as 
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compared to only 39% among those 65 and older.35 Interestingly, race did not appear to have 
a significant impact on support for Prop 8 among the different age groups.  Although there 
was a slight difference between white 18-24 year-olds Latinos of the same age (67% and 
59%, respectively), for example, that difference was smaller than many people anticipated 
after the election.  Given that 25.4% of the California population was between eighteen-and-
thirty-four in the 2000 Census, this is perhaps an indicator for supporters of same-sex 
marriage that the marriage ban from Prop 8 could be overturned.36 
 
Race & Socioeconomics 
 Immediately after the election, pundits began shouting that black voters had tipped 
the scale in favor of banning gay marriage.  Andrew Pugno, general counsel of 
ProtectMarriage.com, said, “Really, Hispanic and black voters in California passed 
Proposition 8…Inner-city black neighborhoods voted stronger for Prop 8 than the Republican 
suburbs. An amazing analysis.”37  It was a particularly amazing analysis in that it was not 
actually accurate, as many commentators pointed out in the weeks following the election.  
Hendrik Hertzberg of The New Yorker, wrote: 
Some conservative commentators, who didn’t have much else to gloat about, 
dwelt lingeringly on what they evidently regarded as the upside of the huge, 
Obama-sparked African-American turnout. “It was the black vote that voted 
down gay marriage,” Bill O’Reilly, of Fox News, insisted triumphantly—and, it 
turns out, wrongly. If exit polling is to be believed, seventy per cent of 
California’s African-American voters did indeed vote yes on Prop. 8, as did 
upward of eighty per cent of Republicans, conservatives, white evangelicals, and 
weekly churchgoers. But the initiative would have passed, barely, even if not a 
single African-American had shown up at the polls.
38
 
 
Mark Balderasse, president of the Public Policy Institute of California, which conducted a 
more complete analysis after the election, observed, “Among both whites and non-whites, 
among non-college graduates and lower-income voters, Prop. 8 won. It seems to me that 
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some of what we attributed to race and ethnic differences really had to do with a 
socioeconomic divide in regard to same-sex marriage.”39  Indeed, 57% of college graduates 
opposed Prop 8, compared to only 31% of people with an attainment of high school or less.  
That difference was almost the same for income: 55% of those making $80,000 or more 
opposed the initiative, while 37% of people making less than $40,000 supported it.40  There 
is a certain element of circularity in this data, given that black and Hispanics are more likely 
to be low-income and have less education than their white counterparts, but attributing the 
success solely to race was simply inaccurate.  A more complex dynamic within a general 
category of socioeconomics was the more compelling indicator of support for Proposition 8. 
 
Religious Affiliation 
 As it proves to be in almost all circumstances related to gay marriage, religious 
affiliation was a strong indicator of a person’s position on Proposition 8.  California is home 
to a substantial number of evangelical Protestants (18%), black Protestants (4%), and 
Catholics (31%), compared to the rest of the country.41  Evangelical Christians supported 
Prop 8 in higher numbers than any other surveyed group, with 85% in support, while 
Catholics also turned out in large numbers for the initiative at a rate of 60%. More generally, 
a strong religious commitment led to support of the measure, indicating that the 
aforementioned strategy of relying on the pulpit to garner support paid off.  Indeed, “exit 
polls showed that the one-third of Tuesday's voters who attended church weekly supported 
the measure by an overwhelming 84 percent to 16 percent…”42 On the flipside, 79% of 
voters who said they had no religion opposed the measure,43 and those who said they never 
attended religious services showed 83% opposition to Prop 8.44 These findings are consistent 
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with opinions nationally and, more specifically, in Massachusetts and Vermont regarding 
religious affiliation and feelings toward gay marriage.  Mark DiCamillo, director of the Field 
Poll, noted, “What the exit polls say is that religion trumps party affiliation when it comes to 
social issues.”
45
  
 
Political Affiliation 
Political affiliation generally comes in on the heels of religion as an indicator of gay 
marriage support, and California was no exception to that trend.  Political parties add an 
interesting dimension to a discussion of Prop 8 because the ballot measure coincided with an 
historic presidential election with many new voters flocking to the polls in support of Barack 
Obama.  The Democratic Party was in some respect split between two of its most committed 
groups, minorities, particularly African-Americans, and gays.  California’s outcome on Prop 
8 best embodies the Pew data showing a marked difference between moderate Democrats 
and liberal Democrats in their support of gay marriage.  “Liberal” did not mean Democrat on 
this issue: 65% of Democrats opposed Proposition 8, while 82% of self-described liberals 
opposed it.  On the other hand, “Conservative” was much more likely to mean Republican, as 
83% of conservatives supported Prop 8 and 77% of Republicans did also.  Moderates and 
Independents were far more divided; the former split 52-48 in favor of Prop 8, while the 
latter split evenly 50-50.
46
   
There were several groups that broke ranks with party affiliation, as well.  Exit polls 
showed that 94% of black voters in California voted for Obama, who had publicly supported 
the “No-on-8” position, and yet 70% supported the measure.
47
  Catholics also voted for 
Obama at a high rate (59%) but supported Prop 8 even more strongly, with 64% in favor of 
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banning gay marriage.
48
  Eighty-three percent of new voters supported Obama in the election 
and supported Proposition 8 62-38, compared with more experienced voters who only 
supported the measure 56-44.
49
  Though political party affiliation had substantial bearing on 
support for Proposition 8, it was certainly not definitive and was trumped by other 
characteristics in a several cases. 
 
Political Structures 
 In California, the most notable factor when considering how the political structures 
influenced the gay marriage effort is the political structure absent from the process: the 
legislature.  Indeed, though lawmakers tried to pass various bills, the issue was directly in the 
hands of the people for the vast majority of the time.  The legislature has played very little 
role in gay marriage, though it was responsible for creating limited domestic partnerships for 
same-sex couples.  Initiatives relating to gay marriage started with the people and then went 
to the courts, and then back to the people.  The legislature’s actions on this issue were 
essentially tangential to the real proceedings that actually determined whether or not gay 
marriage would be legalized.  The courts played a passive role in gay marriage proceedings, 
ruling on the smallest scope of the issue possible.  Although the Supreme Court effectively 
legalized gay marriage in response to the Prop 22 challenge, it repeatedly refused to buttress 
that position by ruling explicitly for gay marriage or including the state legislature in 
deciding how the state should deal with the issue.  The hesitation to rule consistently in favor 
of gay marriage undermined the Supreme Court’s ability to move the state toward same-sex 
marriage.  Instead, the issue rested almost exclusively with the people and their particular 
feelings on gay marriage, which, like the vast majority of the country, were not favorable 
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opinions.    
Beginning with Proposition 22, California voters reinforced existing marriage laws to say 
that only those between a man and a woman were recognized by the state of California, 
bringing to the fore the issue of same-sex marriages.  The overwhelming support for the 
measure served to reiterate the intolerance for gay marriage, but it also provided supporters 
of gay marriage an opportunity to gauge how steep the road before them actually was.  In 
addition, the Prop 22 vote indicated in which counties support for gay marriage was highest, 
and of particular note was San Francisco County.  When Gavin Newsom was elected mayor 
of San Francisco four years later, he was clearly aware of San Francisco’s history of gay 
activism and position on Proposition 22, and thus when he decided to challenge marriage 
laws, he did so in the most supportive context possible.  Nonetheless, backlash from far less 
supportive counties and the rest of California was swift and fierce.  While daring, it appears 
that Newsom’s actions may have done more harm than good to the cause overall.  By forcing 
the issue, Newsom caused an emotional stir in the rest of the state and emotional voters tend 
not to be as rationale or tolerant as they might ordinarily be.  Supporters of Proposition 8 
later used Newsom as the face of their campaign when he officiated at the wedding of a 
Lesbian teacher, who brought her first-graders along to the ceremony.  Professor of political 
communications at California State University Sacramento, Barbara O’Connor, observed, 
“His pictures have become the rallying cry for Prop. 8. It's unfortunate for him, and it's 
unfortunate for the anti-Prop. 8 campaign…I don't know that I would change his behavior, 
because he's representing his constituency, and he's been totally consistent in his position. 
But he's become everyone's worst nightmare.”
50
  While one can respect his political charisma 
and willingness to do what he and the majority of his constituents thought was the right 
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thing, the choice to permit giving marriage licenses to same-sex couples was strategically 
flawed and politically detrimental to the state-wide effort because he acted independently and 
without a legal mandate to do so. 
 The California Supreme Court’s ruling in 2008 in In re Marriage Cases, which ruled 
that Proposition 22 and laws barring same-sex marriages were unconstitutional, magnified 
the negative impact of Newsom’s choice to issue marriage licenses to gay couples.  
Unsurprisingly, opponents of gay marriage rallied against the decision, submitting nearly 
double the requisite signatures for a November ballot measure to amend the California state 
constitution.  Backers of the decision challenged the legality of such a measure on the 
grounds that it qualified as a constitutional revision, and not simple an amendment.  San 
Francisco City Attorney Dennis Herrera explained the difference: 
We're saying that the process for putting Prop. 8 on the ballot was fundamentally 
flawed…For the electorate to change the nature of the equal protections clause of 
the California Constitution, it would require a constitutional revision. That means 
that you need a two-thirds vote of the Legislature before you can even put it on 
the ballot -- that's not what happened in November. Prop. 8 was instead treated as 
a constitutional amendment and brought directly to the voters…Prop. 8 also 
drastically altered the structure of state government; it stopped the courts from 
applying the equal protection clause of the California Constitution to a protected 
class of citizens, those being gay folks.
51
 
 
Later in the interview, Herrera explained how little exists by way of legal guidelines for 
making such a distinction, which makes the challenge to convince the California Supreme 
Court that much more difficult.  When opponents of putting Prop 8 on the ballot made this 
argument, the court demurred.  Had the court made the inclusion of the legislature as part of 
the process, it would have been far more difficult to pass a measure like Proposition 8, 
especially given the fact that the state legislature had shown support for gay marriage 
previously.  Though there was no guarantee of how many people would vote for Proposition 
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8, and there was no constitutional obligation to do so, the court could have made it far more 
challenging to make gay marriage unconstitutional under California law.
*
 
 California’s highest court acted within its purview in refuting the constitutional 
revision claim, which highlights the deeper and perhaps more important issue of the ease 
with which the state constitution can be amended.  Unlike Vermont and Massachusetts, 
California law does not necessarily require legislative input for constitutional amendments.  
In both Vermont and Massachusetts, however, that involvement was critical for a successful 
legalization of same-sex unions.  Without a representative body working as an intermediary 
between the people and the law, gay marriage had a much smaller chance of success. There 
was no “scrutiny period,” either, in which those charged with deciding on gay marriage could 
process and reconsider their position and not simply act emotionally or rashly.  Though 
constitutional and democratic by most definitions, allowing the vote to go straight to the 
people without any checks on their power seems contrary to the ideals of protecting the 
minority from the tyranny of the majority.  In an Opinion piece for the San Diego Union-
Tribune, the authors write: 
Consider that the groups behind a pending initiative amending the California 
Constitution to ban gay marriage welcomed the Supreme Court ruling, saying it 
would "ignite" voters who pushed Proposition 22 to easy passage eight years ago. 
Even before the ruling, supporters of the proposed constitutional amendment had 
no trouble gathering 1.1 million signatures, all but ensuring its placement on the 
November ballot. The result is likely to be an imposition of the ban on gay 
marriage in the state constitution and a return to the status quo. The Proposition 
22 ban was an initiative statute, not part of the constitution…We think it's 
difficult to believe a sweeping court ruling is the best way to resolve the gay-
marriage question…A case can be made that an evolution of incremental change 
driven by changing public perceptions is preferable.52 
 
This position has gained much traction among a variety of different supporters of gay rights, 
                                                
* Oral arguments on this issue took place in March 2009 and the California Supreme Court, at time of writing, 
had yet to rule on the merits of the constitutional revision argument. 
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but to apply it to all cases is at best foolish and at worst ignorant of context.  In 
Massachusetts and Vermont, the high court decisions required the generally tolerant citizenry 
to become even more accepting of a new marriage paradigm.  The courts were able to do this 
because of how difficult constitutional amendments would be and because their rulings were 
directed at the legislatures first and voters second.  In California, the generally tolerant 
citizenry was ripe for conditioning, but the court did not have the fallback of a legislative 
buffer between its ruling and the wider public.  Without all three, gay marriage has failed in 
California, at least for the time being. 
 
Variables 
 A few factors in particular led to the success of Proposition 8 and the successful bid 
to make gay marriage unconstitutional.  First, the candidacy of Barack Obama dramatically 
increased the number of new and minority voters in California, and both groups 
overwhelmingly supported Prop 8.  Despite Obama’s own position against Proposition 8, 
groups that voted in large numbers for him did not hesitate to vote against his position for 
themselves.  Another major factor was financing.  On October 18, 2008, campaigns for and 
against Prop 8 had raised a combined $56 million, making it the most expensive social-issue 
election issue in American history.53  By the day of the election, however, the combined total 
raised by the two campaigns was $83 million, a twenty-seven million dollar increase in just 
over two weeks, and much of it went to the “Yes-on-8” campaign.  Members of the Mormon 
Church were the biggest donors, with estimates that they spent $20 million in support of the 
gay marriage ban.54 The huge influx of money for both campaigns made it possible to run 
expensive advertising campaigns, including the one of Mayor Newsom’s participation in 
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“teaching” homosexuality to young students.  Though there was substantial outcry about the 
honesty of the “Yes-on-8” claims, they were nonetheless effective at communicating to 
voters that their families, and ergo society at large, would be threatened by gay marriages.  A 
final variable that set California apart was its sheer size.  California is not a small state in the 
Northeast that can claim a relatively homogenous population and to be a gay enclave.  Gay 
marriage in California would have a far wider impact on the rest of the country than 
Massachusetts or Vermont could, and as a result, more people were willing to fight for their 
position in a way that they might not in other states.  When these three variables are 
considered in conjunction with the demographic and political structures that impacted the gay 
marriage effort in California, one gets a clearer picture about which factors matter the most in 
achieving legalization of same-sex marriage. 
 
East Coast v. West Coast 
 California did not succeed in legalizing gay marriage because the state Supreme 
Court did not mandate gay marriage in its ruling, and therefore did not positively initiate 
same-sex unions in Massachusetts and Vermont.  Furthermore, the citizens were charged 
with voting on an emotional issue without the legislature acting as an intermediary between a 
controversial court ruling and a direct vote from the people.  In Massachusetts, the legislature 
ensured that the amendment to ban gay marriage did not reach the people, and in Vermont, 
with even more strict guidelines for constitutional amendment, the legislature protected the 
rights of same-sex couples.  In both states, the action of the legislature provided the “scrutiny 
period,” in which the citizens could adjust to the reality of having legal recognition of gay 
relationships rather than acting immediately on their objections.  This period did not occur in 
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California, and the state Supreme Court did not provide such a scrutiny period or the 
legislative intermediary though it could have done so.  Three potent variables – an historic 
election, vast amounts of money, and the size of California – all supported the implications 
of the demographic and political structures.  The variables credited with affecting the 
outcome of the vote were mostly negative, and these variables simply did not exist for the 
cases in Massachusetts and Vermont.  As for who or what really pushed the issue onto the 
main stage in each of these states, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the 
Vermont Supreme Court both mandated action from the legislature in protecting same-sex 
unions, which the California Supreme Court did not do.  Further, the California court did not 
do all it could have done to add that extra legislative step in the process for further 
consideration.  Finally, there was no Mayor Newsom in Massachusetts or Vermont that 
prematurely forced the issue into the public arena and caused serious backlash.  The state 
supreme courts in both the Bay State and the Green Mountain state were responsible for 
addressing gay marriage and were far less vulnerable targets than Newsom proved to be.  In 
sum, the political process, demographic considerations, and external influences in California 
proved to be far too much for gay marriage, whereas in the two New England States, those 
various factors were far better situated to ensure the legal recognition and protection of same-
sex unions. 
 
Conclusion 
Supporters of gay marriage in California are working to get enough signatures to put 
gay marriage back on the 2010 state ballot, this time in support of legalization.  If they 
succeed and the amendment passes, there will no doubt be further lawsuits and objections 
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from opponents of such a change.  Passage of a constitutional amendment legalizing gay 
marriage in 2010 will have taken ten years of active and passionate work from both sides of 
the issue, and may continue on for many years.  There is little doubt that California will 
indeed legalize gay marriage in the not-so-distant future, but questions remain as to whether 
or not the path it took was the most efficient or effective not only legalizing such marriages, 
but also cultivating a society that actually accepts them, as people now do in Massachusetts 
and Vermont.  Demographically, California is far more diverse than many states and thus has 
to account for a variety of different viewpoints on the issue, a real social challenge.  The 
political structures are not conducive to dealing with controversial issues that affect society at 
large on a deeply emotional level.  If the examples of Massachusetts and Vermont are any 
indication, if the California Supreme Court does indeed rule that Prop 8 amounted to a 
constitutional revision and thus needs the approval of the legislature, chances for legalization 
of gay marriage will soar.  If not, gay marriage will eventually make it back to the people for 
another vote and perhaps next time, or the time after, Proposition 8 will be reversed. 
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“Marriage is the legally recognized union of two people. Gender-specific terms relating to 
the marital relationship or familial relationships…must be construed to be gender-neutral for 
all purposes throughout the law, whether in the context of statute, administrative or court 
rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law.” 
 -An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom 
 
“Picture a country where you could lose your job for expressing moral reservations about 
homosexuality—or even worse, where the public voicing of such opposition could be a 
crime. You do not have to imagine such an Orwellian land: it is increasingly becoming a 
reality in the United States of America.  This has long been the goal of radical gay activists.” 
 -Timothy J. Dailey, “The Other Side of Tolerance,” for the Family Research Council 
 
 
 
 The most enterprising part of this work is contained in this chapter: my prediction 
state.  The other three case studies have all addressed the issue of gay marriage directly, and 
while there may be more to be done, all of them have made some sort of ruling that holds as 
law for the time being.  The Maine legislature voted back in 1997, at the height of DOMA 
votes, to ban gay marriage.  The issue is back on the table, however, as the Maine legislature 
prepares to consider a bill sponsored by Representative Dennis Damon that would legalize 
same-sex marriages and recognize those same-sex marriages from other states.  This issue 
could be decided in the next few months, making Maine a natural choice as the state with 
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which to test my framework.  Maine is not alone in the Northeast when it comes to 
considering gay marriage legislation; New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, and New 
Jersey are all at varying stages of considering legislation that would legalize gay marriage, 
and Vermont just legalized gay marriage, the first to do so by legislative process.  The two 
most northern states appear to be the most likely to pass such legislation in the next several 
months.  As of writing, New Hampshire has already passed a version of a same-sex marriage 
bill in one of the chambers of the legislature, though its governor has publicly expressed 
opposition to gay marriage.  In Maine, the bill sponsored by Rep Damon has sixty additional 
sponsors from both the House and Senate, while Governor Jim Baldacci, though opposed to 
gay marriage, has not publicly announced how he would respond to such a bill.  Much like 
every other state that has become a marriage battleground, activists on both sides of the issue 
are gearing up for lobbying, media campaigns, and demonstrations on behalf of their 
position.  Given the immediacy of the Maine bill and the potential for New England to be an 
example of tolerance, Maine was the logical choice to test out the application of my 
framework on a state that has a Defense of Marriage Act and only minimal protections for 
same-sex couples in its Domestic Partnership Registry.  Determining the outcome of the 
current same-sex legislation is a two-part process, one institutional and one demographic.  
On the institutional end, the Maine legislature is charged with passing the proposed gay 
marriage bill, which it can do without fear of causing a backlash in the form a constitutional 
amendment to ban such unions because in Maine only the legislature can initiative 
amendments to the constitution.  From a demographic standpoint, the people may override 
the legislature’s action on the bill in the form of a “people’s veto.”  If opponents of gay 
marriage can collect enough signatures to place such a veto on the ballot, voters can repeal 
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the bill and force the issue back to the legislature.  In Maine, the institutional and 
demographic factors have some interplay but will mostly operate independently of each other 
on the gay marriage bill. 
Maine and Massachusetts: Together Again? 
 On January 14, 2009, Representative Dennis Damon, Democrat of Trenton, and about 
seventy supporters gathered on the steps of the Maine State House for a press conference.  
Damon announced his intention to sponsor a bill legalizing same-sex marriage in Maine, 
asserting, “Some have asked if this is the right time. To them, I say, this legislation is long 
overdue.”
1
  Whether because of elections or other legislative responsibilities, timing is 
always a concern with gay marriage.  Many people question the timing of Damon’s bill 
because they feel that the economic crisis ought to take center stage in Maine’s 124
th
 
legislative session, while others wonder if the people of Maine are ready to accept gay 
marriage in their state.  (Interestingly, a recently published study by researchers at the 
Williams Institute documents the economic benefits that legalizing gay marriage would have 
for Maine.  They conclude “allowing same-sex couples to marry in Maine is a gain of 
approximately $60 million to Maine’s businesses and workers, and $3.6 million in state and 
local government revenues over the next three years.”2)  LD 1020, as “An Act to End 
Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom,” is known, has to overcome 
several hurdles before it would become law.  The first is approval from both the Maine 
House and the Senate, and then support from the governor.  In addition, Maine has a unique 
constitutional construct called the “people’s veto,” in which voters can veto a piece of 
legislation in an election.  In 2005, the Maine legislature passed a law to protect gays and 
lesbians from discrimination in employment, housing, education, public accommodation, and 
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credit, which went to the people in a referendum.  The repeal was rejected, 55% to 45%, but 
this ultimate passage masks the fact that it took ten years and three votes for the anti-
discrimination bill to actually become law.
3
  All indicators show that an effort to repeal any 
gay marriage legislation in a people’s veto is almost guaranteed, which very much affects 
any prediction of the outcome of Damon’s bill. 
 In 1997, Maine passed its own Defense of Marriage Act, which stated simply, 
“Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage.”
4
  Same-sex marriage became the fifth 
marriage prohibition according to Maine law, in the company of polygamy and degrees of 
consanguinity.  A group called Concerned Maine Families assembled more than 60,000 
signatures to put the one-man, one-woman definition of marriage before the legislature, 
resulting in the DOMA.
5
 After that, same-sex union issues were largely sidelined until 2004, 
when the Maine legislature considered and passed legislation creating domestic partnerships.  
The 2004 law, “An Act to Promote the Financial Security of Maine’s Families and Children,” 
created a domestic partnerships registry which allowed same-sex couples to register their 
relationship and receive some of the benefits civilly married heterosexual couples did.  All 
parties involved were quick to point out that domestic partnerships do not qualify as 
marriage.  In the document provided by the Department of Health & Human Services 
regarding the instructions and information for domestic partnerships, there is a large red 
exclamation point, drawing one’s attention to a notice.  The notice reads: 
It is important to remember that a registered domestic partnership is NOT the 
same as a marriage and does not entitle partners to rights other than those for 
which the registry was intended.  This registry is intended to allow individuals to 
have rights of inheritance as well as the rights to make decisions regarding 
disposal of their deceased partners remains. 6 
 
C. Madigan 
 
 
125 
In many instances, politicians have argued that a non-marriage alternative for same-sex 
couples is sufficient, but in Maine, lawmakers and other government officials made it 
abundantly clear that domestic partnerships were not the same thing.  Furthermore, unlike 
Vermont’s civil unions that afforded all the rights of marriage to gay couples but without the 
title, Maine’s registry does not create an equal alternative to marriage.   
 Despite the limited nature of the domestic partnerships legislation, a backlash from 
staunchly anti-gay marriage activists occurred.  In 2005, Representative Brian Duprey, 
Republican from Hampden, introduced LD 1294, a constitutional amendment, to the 
legislature.  The text read: 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or 
recognized by this State and its political subdivisions.  This State and its political 
subdivisions may not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of 
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage.7 
 
Not only would the amendment have banned gay marriage, it would also have done away 
with domestic partnerships and civil unions, barring same-sex couples from any legal 
protections under Maine law.  Opposition to the bill came from some high places, including 
Attorney General Steven Rowe, who argued, “This ... is, I believe, contrary to the concepts of 
freedom, fairness, human dignity and equality upon which our state constitution is based.”  
He further warned “that the change could undermine existing state statutes such as those 
protecting unmarried victims of domestic violence and those granting domestic partner 
benefits to unmarried couples.”8  Unlike a change to state law that only requires a simple 
majority, two-thirds of the legislature would have had to vote in favor of an amendment in 
order for it to then go to the people for a vote.  The House voted 88-56 against the bill, a 
landslide defeat and making the Senate’s 19-15 defeat almost irrelevant.9 
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 Three years later, Representative Damon introduced his bill that would legalize gay 
marriage entirely, a move that is simultaneously a strong message of advocacy for gay 
couples, but also one that may result in a backlash in the form of a people’s veto.  Unlike in 
California, voters cannot amend the constitution on their own and, given the legislature’s 
rejection of such an amendment three years ago, it is highly unlikely that one would succeed 
now. Opponents of same-sex marriage failed to find a legislator to sponsor another 
amendment but plan to try again for 2010.  In fact, as of right now, it appears quite likely that 
LD 1020 will pass both the House and Senate, given how many sponsors have signed on.  
The remaining question marks are the potential for a governor or people’s veto.  A public 
hearing on the bill is scheduled for April 24, 2009, after which the legislature will take up 
debate.   
 
Applying the Model 
Demographics 
 New England states are often grouped together by similar demographic landscapes.  
Maine looks very much like Vermont and Massachusetts in its population makeup, 
particularly when it comes to religion and political party membership, as well as a more 
general connection between age and religious affiliation. There is no public opinion polling 
data at the time of writing, and thus the demographic model is applied without parameters 
ordinarily provided by that information.  An analysis of the overlapping demographic data 
will determine whether there is reason to believe that Maine has the “tolerant citizenry” 
required to successfully legalize gay marriage.  The interactions between age, gender, 
religion, and politics that tend to be generally accepting of gay marriage appear to hold true 
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in Maine, meaning a logical conclusion to draw is that Maine has a tolerant citizenry, much 
like those in Massachusetts and Vermont.   
 
Age 
 In order to account accurately for age trends in Maine, I adjusted the data from the 
2000 Census by factoring in the fact that a ten-year age difference is substantial when 
considering public opinion towards gay marriage.  Individuals who were ten in 2000 are now 
of voting age, and they came of age over a period in which two neighboring states legalized 
same-sex unions in a very public way.  According to a Pew survey, support for gay marriage 
is dramatically improved when someone has in some capacity been exposed to an individual 
who identifies as GLBTQ.10  In Massachusetts, a huge jump in support for gay marriage 
occurred once such nuptials actually began taking place and people saw that there were no 
adverse societal effects.  The common variable between the Pew findings and the 
Massachusetts results is that exposure to homosexuality, broadly defined, increases support 
for gay rights, particularly gay marriage.  Consequently, fifteen percent of the voting-age 
population witnessed same-sex unions taking place across the border for much of their teen 
and early adult years.  Lee Swislow, executive director of Gay and Lesbian Advocates and 
Defenders, explains, “One of the advantages of New England is that we share geography and 
media markets, so folks in other states have seen marriage in Massachusetts for five years 
and can see the good.  I think the efforts build on each other. What happens in one state 
inspires folks in other states…”11 There is good reason to think that the sharing to which 
Swislow refers has improved the likelihood that gay marriage will be legalized in Maine and 
other New England states. 
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 With the adjusted figures based on the 2000 Census data, Maine has a different age 
breakdown than Massachusetts and Vermont.  The difference in the number of young and old 
people is far less stark; the 18-32 year old group is only 19.7% of the population, while the 
oldest group, those who are 68 and older, makes up 16.8%.12  This difference of less than 
three percent compares to differences of more than ten percent in Massachusetts and nearly 
nine percent in Vermont.  Voter pattern data has indicated that younger people are less likely 
to vote than older people, which gives the generally anti-gay marriage, older population a 
greater voice at the polls.  The age bloc of 33-52 year olds constitutes the largest portion of 
the population at 29.1% and the 53-67 year old bloc makes up 20.5%.13  These two in-
between segments of the population are likely, then, to be targeted by the two campaigns, 
both because of their size and diversity of the opinions within the groups. 
Gender: 
 The number of men and women in Maine makes for a less-clear indicator of how gay 
marriage is perceived and thus how it could be received by the Maine public if the legislature 
legalizes it.  In 2000, women made up a slightly larger portion of the population – 51.3% 
than the men, which is consistent with the other three case studies.  If national public opinion 
data holds for Maine, as well as the fact that women are more likely to vote than males, a 
potential people’s veto could be posed with a real challenge from a gender-based perspective.  
Another interesting gender issue pertains to the genders of same-sex couples in Maine.  
According to the “Census Snapshot” of Maine by the Williams Institute, there are more 
lesbian couples than male gay couples in Maine, with the former representing 56% of same-
sex couples and the latter 44%.14  In national opinion surveys, men are more tolerant of 
lesbians than of gay men and thus the greater number of lesbian couples may serve to boost 
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overall support for same-sex marriage.15  I am inclined to think that gender will be the least 
influential aspect of demography in the case of a people’s veto in Maine, but it is very much 
worth considering as part of a larger picture.   
 
Religious Affiliation: 
 As expected, religion, or a lack thereof, matters in Maine as it did in Massachusetts, 
Vermont, and California.  Trinity College sociologist, and co-director of a survey for USA 
Today on gay marriage in New England, Barry Kosmin, observes, “Given that 25% of GenX 
(those ages 29 to 42) and GenY (ages 18 to 28) are nones [have no expressed religion 
affiliation], this is where we are headed.  It's a standoff between young people with a 
tremendous sympathy for civil rights and what appears to be biblical injunctions from 
religion.”16  Neither religion nor age demographics definitively indicate the outcome of a 
same-sex initiative, but as Kosmin and others point out, public opinion is trending in the 
direction of acceptance and not the other way around.   
Maine, like much of New England, is not particularly religious.  The Gallup survey 
rated Maine as third on the least religious states list, behind Vermont and New Hampshire 
and one ahead of Massachusetts.17  Evangelical Protestants, black and white, make up about 
15% of the population, a number well below the national average of 26%, while Maine also 
has more mainline Protestants (26%) than the national average (18%).  While California and 
Massachusetts had more than thirty percent of their populations identify as Catholic, Maine 
has 29% Catholics (Figure 7.1).  Finally, the unaffiliated group or, as Kosmin calls them, 
“nones,” make up a substantial part of the Maine population, far more than Massachusetts. 18 
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Religion/Denomination Maine Country 
   
Evangelical Protestant 15% 26% 
Mainline Protestant 26% 18% 
Hist. Black Protestant <.5% 7% 
Catholic 29% 24% 
Unaffiliated 25% 16% 
Figure 7.1 
 
 Religion continues to be a rallying cry for opponents of same-sex marriage.  Tony 
Perkins is the president of the Family Resource Council in Washington D.C., an offshoot of 
James Dobson’s Focus on the Family.  At an opposition protest, Perkins opened the event 
with a prayer that began, “This is not our battle, Lord, it is your battle.  We are simply 
reporting for duty.”19  Representative Richard Cebra, R-Naples, implored the crowd to “put 
on the armor of God.”20  This language of a divine fight is a compelling rallying cry for 
opponents of same-sex marriage, particularly when used in conjunction with more secular 
language of traditions, family values, and the good of society.  Religious organizations 
constitute a large part of the mobilization apparatus for the opposition in Maine, called the 
Maine Marriage Project.  The project encompasses various denominations of evangelicals, 
the Roman Catholic diocese, and other conservative Christian groups.  The presence of the 
Christian-based opposition movement is unmistakable in Maine, but may be offset by a few 
variables.  In the Vermont media during the civil unions debate, newspapers quoted at length 
religious leaders and religious-affiliated individuals who opposed the creation of civil unions.  
In the Maine public discourse, there are two notable differences.  Firstly, there are fewer 
indications that a huge movement has rallied around the cause based on religious persuasion 
alone.  In my analysis, there is simply a less confident religious voice in Maine than there 
seemed to be in Vermont, the state with the most-similar religious profile.  Secondly, there is 
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a strong coalition of clergy in Maine that supports gay marriage and does so publicly and 
actively.  A vocal theological opposition did not appear in any meaningful way in the three 
previous case studies, and this is a significant difference.  Another important consideration 
that is not unique to Maine is the limitations of the religious message to reach undecided and 
non-religious people.  Religion will have its potent role in the Maine gay marriage debate, 
but will likely taper out as the younger and less religious replace the older and more religious 
members of society. 
 
Political Affiliation: 
 There is good reason to think that Maine, like Vermont, is home to two different 
kinds of people: the “two Maines” phenomenon, if you will.  The first Maine is conservative 
and traditional, while the second is liberal and progressive.  Some observers also note a 
libertarian streak in the upper Northeast states with a tradition of respecting the individual 
rights of others.21  For this reason, political party affiliation can be misleading, as it was in 
Vermont.  The Democrats in both these states are very likely to be moderate and conservative 
democrats, a group that views gay marriage unfavorably.  In the 2006 election, just under one 
million Mainers voted and that total was almost evenly divided into Democrats, Republicans, 
and Un-enrolled (Independents), with a smaller number of people voting for the Independent 
Green party.22  The ‘un-enrolled’ group was in fact the largest bloc, indicating that using 
party affiliation per se as a gauge for gay marriage support would be deceptive in Maine.  
Political persuasion could be leveraged in the case of a people’s veto (assuming the law 
passes) if the Republican and conservative Democratic lawmakers who voted for LD 1020 go 
back to their constituents and explain to them why they voted as they did.  This could act like 
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the “scrutiny period” for the Massachusetts legislature, in which opinions and ideas are 
exchanged, but for the people who would vote to reverse a gay marriage law instead of the 
legislature.  On the other hand, the same leverage could be used to mobilize voters of similar 
political party identification to vote to repeal a gay marriage law in a people’s veto.  In either 
case, political affiliation could affect gay marriage law, particularly after its passage. 
 
Political Structures 
 Unlike in the other three case studies, the Maine Supreme Court has not been 
particularly involved in the gay marriage debate, which means that the political structures of 
concern for this part of the model are Maine’s legislature and its constitutional procedures.  
The Maine House of Representatives has 151 members in the 124th session: ninety-five 
Democrats, fifty-five Republicans, and one Un-enrolled member.23  The Senate has thirty-
five members, with twenty Democrats and fifteen Republicans.24  Democratic control of both 
houses means that the leadership of both chambers s also Democratic, and the Speaker of the 
House, Hannah Pingree, is a co-sponsor of the gay marriage bill.  The Senate President, 
Elizabeth Mitchell, has not taken a public stance on the bill, but given a strong civil 
libertarian trend and previous advocacy for gay rights, it is not unreasonable to conclude that 
Mitchell will support the gay marriage bill.  Of the sixty co-sponsors to Damon’s gay 
marriage bill, eight are Democratic senators, while the other fifty-two are representatives, 
fifty of whom are Democrats.  The only Republican representatives sponsoring the bill are 
Robert W. Nutting of Oakland and Meredith N. Strang-Burgess of Cumberland.25  The 
partisan nature of the sponsorship of the bill may not be identical when it comes to the actual 
vote, but the party divisions are nonetheless telling.   
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Maine’s domestic partnership provisions are extremely limited, which indicates that 
Representative Damon’s bill challenges the marriage paradigm profoundly.  Unlike 
Vermont’s gay marriage legislation, which is based on a strong civil unions foundation, 
Maine is essentially acting on the examples set by Massachusetts, Vermont, and Connecticut.  
In other states, the lack of pro-gay marriage mandate from a supreme court would make the 
passage of such legislation less likely, but because Maine is so close to the gay marriage 
states, the proximity may offset the lack of court intervention.  Other New England states 
with similar demographic and political profiles have provided an example to Maine, which in 
some respects gives the Maine legislature reason to act on the Massachusetts Judicial Court 
decision in Goodridge.  California has a distinctly different set of demographic and political 
factors than those of New England states, meaning that it needed its own judicial mandate, 
while Maine can “adopt” the mandate from Goodridge.  The legislature runs less of a risk in 
supporting the gay marriage law on these grounds, assuming it is addressed this session, 
because any lawmakers up for re-election will have more than a year’s buffer in between a 
yea vote and that 2010 election.  In addition, because legislators will not have to be 
conducting their own campaigns at the close of the session, they can actively work on behalf 
of whatever position they took on LD 1020 in between a vote and a potential people’s veto.  
As mentioned in the “political affiliation” section, this buffer could provide a scrutiny period 
for voters so that they would not vote to repeal the gay marriage bill.  Of course, if it does not 
pass the legislature, a scrutiny period for the people would be unnecessary.  
At this point, there is very little evidence of how lawmakers will vote on LD 1020, 
with the exception of its sixty sponsors.  While a few others have come out in support of or 
opposition to the bill, a complete picture of where each lawmaker falls is not available.  A 
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telling remark from Kris Mineau of the Massachusetts Family Institute indicates what the 
future of the bill might be.  In an interview he noted, “There’s no doubt that [gay marriage 
advocates are] making progress in the legislatures.   They have wisely targeted the New 
England states, because of their progressive stance on social issues.”26  Mineau’s observation 
buttresses the earlier argument that Maine and other New England states have adopted the 
Goodridge position as their own, thus making a legislative approach rather than a judicial 
one not only feasible but also potentially successful.  Given the number of sponsors, House 
and Senate leadership support of the bill, and the Democratic advantage in the legislature, LD 
1020 has a good chance of passage.  The possibility exists that Governor Jim Baldacci could 
veto the bill, but there is insufficient evidence at this point to make such a speculation.  
In Maine, it is highly unlikely that a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage 
would pass because it would require a two-thirds vote by both houses of the legislature 
before going to the people for ratification.  Fifty-three representatives, including the main 
sponsor Damon, support gay marriage openly as indicated by their willingness to co-sponsor 
LD 1020.  With 151 members, fifty-three opponents of such an amendment already puts a 
two-thirds majority out of reach, if barely, without considering how many more may support 
the gay marriage bill later.  There is no process for citizen-initiated amendments to the 
constitution in Maine, leaving such a revision entirely up to a legislative body that does not 
appear poised to do so.  Thus, the remaining option to ensure gay marriage remains illegal in 
Maine would be to use the people’s veto.  Article IV, Section 17 of the Constitution of Maine 
establishes the people’s veto: 
Upon written petition of electors, the number of which shall not be less than 10% 
of the total vote for Governor cast in the last gubernatorial election preceding the 
filing of such petition, and addressed to the Governor and filed in the office of 
the Secretary of State by the hour of 5:00 p.m., on or before the 90th day after the 
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recess of the Legislature… requesting that one or more Acts, bills, resolves or 
resolutions, or part or parts thereof, passed by the Legislature but not then in 
effect by reason of the provisions of the preceding section, be referred to the 
people…27 
 
In short, people submit an application to gather the requisite number of signatures in order to 
get the issue at hand on a ballot to be voted upon by the population-at-large.* 
 Opponents of the anti-discrimination legislation that would have offered certain 
protections to gay people, employed this tactic successfully for several election cycles.  If 
there is one variable likely to derail the gay marriage law, I anticipate that the people’s veto 
would be it.  The veto does not have the weight of the more permanent constitutional 
amendment, and thus people can vote strictly on the issue and not on the constitutional 
implications.  Opponents of gay marriage can argue compellingly that the veto is a 
profoundly democratic mechanism, while not irrevocably impeding the legalization of gay 
marriage.  This gives advocates of such legislation the ability to continue an educational and 
lobbying campaign for gay marriage, as they did with the anti-discrimination bill, until they 
achieve success in both the legislature and among the populace.  While there will 
undoubtedly be disaffected parties at some point in this process, people’s veto is perhaps the 
best way of ultimately legalizing gay marriage because it creates a consensus among the 
legislature and the population. 
Variables 
 Though it has already been briefly discussed, the shared media outlets for New 
England undoubtedly affected the willingness of lawmakers to address gay marriage in 
Maine.  Many Massachusetts newspapers are widely distributed outside of the Bay state, and 
                                                
* The 2006 Gubernatorial Election would provide the basis for the 10% rule.  There were 550,865 votes cast for 
governor that year, which means that 5,587 signatures would be required to place a people’s veto on the ballot 
in 2010. 
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thus Mainers would have been aware of the extensive coverage of Goodridge and its 
aftermath.  Similarly, the events in Maine and other New England states get back to 
Massachusetts residents, the vast majority of whom have comfortably settled into the new 
marriage paradigm.  The exchange of experiences between these states is perhaps unique to 
New England and increases the chances that as one does, so too will the others.  Another 
variable may be the aforementioned recently released report from the Williams Institute 
about the economic benefits of legalizing gay marriage.  In a time of severe economic 
concerns, a law that would bring in funding without cost to the state is appealing, perhaps 
even to those who would have been hesitant to support same-sex marriages, or at least want 
to address the issue as soon as possible to move onto other items. 
 
Conclusion and Prediction 
 The gay marriage issue in Maine shares some important traits with Vermont and 
Massachusetts dealt with the same challenges.  In all three states, the legislatures were the 
primary architects of same-sex union legislation and provided the necessary buffer between 
the courts and the people to successfully legalize gay marriage.  The barriers in place to 
prevent constitutional amendments all rested with the legislatures, which were unwilling to 
so dramatically preserve heterosexual marriage when the issue came before them.  The 
similar demographic profiles, particularly with regard to religion, are another commonality 
between these three states.   These profiles provide the foundation for the “tolerant citizenry,” 
which acclimated to same-sex unions in Massachusetts and Vermont, and very well may 
react similarly in Maine, though that will not be known until polls and surveys are conducted.  
The only reason Maine may not legalize same-sex unions outright is because it has a people’s 
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veto, a political tool not available to residents of Massachusetts and Vermont.  This veto is 
more reminiscent of the California Proposition 8 rejection of gay marriage, though the 
consequences of the Maine veto are not as permanent or extreme.  
 Maine will legalize gay marriage this legislative session and opponents of the law 
will gather enough signatures to put a people’s veto on the ballot for the next election.  At 
this point, I have insufficient data to venture a definitive guess on the outcome of the 
people’s veto, and there are strong reasons to believe in either possible outcome.  For 
opponents of gay marriage, they are sufficiently passionate and organized to assemble the 
requisite number of signatures and get the issue to the ballot and then allow people to vote 
for themselves.  Proponents of gay marriage, however, can take comfort in the fact that it is 
very difficult to get so many signatures in only ninety days, and there would be time for a 
“scrutiny period,” during which activists could work to persuade people not to repeal the law. 
Ultimately, I think a veto will be on the next ballot and depending on how activists use the 
intervening time, the veto will either barely pass and then be defeated when the legislature re-
approves gay marriage, or proponents of gay marriage will defeat the veto the first time.  In 
either case, gay marriage will be legal in Maine by 2012.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
“I have no doubt we shall win, but the road is long, and red with monstrous martyrdoms.” 
 -Oscar Wilde in a letter to George Ives 
 
“The world only spins forward. We will be citizens. The time has come.” 
 -Prior Walker in Tony Kushner’s Angels in America 
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 Less than a week after Iowa became the first state outside of New England to legalize 
gay marriage, Vermont became the first state in the country to do so by legislative action and 
not a judicial mandate.  Evan Wolfson, executive director of Freedom to Marry, the national 
advocacy group behind gay marriage, responded to the week’s events in an article for the 
New York Times: “Contrary to the claims made by the opponents of equality, it’s not just 
judges, it’s not just the coasts, and it’s not just going away.”1  Many people who oppose gay 
marriage do no conceive of themselves as “opponents of equality,” but rather traditionalists 
who do not see why same-sex couples ought or need to be married when marriage, for all of 
recent history, has been between a man and a woman.  This viewpoint seems to be losing 
ground, however, and Wolfson’s observation that gay marriage initiatives are beginning to 
succeed regardless of where or by what means, marks the start of a genuine shift to a new, 
more inclusive definition of marriage.  The country is a long way away from national 
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legalization of marriage, but every state that has gay marriage is dropping a stone into a pool 
with far-reaching ripples.   
 
Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
 The goal of this paper was to understand what states are more likely to legalize gay 
marriage.  To this, I used a framework of analysis that employed a number of factors related 
to the subject.  The first part dealt with demographics, and four particular traits that have 
been shown to affect how groups with those characteristics generally feel about gay 
marriage. Based on national public opinion data from the Pew Research Center and the Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life, I determined that age, gender, religious affiliation, and 
political party affiliation were the four demographic traits that were both consistently tracked 
and likely to have variation of opinion toward gay marriage.  Age data indicates that younger 
people are more supportive of gay marriage and as people get older, they become generally 
less supportive.  When it comes to gender, women are surprisingly more supportive of gay 
marriage than men are.  By far the most influential demographic trait is religious affiliation, 
particularly for evangelical Christians.  Pew studies repeatedly show that religion is the 
driving force behind most opposition to gay marriage, and no group of any demographic 
identification matches the opposition of evangelical Protestants in this regard.  The final trait, 
political party affiliation, indicates that conservative Republicans are more likely to oppose 
gay marriage and feel strongly about their opposition, while the only political group in which 
a majority supports gay marriage is liberal Democrats.  With these groupings and trends in 
mind, I next considered political structures and their role in the gay marriage process. 
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 Political institutions are the second part of the framework, and can be state courts, 
legislatures, elected officials, or constitutions.  The state supreme courts were the most 
obvious institution to consider, given that in each case study, the state supreme court was 
directly involved in the outcome.  As the government arm charged with interpreting matters 
of the constitution, upon which much of the gay marriage argument rests, initiatives to 
legalize same-sex marriages will be deeply tied to the courts.  The state legislatures are 
usually involved as well, though to varying degrees.  Lawmaking is the purview of the 
legislature, and thus laws and amendments related to gay marriage will probably end up in 
the legislature somehow.  The leadership of different elected officials, from Speakers of the 
House to governors, often steers an initiative in a direction it might not have gone and 
changes the ultimate result.  Finally, the procedures established by the state constitutions for 
lawmaking, court authority, and amendment processes provide the foundation upon which 
the gay marriage battle is waged.  In many cases, slight differences between one state’s 
constitution and another’s can have a profound effect on the outcome.   
 Finally, there are state-specific variables that also change the character of a gay 
marriage initiative.  These variables are the third part of the framework and provide a flexible 
context in which to consider the demographics and political structures.  Not every state 
addresses gay marriage in the same environment or with the same tools that the others do, 
and this variables section accounts for those differences.  A handful of factors could be in 
play, including timing, finances, particular individuals, and/or geographic location. 
To test the framework, I used three case studies – Massachusetts, Vermont, and 
California – and compared the processes in those states with their respective outcomes.  
What emerged was a series of interrelated factors that seemed to make gay marriage more 
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likely to be legalized than to be defeated or banned.  In Massachusetts, the state Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled in Goodridge v. Public Health that there was no constitutional rationale 
for excluding same-sex couples from marrying, and mandated that the legislature re-write the 
state’s marriage laws to include same-sex couples in whatever way it saw fit to do so.  In 
response to the ruling, a backlash from the people resulted in a signed petition for the 
legislature to consider a constitutional amendment that would ban gay marriage.  Over the 
course of more than three years, the legislature stalled and then finally voted the amendment 
down in the second of two consecutive legislative sessions.  Since then, same-sex marriages 
have become a largely accepted part of life in Massachusetts with no adverse consequences.  
Vermont did not legalize gay marriage the first time it was given a chance to, and instead 
created a parallel construct called civil unions, which afforded all of the benefits associated 
with marriage to same-sex couples without the title.  There was vicious argument in the 
public sphere about the civil unions law while lawmakers debated it, and after it was passed, 
many of the supportive lawmakers were voted out of office because of their votes.  (Despite 
the backlash, however, civil unions remained the law until recently, when the state legislature 
legalized full marriage for same-sex couples.)  A ban on gay marriage is still in effect in the 
third case study, California, which voted in November 2008 to add a clause to the California 
constitution that made marriage strictly between one man and one woman.  Proposition 8 
came in response to a California Supreme Court ruling that the state Civil Code, which also 
limited marriage to between one man and one woman, was unconstitutional.  Opponents of 
gay marriage gathered enough signatures to put the issue to the people, who voted in favor of 
Proposition 8’s ban on same-sex marriages. 
C. Madigan 
 
 
144 
Applying the framework to the accounts from those three states allowed me to 
identify the factors that impacted the outcome of the particular gay marriage initiative.  By 
comparing those factors from all three states, several commonalities revealed themselves.  In 
the two states that legalized same-sex unions, Massachusetts and Vermont, the state supreme 
court initiated the legalization and gave the legislature minimum leeway to interpret the legal 
consequences of those rulings.  Furthermore, the rulings indicated that the next step rested 
with the legislatures.  In California, on the other hand, the ruling in In Re Marriage Cases did 
not specifically endorse gay marriage or involve the legislature.  Rather, the court left the 
door open for the people to amend the constitution by ballot initiative alone.  Without the 
legislature acting as an intermediary between the courts and the people, Californians were 
free to act on their emotional and defensive opposition to gay marriage, whereas the 
legislature would have been obligated to consider a broader range of issues had it been 
involved.  Furthermore, an affirmative ruling on gay marriage from the state supreme court 
makes two demographic realities into less of a liability for the pro-gray marriage campaigns.  
The first is that the group that is most likely to support gay marriage, young people, is also 
the least likely to vote, and people who support gay marriage also tend to feel less strongly 
about their position, while opponents tend to feel very strongly about their position.  
Another related factor is that of state constitutional amendment procedures.  In 
Massachusetts and Vermont, to amend the state constitutions would require legislators to 
support such an amendment in two and four consecutive legislative sessions, respectively.  
Those are stringent requirements, unlike in California, where an amendment can be included 
by a simple majority vote of the people and bypass the legislature altogether.  Had the 
California Supreme Court ruled that adding the marriage amendment to the constitution 
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qualified as a constitutional revision rather than just an amendment, and therefore must also 
pass the legislature, gay marriage would still be legal there.  All three case studies had 
progressive, Democrat-led legislatures with officials that proved at least hesitatingly open to 
same-sex unions.  In Iowa, where the supreme court just ruled that gay marriage was legal, 
there is also a two-consecutive sessions rule for constitutional amendments, and one that can 
only be initiated by the legislature, which appears unlikely to do so.  Based on this evidence, 
it is logical to conclude that in order to increase a gay marriage initiative’s likelihood of 
success, advocates should target states with Democratic legislatures, progressive supreme 
court justices, and stringent requirements for constitutional amendments that keep the issue 
away from the people as long as possible.  The longer that individuals have time to adjust to 
the idea of gay marriage, my “scrutiny period,” the more likely it is that they will accept 
those unions. 
Giving people time to reconcile their views of gay marriage with a new reality only 
works when a sufficient number of people are disposed toward acceptance.  A state with a 
large number of evangelical Christians and conservative Republicans is unlikely to docilely 
come to terms with gay marriage just because the state courts said they should.  Of course, a 
state with such a staunchly traditionalist character probably would not have progressive 
justices or liberal legislatures, so that scenario is highly improbable.  In more moderate or 
liberal states, however, people still generally do not support gay marriage in large numbers, 
but it seems that if approximately forty-percent (no less than thirty-eight percent) of the 
people are supportive and a large percentage is unsure, a state has the demographic profile of 
a “tolerant citizenry.”  A tolerant citizenry tends to be cautiously open to the idea of gay 
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marriage or, because the people are unsure, can become accepting when they see that there 
are no negative ramifications for their families or society-at-large. 
 
The Next Steps 
Based on the conclusions drawn from the three case studies, I made a prediction 
about what would happen in Maine, where the state legislature is holding hearings in April 
2009 about a proposed bill that would legalize gay marriage.  For Maine, and Vermont’s 
legislation that fully legalized gay marriage, Goodridge is an adopted court ruling.  Their 
own courts did not have to positively initiate gay marriage proceedings because 
Massachusetts, Vermont, and Maine are so similar that the ruling of one could act as a 
surrogate to the others.  Consequently, Maine was able to go straight to the legislative 
process where chances are good that the bill will pass.  Democrats are the majority in both 
chambers and the Democratic leadership supports the bill.  If the bill passes the legislature, it 
may face two hurdles: a veto from the governor or a people’s veto.  In the case of the latter, 
opponents of the gay marriage bill could gather enough signatures in the ninety days after the 
bill passes to put the issue to the people.  A majority vote to repeal would mean that the 
legislature, if willing, would have to take the bill up again.  The process would repeat until 
opponents fail to get enough signatures or a veto is voted down.  Regardless of the precise 
steps, I believe Maine will legalize gay marriage by 2012. 
As for the rest of the country, Iowa may prove to be a critical turning point in this 
process because it represents a new frontier for the gay marriage discourse.  Iowa is not in 
New England which, though obvious, marks a move away from the “gay enclave” talk that 
opponents of gay marriage use to isolate the Northeast’s openness to same-sex couples.  By 
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the end of 2012, I anticipate that all of New England will have fully legalized marriage for 
same-sex couples, as will California, New York, and New Jersey.  The supreme court-to-
legislature-to acceptance model is by no means the only route but it is has proven to be 
successful in the current political and cultural domain.  As more states expand marriage laws, 
however, there will be less of a need for courts to act as the provocateurs of these issues.  The 
New England example is a microcosm of this effect: Massachusetts served as an example to 
its demographically and politically similar neighbors.  That trend will continue and I would 
not shy from guessing that by 2018, at least fifty percent of states will have legalized gay 
marriage.  
State-recognized marriages would mean much more if the federal government also 
recognized them and thereby provided those couples with the rights and benefits associated 
with marriage.  Though legally married same-sex couples receive state benefits, they are still 
excluded from more than one thousand federal marriage benefits.  From this standpoint, 
marriage is largely symbolic for gay couples.  As far the government is concerned, their 
relationships do not exist, and marriage and civil unions amount to the same entity; neither is 
recognized as legally valid by federal law.  On March 3, 2009, Gay and Lesbian Advocates 
and Defenders, the firm responsible for Goodridge, Baker, and several other gay rights 
lawsuits in New England states, filed the paperwork in Boston’s Federal District Court to 
challenge Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act.  According to GLAD’s website: 
 Section 3 of DOMA applies to the federal government only. It overrides a state’s 
determination that a same-sex couple is married and says that they are not 
married for purposes of all federal laws and programs, even though the federal 
government has always deferred to state determinations of marital status. Under 
this law, “the word ‘marriage’ means only the legal union of a man and a woman 
as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”  This lawsuit challenges the federal 
government's denial of marriage-related protections and benefits to legally 
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married Massachusetts same-sex couples, protections and benefits that are 
available to all other legally married couples.2 
 
This lawsuit does not challenge the DOMA in order to force all states to have gay marriage 
but rather would require the federal government to recognize those marriages in states that 
have legalized them.  If this lawsuit succeeds, it would dramatically change the nature of gay 
marriage for same-sex couples and move the country towards legalization.  By choosing only 
to challenge Section 3, GLAD recognizes that the Supreme Court is probably not prepared to 
rule for universal gay marriage and a premature challenge would do far more harm than 
good. 
 
Conclusion 
 There are lessons to be drawn from this paper about gay marriage, as such, and I have 
laid those out at length.  In many respects, though, gay marriage is just one example of how 
politics and people, or perhaps more broadly, culture, interact in the United States.  The way 
in which different states have dealt with gay marriage speaks volumes about the very nature 
of American democracy.  Which comes first, political institutions or culture?  Which defines 
or leads the other?  They both march in close step, of that one can be sure.  One cannot get 
too far out of line without being reigned in by the other.  Ultimately, though, it strikes me 
that institutions lead culture; they must always be just a little more ahead so that culture is 
constantly called to become more aware and more inclusive.  Brown v. Board challenged 
deeply-seated tenets of American society because the political institutions recognized that, 
left up to the people, segregation and discrimination against black people would continue far 
longer than it already had.  Opponents of gay marriage have almost exhausted their 
resources; they cannot conceivably make gay marriage any more illegal than it already is, 
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which means that the only way for the pendulum to swing is toward equal marriage.  There 
cannot be a decisive push by all of American political institutions to make that change 
happen, and many political bodies are far from willing or able to do that right now.  But in 
the right places, with the right people, institutions are laying the groundwork for the 
realization of another civil right in the United States of America.   
                                                
1 Abby Goodnough, “Gay Rights Groups Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push,” New York 
Times, April 7, 2009. 
2 GLAD, “DOMA Means Federal Discrimination Against Married Same-Sex Couples,” 
http://www.glad.org/doma/lawsuit/ Accessed April 10, 2009. 
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